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8Summary
Many people in South Sudan and northern Uganda—like others around 
the world—see boundaries and borders as a potential source of clarity, 
security and conflict prevention. Political and economic ambitions, along 
with fears of discrimination or exclusion from land lead to the promotion 
of more rigid boundaries, both on the ground and between groups of 
people. The prevalence of such discourse reflects a picture first imagined 
by colonial officials, in which the peoples of this region live in discrete 
ethnic territories, organized into patrilineal descent groups and governed 
by their own decentralized administrations. In such a picture, it might 
indeed seem that demarcating clear boundaries and borders between 
various territories would resolve the tensions and conflicts that surround 
them.
A different picture emerges, however, from a detailed exploration of 
the intricate histories and present realities of demography, ecology, liveli-
hoods, social relations and land governance in South Sudan and northern 
Uganda. Historically, there is said to have been popular unease here 
with the moral and spiritual implications of trying to demarcate fixed 
boundaries in the soil. Moreover, transhumant pastoralism depends on 
negotiating access to land controlled by others, rendering the delimita-
tion of clear and fixed borders impractical. Drawing boundaries between 
clans and tribal sections is also impossible because settlements are 
widely interspersed with other clans and sections. Although clans and 
sections are defined in a language of patrilineal kinship, they have always 
absorbed outsiders into their lineages and co-residential communities. 
Oral histories reveal the extent of migration and shifting identities. 
Practices of assimilation and intermarriage have worked to overcome 
boundaries rather than to create them. After all, being able to cross 
borders during recurrent wars and violent conflicts has been vital for 
survival. 
There is, however, a paradox. Greater peace in some parts of this 
region seems to have brought new conflict over land and boundaries 
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in the past decade. Multiple factors are at work here, including urban-
ization and uneven population densities driven by processes of return 
and patterns of service delivery and economic activity. Many people in 
South Sudan and northern Uganda are well aware of the wider context 
in Sudan and eastern Africa, where conflict over land and land grabbing 
are prevalent concerns. In their own countries, anticipated development 
and commercial exploitation drive perceptions of the changing value 
of land. The processes of government decentralization, begun in the 
1990s, also play a key role in growing conflict over land. Local govern-
ment officials and politicians may have an interest in promoting the idea 
of ethnic territorial units to garner popular support and increase their 
control of land and natural resources. Local land governance institu-
tions—whether state-related, customary or the more common hybrid 
arrangements—derive revenue and power from both land transactions 
and disputes over land. 
It would be mistaken, however, to see increasing land disputes as simply 
the result of top-down control and manipulation. In an atmosphere of 
growing uncertainty and insecurity over land rights, there is also bottom-
up demand for greater security and dispute resolution. Many people in 
South Sudan and northern Uganda are seeking to secure their own land 
rights through various mechanisms, whether through written documen-
tation, the purchase of leasehold titles or by asserting customary rights 
to land through historical narratives and genealogical claims. Unsurpris-
ingly, their efforts can easily become attempts at exclusion on the same 
basis, creating yet more disputes and conflicts over land and boundaries.
Attempts to privatize land rights or assert more exclusionary defini-
tions of customary land rights have been aided by national land reforms, 
which promote legal clarity and simultaneously impose simplified defini-
tions of customary rights. External interventions in land governance 
have tended to support legal and policy processes, failing to adequately 
consider the implementation of statutory approaches on the ground. 
At the local level, it is evident that national laws and policies are being 
interpreted with varying degrees of accuracy, as well as being selectively 
adopted and adapted in combination with customary principles. These 
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processes both rely on the cooperation of customary authorities and local 
governments and create competitions between them. This demonstrates 
a hybrid approach to land governance that is not amenable to being 
reduced to a legal or statutory form. 
There is a danger that the national discourses on land in South Sudan 
and northern Uganda entail a simplification, and at times a distortion, 
of the more complex and fine-grained customary definitions of rights. 
In these discourses, ethnicity becomes problematic shorthand for identi-
fying land rights and determining territorial belonging and boundaries. 
It is also assumed that those rights can be converted into property rights 
through processes of registration. The attempt to turn customary land 
rights into property rights, however, is not a straightforward translation 
or recording process but entails the denial and misrepresentation of 
bundles of overlapping rights, claims and obligations, which are then 
converted into an exclusive right of ownership. Customary land gover-
nance must not simply be understood in terms of rights but also in terms 
of the obligations and reciprocities that have enabled people to access 
the various kinds of land and natural resources within and between the 
territories associated with particular lineage groups. Historical knowl-
edge of such customs is a valuable resource for negotiating and perhaps 
preserving or reviving the generosity and reciprocity that elders often 
idealize in narrating past practices of land allocations and access. 
Lessons can be learned in this regard from current practices, notably 
the attempts by chiefs’ courts in South Sudan and land committees in 
northern Uganda to negotiate compromise solutions to land disputes in 
order to avoid breaching family and social relations or displacing people 
from their land. These local-level institutions have been essential for 
reconciling the disparate and sometimes contradictory provisions of 
statutory law with customary land law. Such institutions are reasonably 
well known and recognized mechanisms for obtaining land and resolving 
land disputes. The chiefs, landlords, elders and other local authori-
ties, recognized by their district or county governments as legitimate 
spokespeople, brokers and adjudicators in land cases, serve to protect 
and negotiate community and individual land rights. 
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These systems are not without their problems, however. Some of their 
institutions and individuals are accused of corruption or incompetence. 
As their work has become more lucrative, they have become the focus 
for competing claims to authority and ownership of land. They also 
have unprecedented opportunities to gain power and profit from their 
positions. Consequently, a particular chief or landlord is not necessarily 
exercising legitimate or uncontested authority over community land nor 
may collective section or clan interests be an uppermost priority. This 
is likewise the case at the level of local government and administration.
Land governance, whatever laws and procedures it uses, tends to be 
skewed in favour of influential, powerful and wealthy members of local 
and national society. Changing laws or formulating policies will not in 
itself overturn this basic fact. Land is increasingly a focus of the tensions 
and inequalities in the broader political economies of South Sudan and 
northern Uganda. In this context, the most constructive responses are 
those that focus on strengthening the options and institutions for dispute 
resolution and remedying the grievances of those who are poor, vulner-
able or marginalized in the local political economy. The solution to most 
boundary conflicts is likely to be found in the practices of negotiation and 
mediation that have always characterized customary land governance, in 
particular the long-standing principles of managing multiple needs and 
rights in land. In South Sudan and northern Uganda, land and the multi-
layered rights, obligations and reciprocities related to its use constitute 
far more than property that can legally—or illegally—be bought and sold, 
from one owner to another.
12
1. Introduction 
In October 2015, the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, issued a decree 
increasing the number of states in the country from 10 to 28. This proved 
to be a highly contentious move, rejected by the opposition forces with 
which Kiir had recently signed a peace agreement and criticized by the 
international community, including IGAD, the EU, the UK, Norway and 
the United States on the grounds that it violated the peace agreement.1 
Meanwhile, tensions and conflicts had already erupted over the proposed 
state boundaries, with Nuer and Shilluk ethnic groups declaring that 
their ancestral land was being alienated to Dinka-controlled new states. 
Fighting also occurred between neighbouring Dinka sections in Warrap 
State over competing land claims, reportedly related to the proposed 
new state border.2
Kiir declared his move to be a response to a popular demand, in partic-
ular the need ‘to adopt a federal system of governance in the country’ 
and to devolve power to the people to ‘develop your locality, your home 
villages through mobilization of local and states resources’.3 The recep-
tion and immediate effects of the decree demonstrate the extent to which 
ethnic identity, communal land rights and territorial administrative units 
have become entwined. The same logic has driven the sub-division of 
local government areas into ever smaller and increasingly ethnically 
defined units in both South Sudan and Uganda since the 1990s. This logic 
is also reflected in the violent conflict that broke out earlier, in September 
1 Sudan Tribune, ‘IGAD says president Salva Kiir violates peace agreement’, 13 October 
2015. Accessed 10 January 2016, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article56708. 
2 Radio Voice of Hope, ‘New states border dispute leaves dozens dead, 
several wounded in Tonj’, 12 October 2015. Accessed 24 October 2015, http://
catholicradionetwork.org/?q=node/18968.
3 Sudan Tribune, ‘South Sudan president expands states to 28 as opposition accuses him 
of deal violation’, 2 October 2015. Accessed 14 October 2015, http://www.sudantribune.
com/spip.php?article56581; Sudan Tribune, ‘South Sudanese cabinet approves creation of  
28 states’, 14 October 2015. Accessed 10 January 2016, http://www.sudantribune.com/
spip.php?article56709. 
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2014, over the international border between Kajokeji County in South 
Sudan and Moyo District in Uganda, where the boundaries between clan 
lands were asserted as evidence of where the border should lie.
State and local government boundaries have become an increasingly 
important focus of ethnic tension and competing land claims. This can 
be linked to historical and contemporary processes of decentralization 
in Southern Sudan and Uganda, which have generated a fraught nexus 
of political authority, ethnic identity and land control. Decentralization 
processes have increased the political value of controlling land. At the 
same time, land has gained new and changing value from processes of 
urbanization and evolving settlement patterns, new opportunities for 
or anticipation of commercial land-use and rents, and reports of land 
grabbing by powerful actors and external investors in this region and 
beyond. This has contributed to growing fear among ordinary people that 
they might lose access to the land on which their livelihoods depend. 
To best understand these increasing disputes over land, it is necessary 
to recognize that individual access to land is largely inseparable from 
broader questions of territorial sovereignty, decentralized government, 
legal pluralism, economic changes, infrastructural development and 
service delivery. 
Just as land was a focus for mobilizing the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) rebellion against the Sudanese government 
in the 1980s and 1990s,4 there is a real risk that the widespread tensions 
over land and boundaries in this region, which have been emerging over 
the past decade, have a similar potential to feed larger-scale wars. There 
is, however, a critical lack of empirical research on the rapidly changing 
4 Sara Pantuliano, The land question: Sudan’s peace nemesis, London: Humanitarian 
Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, 2007; Øystein Rolandsen, ‘Land, Security 
and Peace Building in the Southern Sudan’, PRIO Paper, Oslo: International Peace 
Research Institute, December 2009; Douglas H. Johnson, ‘Decolonising the borders 
in Sudan: Ethnic territories and national development’, in Empire, development and 
colonialism: the past in the present, eds. Mark Duffield and Vernon Hewitt, London: 
James Currey, 2009.
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land tenure systems in South Sudan and northern Uganda.5 The nature 
of and changes in customary land law and governance in this region 
have rarely been subject to empirical research.6 Consequently, customary 
practices are frequently characterized in simplistic and largely inaccu-
rate terms as ‘communal’ or ‘community’ land tenure, and criticized as 
a patriarchal property system.7 Moreover, customary land governance 
is often assumed to operate separately from government institutions 
and statutory law, with little awareness of the overlapping, adaptive 
and hybrid institutions and laws of land governance that have instead 
emerged at the local level. Boundary conflicts are likewise simpli-
fied—assumed to be a result of ethnic tensions and disputes over tribal 
territories. In South Sudan ‘tribal clashes over land, water and cattle’ are 
said to be ‘common’.8 
This report attempts to redress the lack of empirical research on land 
governance in South Sudan and northern Uganda, with specific attention 
to South Sudan.9 It is based on 150 qualitative interviews with govern-
ment officials, chiefs, clan leaders and landlords, NGO employees, church 
5 Naomi Pendle et al., Local socio-political organization and implications for community-
driven development in South Sudan: an analysis of existing literature, London: London School of 
Economics, 2013.
6 A notable exception is the discussion of customary land tenure in the mapping 
tool developed by Human Rights Focus (HURIFO). See: Julian Hopwood and Ronald 
R. Atkinson, ‘Final Report: Land Conflict Monitoring and Mapping Tool for the Acholi 
Sub-Region’, Gulu, Uganda: Human Rights Focus and United Nations Peacebuilding 
Programme in Uganda, 2013.
7 For example, see: ‘South Sudan: country profile’, Oxfam Canada, February 2013. 
Accessed 1 December 2015, http://www.oxfam.ca/sites/default/files/imce/country-
profile-south-sudan.pdf; and ‘Country profile: Property rights and resource governance, 
South Sudan’, USAID, 2013. Accessed 1 December 2015, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/
pnaeb888.pdf.
8 Thomson Reuters Foundation, ‘Briefing: South Sudan crisis’, 29 July 2014. Accessed 
12 September 2015, http://www.trust.org/spotlight/South-Sudan-decides/?tab=briefing. 
9 This report is not intended as a representative, comprehensive or conclusive study 
of land governance in South Sudan and northern Uganda, either in its methodology or 
scope but instead offers a starting point for further research.
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leaders and a wide range of men and women of all ages.10 It also draws 
on documentary and archival material. The interviews were conducted 
in two different and geographically distant areas—the Kajokeji–Moyo 
border area straddling the international border between South Sudan and 
10 The majority of these interviews were conducted between 2013 and 2014 on the 
condition of anonymity. The aim of these interviews was to learn from the expertise 
of existing land authorities and from the experience and views of different types of 
respondents in order to better understand the nature of customary land law and the 
current and past practices of actual land governance in the two case study areas. Some 
of these interviews were conducted in Dinka, Kuku or Madi and translated into English, 
which is indicated in relevant references.
BOX 1. ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES AND 
GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH SUDAN AND UGANDA
In South Sudan, chiefs are traditional authorities recognized by 
national law as the primary authority at the lowest level of local 
government, the boma (village). They have courts at the boma, payam—
the second lowest administrative division, below counties—and 
sometimes county levels. Payams are headed by administrators and 
the county government is headed by a county commissioner. These 
local government structures fall under the newly introduced 28—
formerly 10—state governments in South Sudan, which are headed by 
governors.
In Uganda, chiefs are not traditional authorities but civil servants 
appointed to run sub-counties. Uganda has a five-tier structure of 
decentralized local government, with local councils (LCs) at village, 
parish, sub-county, county and district levels. The national government 
appoints a resident district commissioner (RDC) alongside the elected 
district council. Originally structures of the movement system under the 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) government, the LC 3 and LC 
5 (sub-county and district council) are now elected through the multi-
party system.
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Uganda and Aweil East in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, South Sudan. Both 
areas have remained relatively peaceful in recent years but are witnessing 
an increase in disputes over land that bear striking commonalities. As 
such, these two areas provide contrasting contexts for developing a better 
understanding of and more in-depth insight about land governance. 
This report shifts attention away from the national legislation and 
policy with which much analysis and advocacy in South Sudan and 
Uganda has been preoccupied to explore instead the everyday initia-
tives, strategies, laws and mechanisms people have been using to assert 
or secure their rights to land. It examines the underlying factors that 
may be driving the proliferation of land and boundary conflicts in this 
region, with emphasis on their novelty. The report focuses on how local-
level government and customary authorities manage land transactions, 
define land rights and interpret statutory laws, and resolve disputes and 
conflicts. It also looks at the ways in which ordinary people navigate the 
challenges, opportunities and threats presented by the changing value 
of land and evolving local land governance mechanisms.
Kajokeji County (South Sudan) and  
Moyo District (Uganda)
The borderlands
Kajokeji County in South Sudan and neighbouring Moyo District in 
Uganda straddle the international border between the two countries. 
Both areas are very similar in landscape, lifestyles and livelihoods, which 
are characterized by mixed farming and livestock herding. Geographi-
cally, this is an area consisting of high plateaus and hills, with cultivable 
soil and high rainfall. The significant commonalities shared by Kajokeji 
County and Moyo District render the cross-border violence that came to 
a head in September 2014 all the more surprising. 
Kajokeji County, South Sudan
Kajokeji County forms one of the southernmost counties of the former 
Central Equatoria State (CES), on the western bank of the Nile. Although 
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only a short distance from the CES capital, Juba—also the national capital 
of South Sudan—poor roads to the north and west make Kajokeji County 
feel surprisingly remote from the rest of the state. The Kajokeji County 
administrative headquarters is in Mere. With the nearby market centre 
of Wudu, both towns form a small but expanding urban centre.
Kajokeji County is largely inhabited by Kuku but also has two distinct 
ethnic groups: Nyepo from the Bari area, who live in the northern epony-
mous payam; and Kakwa in the south-western payam of Liwolo, who are 
said to have migrated from the west. These societies are all organized 
by patrilineal clans associated with particular small territories, although 
clan members are also dispersed. Bari, Nyepo, Kakwa and Kuku all 
speak different dialects of the same language. Many Kajokeji County 
inhabitants speak Ma’di, too, an entirely different language. Some Kuku 
clans were originally Ma’di and have retained close relations with their 
clans to the east and south. Many Kuku families have intermarried with 
the Ma’di, and reside, trade and interact with the Ma’di of Moyo and 
Adjumani Districts in Uganda.
Kajokeji County was one of the first Equatorian areas to be captured 
by the SPLA in 1990 and was cut off from Juba, which was held by the 
Government of Sudan for the remainder of the civil war. Most of its 
population took refuge in Uganda during the civil war. A sizeable Kuku 
population remains there. So much so that the Kuku are listed as an 
ethnic group in Uganda. Kajokeji County has long been oriented towards 
Uganda for trade, employment, schooling and even medical care. Since 
2005, most refugees have returned to Kajokeji County, although many 
have kept their children in school in Uganda. 
Rural land in Kajokeji County is governed by the lineage structures and 
spiritual authorities of each clan, headed by a land custodian—commonly 
referred to as landlord in English. Land disputes that cannot be resolved 
by clan elders are handled by the hierarchy of chiefs’ courts, the highest 
of which is the county paramount chief ’s court in Mere. There is also a 
separate county court with a magistrate, who is a former chief. Private 
or government land sales or leases in urban and peri-urban areas involve 
clan landlords, leading chiefs and the county survey office. A county land 
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committee has also been formed to handle land disputes, which overlaps 
in personnel and practice with the chiefs’ courts. 
Moyo District, Uganda
Moyo District is situated in northern Uganda. It is named after its main 
town, Moyo, which is also the administrative headquarters. Only 12 miles 
or so of what is now a good murram (gravel) road separate the town 
of Moyo from the towns of Mere and Wudu in Kajokeji County. Moyo 
drops down very steeply to the Nile on its southern and eastern side, 
and more gradually to the rolling country of its western border with 
Yumbe District. 
Moyo District is largely inhabited by Ma’di. Like Kuku society, the 
Ma’di practice mixed agriculture and livestock-rearing, and are organized 
by patrilineal clans associated with particular small territories, although 
clan members are also dispersed. Many Ma’di speakers can also speak 
neighbouring languages, such as Lugbara, Acholi and Kuku.
After 1979, the population was displaced into Sudan—particularly into 
Kajokeji County—during Uganda’s conflicts, until the Sudanese civil war 
forced a return of the population in the late 1980s, along with Sudanese 
refugees. Both hosts and refugees in Moyo District faced continuing 
insecurity from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and other Ugandan 
rebel groups, along with incursions from the SPLA and the Sudanese 
army. Since 2006, peace has finally returned to the area after the 
Sudanese and Ugandan conflicts of preceding decades. Moyo District has 
seen some benefits from the recovery and development programmes in 
northern Uganda. Compared to Kajokeji, Moyo has better roads, schools 
and hospitals, and electricity supplies.
As in Kajokeji, rural land in Moyo is governed primarily by clan land 
custodians, elders and family heads. A variety of institutions have been 
involved in handling land disputes and transactions since 1998, including 
district land boards and tribunals. By 2014, land governance was, in 
practice, mostly conducted by village, parish or sub-county councils (LC 
1–3), including area land committees at the sub-county level.
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Aweil East County and Aweil Town (South Sudan)
Aweil East County—which became Aweil East state with the contested 
introduction of the 28 states in 2015—is situated in north-west South 
Sudan in the state of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal (NBG), at the opposite 
end of South Sudan from Kajokeji. It is on the border with Sudan. Aweil 
East County administrative headquarters are in Mabil. Aweil Town is the 
state capital of NBG (see Map 3).
Aweil East County is a largely rural cattle-keeping floodplain inhabited 
by Dinka subsistence agro-pastoralists who engage in both agriculture 
and transhumant pastoralism, moving cattle between lowland (toic), 
midland (gog-chel) and highland (gok) areas. The importance of cattle in 
Dinka society is reflected in the fact that the major socio-political sections 
are termed wut, which is the same word as ‘cattle-camp’, because its 
members jointly herd their cattle and share grazing and other resources. 
Since the colonial period, these sections have corresponded with the 
government-recognized chiefdoms, and more recently also with payams.
During the civil war (1983–2005), Aweil East County was severely 
affected by attacks from militias aligned with the Government of Sudan. 
Many people were killed and thousands displaced to present-day Sudan, 
within South Sudan or to neighbouring countries. From the late 1980s, 
the rural areas of NBG—including Aweil East County—were more or 
less controlled by the SPLM/A rebel forces, while Aweil Town remained 
under the control of the Government of Sudan. Since 2004, particularly 
around South Sudan’s independence in 2011, large numbers of returnees 
have come back to settle in Aweil Town and Aweil East County,11 creating 
rapid population growth in both urban, peri-urban and rural areas.  
Land in rural areas of Aweil East County is largely administered 
and governed by chiefs using customary law. In urban and peri-urban 
areas, land is administered and governed by several different and partly 
11 Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation, ‘Statistical 
Yearbook for Southern Sudan’, Juba: Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics 
and Evaluation, 2010. Accessed 14 March 2016, http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static
/f/750842/10009929/1293750138733/Statistics+Year+Book+2010+.pdf?token=fGymEGZn
0SXyngA9PxCxudJo1uQ%3D.
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competing authorities. In Aweil Town, the municipality and the State 
Ministry of Physical Infrastructure are key players in land governance. 
In peri-urban areas of Aweil East County, the county land authority, land 
commissions, different levels of the judiciary and chiefs and community 
leaders engage in land governance. Throughout Aweil East County and 
the whole of NBG, there are land disputes over residential plots, arable 
land, pasture and administrative boundaries. For example, the expansion 
of Aweil Town has created tensions between Aweil Municipality and 
Aweil Centre County over administrative control of new settlements. The 
boundaries between Aweil Municipality and the neighbouring counties, 
including Aweil East County, are also a source of contention. These 
different disputes are debated and addressed peacefully in a variety of 
formal and informal arenas of dispute resolution.
taBle 1. seCtions and suB-seCtions By PayaM in aweil 
east County, northern Bahr el-Ghazal
Payam Sections Sub-sections
Mangok
Dulit 
Wunding
Yargot Akanyjok
Wunlang
Apuoth
Hou Alueth
Kuathcuar
Mangartong
Pindung
Ajuongthi
Baac
Wunanei
Makuac
Madhol
Agur Piny
Ajuongdit
Malualbai
Lou
Wundeng
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2. Contesting the line: Conflict on the 
South Sudan–Uganda border
In September 2014, a conflict erupted between South Sudanese and 
Ugandans in the borderlands of Kajokeji County, South Sudan and Moyo 
District, Uganda. Several people were killed, a larger number injured and 
thousands displaced. The violence was reported as a conflict between the 
Ma’di of Moyo District and the Kuku of Kajokeji County. It was attributed 
to the long-term failure of government to define and demarcate this 
stretch of the international border. Government officials and citizens 
on both sides of the conflict emphasized that the only solution was an 
international border demarcation committee, which has been established 
by the two national governments. 
Not only has this border not been demarcated, but it has never been 
legally delineated on a map. The only existing legal definition of this 
border is a British Order of the Secretary of State for the Colonies issued 
on 21 April 1914, almost 100 years before the 2014 conflict. Described 
at the time as a provisional agreement, pending proper mapping and 
demarcation on the ground by the two colonial governments of Sudan 
and Uganda, the 1914 Order reflected the British decision to try to map 
the border onto an ethnic boundary between Kuku and Ma’di speakers, 
whose languages belong to different families—Nilotic and Sudanic, 
respectively. Part of the border was supposed to follow ‘the southern 
boundary of the Kuku tribe’, even though the then British undersecretary 
of state noted that such a boundary was ‘indefinite’.12 
Interestingly, in 1912 the governor of Uganda had proposed that a more 
suitable tribal boundary to follow would have been that between the 
Bari and Kuku, much further north of the subsequent boundary, on the 
grounds that the Kuku ‘speak a Bari patois, but fraternize with the Madi, 
12 H. J. Read for the Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office, letter to the Under-
Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 1 April 1914, London, The National Archives, UK 
(hereafter UKNA), WO 181/236.
 ContestinG the line 23
with whom they associate themselves for tribal purposes’.13 In 1960, the 
British administrator of the Madi–Moyo District—who had formerly 
administered Yei District in Southern Sudan—would similarly suggest 
that the Ma’di had closer relations with their northern neighbours in 
Sudan than with the centre of Uganda: ‘Had the wishes of the people 
instead of alien politicians drawn the boundary lines she [the district] 
would seem disposed naturally to look and bind towards the north, or 
the east, or to both.’14
Despite the governor’s recommendation having ultimately been 
ignored, it is primarily these close relations between Ma’di and Kuku 
that have characterized the history of this border since 1914. These close 
ties have also mitigated the lack of any subsequent formal demarca-
tion of the international boundary. Even at the height of the conflict in 
2014, people on both sides were quick to emphasize the long history 
of peaceful relations and intermarriage between Kuku and Ma’di, and 
the unprecedented nature of the recent troubles. Despite the common 
emphasis on border demarcation as the solution, the lack of a clearly 
demarcated border does not then in itself explain the conflict. This is 
reinforced by a century without such violent dispute over the unmarked 
border.
Rather, an explanation for the recent conflict lies in the way in which 
the border has become the focus for the tensions, pressures and competi-
tion over land and natural resources. These tensions have escalated over 
the past decade not only in these borderlands but in the wider region 
to which they belong and have politicized administrative and customary 
land boundaries in new ways. This is an analysis that many of those 
involved in the dispute also articulate:
13 F. J. Jackson, Governor of Uganda, letter to Mr Harcourt, Secretary of State, Colonial 
Office, Uganda, 14 March 1912, UKNA WO 181/236.
14 W.B.H. Duke, District Commissioner In Charge, Madi, ‘Madi District Annual Report 
1960’, Moyo, 29 January 1961, Makerere University Library Microfilms; also cited in Mark 
Leopold, ‘Crossing the line: 100 years of the north-west Uganda/South Sudan border’, 
Journal of Eastern African Studies 3/3 (2009), 464–78 (470).
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Basing it on historical background, the Kuku community 
sees the root cause to the misunderstanding as owing to land 
ownership rather than the international border. The community 
is equally aware that issues related to the international border 
are matters of sovereignty which it has no competence to 
discuss. It will therefore confine itself to its ancestral lands over 
which it exercises inalienable customary rights.15
The history of the Sudan–Uganda border has contributed to the particular 
way these recent tensions have played out in Kajokeji County and Moyo 
District in terms of the growing importance and intersection of national 
and ethnic identities, experiences of wartime cross-border displacement 
and the uncertainties of a shifting borderline.16 The use of historical 
narratives, communal identities and customary authorities to stake 
ancestral claims to land and assert political control of territory is more 
widespread, however, reflecting the changing political and economic 
value of land in the region as a whole.
A century of uncertainty
It is not surprising that there are such widely conflicting claims about 
the correct border line circulating in recent years. The Sudan–Uganda–
Congo borders were adjusted several times before 1914. The claims by 
some in Kajokeji County that the Sudan border used to extend right up 
to Lake Albert are historically grounded, though not legally relevant to 
the current border as defined in 1914. 
In the nineteenth century, the Turco–Egyptian government of Sudan 
extended its frontiers well into what is now northern Uganda, with a 
15 Kuku Community, ‘Position of the Kuku Community on the disputed land along the 
common border with neighbouring communities of Moyo and Yumbe Districts’, copied 
13 October 2014 at the Lefori sub-county local council 3 office, Lefori, Moyo District, 
Uganda.
16 Also see: Douglas H. Johnson, When boundaries become borders, London: Rift 
Valley Institute, 2010; and Christopher Vaughan, Mareike Schomerus and Lotje de Vries, 
eds., The Borderlands of South Sudan: Authority and Identity in Contemporary and 
Historical Perspectives, New York: Palgrave Macmillan USA, 2013.
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chain of government posts along the Nile north of Lake Albert. Following 
the collapse of Turco–Egyptian rule in Sudan, the region became a focus 
of the growing competition between the European imperial powers in the 
1880s and 1890s, resulting in the rather anomalous creation of the Lado 
Enclave, a large territory west of the Nile and north of Lake Albert that 
was leased to King Leopold II of Belgium for his lifetime. The Lado Enclave 
covered much of what would become the West Nile District of Uganda 
and Central Equatoria State in South Sudan. On King Leopold’s death in 
1909, this territory was once again transferred to Sudan, governed since 
1899 by the British as the Anglo–Egyptian Condominium of the Sudan. In 
1911, a Sudan government station was built at Kajokeji and from here the 
first British administrator, Captain Stigand—whose house still stands at 
the county headquarters in Mere—briefly governed the southern part of 
the Lado Enclave, including the modern-day Moyo District. 
This arrangement lasted only a few years. It was rapidly decided that 
colonial administrative control would be enhanced if both banks of the 
Nile were controlled by the same government.17 The territory east of the 
Nile, from Nimule northwards, previously held by Uganda, was handed 
to Sudan in exchange for the southern part of the old Lado Enclave, 
which became the West Nile District of Uganda. It was this exchange 
that necessitated the boundary agreement of 1914, which was devised by 
the Sudan–Uganda Boundary Commission in 1913. The commission, led 
by Captain Kelly, conducted an expedition to map the boundary. Due to 
time constraints, only around 30 per cent of the boundary was properly 
mapped—none of it to the west of the Nile. In this area, Kelly relied 
instead on second-hand information about the rivers in the area.18 The 
1914 Uganda Order therefore specified a line ‘following the thalweg of 
the Khor Kayu (Aju) upwards to its intersection with the thalweg of the 
Khor Nyaura (Kigura) thence following the thalweg of the Khor Nyaura 
17 Viscount H. H. Kitchener, Agent and Consul General, Cairo, letter to the Right 
Honourable Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Secretary, 27 October 1911, UKNA WO 181/236.
18 Captain H. H. Kelly, extracts from reports on Sudan–Uganda boundary rectification 
commission and reconnaissance to Boma plateau, in Sudan Intelligence Report 228 (July 
1913), UKNA WO 106/6225.
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(Kigura) upwards to its source: thence following the southern boundary 
of the Kuku tribe to the thalweg of the river Kaia’.19 The latter is now 
spelled ‘Kaya’ and forms an uncontested part of the boundary. The first 
stream is clearly the stream known in Kuku as the Kayo and in Ma’di 
as the Ayo. The Nyaura has subsequently been assumed to refer to the 
Nyawa stream—though more than one stream in the region takes that 
name. In reality, however, the Kayo and Nyawa do not meet.20 
As the then Sudan director of surveys explained, ‘No reliable map as 
yet exists of the portion of the boundary lying to the west of the Bahr 
el Jebel … and it is suggested that a definite settlement should stand 
over until a reliable map has been prepared.’21 The Sudan government 
only agreed to ‘the publication of the Order in question as a provisional 
measure, subject to such future amendment as circumstances may 
require’.22
Significantly for the recent conflict, the boundary was supposed to be 
wherever possible a tribal one. The boundary commission was instructed 
to identify a line that would avoid dividing any tribes and, to the west 
of the Nile, ‘separate the Bari speaking tribes from the Madi and the 
Lugware’.23 British colonial officials assumed African society to be neatly 
divided into ethno-linguistic, social and political entities that they termed 
‘tribes’. Yet the situation on the ground was often very different. Ethnic 
groups in northern Uganda and Southern Sudan were not political units, 
nor were they strictly divided or clearly bounded. The first British admin-
istrator in the region, Stigand, was obsessed with categorizing tribal 
19 His Majesty’s Government, Uganda Order of Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
21 April 1914, UKNA WO 181/236.
20 G. H. Blake, introduction to Imperial Boundary Making: the diary of Captain Kelly and the 
Sudan–Uganda Boundary Commission of 1913 (Oriental and African Archives) by H. H. Kelly, 
xxiv–xxv, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
21 Major Pearson, Sudan Director of Surveys, cited in Viscount H. H. Kitchener, 
Agent and Consul General, Cairo, letter to Right Honourable Sir Edward Grey, Foreign 
Secretary, 8 May 1914, UKNA WO 181/236.
22 Viscount H. H. Kitchener, Agent and Consul General, Cairo, letter to Right 
Honourable Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Secretary, 8 May 1914, UKNA WO 181/236.
23 Leopold, ‘Crossing the Line’, 469, citing Collins, ‘Sudan–Uganda Boundary’, 144.
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characteristics and distinctions.24 Nevertheless, his early descriptions of 
Kajokeji and what would become the Uganda borderlands emphasized 
the extent of migration and ethnic mixture, particularly around the edges 
of the district, where Kuku, Kakwa, Ma’di and Lugbara were living in 
intermingled settlements or close proximity.25
This is supported by oral histories on both sides of the border. Both 
Ma’di and Kuku are divided into small patrilineal clans, each with their 
own histories of migration to their present location.26 Some Kuku clans 
claim to have Ma’di origins and vice versa. Oral histories often focus 
on the friendly relations established between Bari and Ma’di-speaking 
migrants, forming the basis of the Kuku ethnic group.27 Despite the 
British attempt to create a tribal boundary, several clans exist on both 
sides of the border, their members identifying either as Kuku and South 
Sudanese or as Ma’di and Ugandan but acknowledging their common, 
exogamous clan membership. Most people in the borderlands speak 
both Kuku (Bari) and Ma’di languages fluently and there have long been 
extensive relations of marriage, migration and trade across the border.
Some of the migrations recalled in oral histories must have been 
relatively recent when Stigand established his administration in 1911. In 
particular, he claimed that the Kuku population used to extend further 
south and west than it did at the time but that the Kuku had been driven 
eastwards by the Kakwa and Lugbara, and that the Belgians had moved 
the Limi section of the Kuku north of the Kayo stream, to be nearer their 
24 Leopold, ‘Crossing the Line’, 469.
25 Chauncey H. Stigand, Equatoria: the Lado Enclave, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1923 
(new edition 1968), 75–6.
26 Also see: Tim Allen, ‘A flight from refuge: the return of refugees from southern 
Sudan to northwest Uganda in the late 1980s’, in Search of Cool Ground: War, Flight & 
Homecoming in Northeast Africa, ed. Tim Allen, London: James Currey, 1996, 223–24.
27 Interviews with female clan elder and her son, Wudu, Kajokeji County, 17 September 
2014; clan elder landlord, Lilye, Kajokeji County, 21 September 2014; and clan elder 
landlord, Mogiri, Kajokeji County, 23 September 2014. Also see: Tim Allen, ‘Social 
upheaval and the struggle for community: a study of the Ugandan Madi’, PhD thesis, 
University of Manchester, 1993, 72.
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station.28 This might explain the present-day claims of some Kuku border-
land clans that their ancestral lands extend south of the Kayo stream, 
which actually represents one of the most clearly defined stretches of 
the Uganda border in the 1914 agreement. More importantly, Stigand’s 
account reveals the extent of migrations and displacements at that time. 
The settlement patterns he observed in 1911–1914 represented a situation 
of considerable flux and exemplified the absence of clear territorial or 
even clan boundaries between tribes.
By defining part of the border as the southern limit of the Kuku tribe, 
the 1914 Order laid the basis for Kuku assertions a century later that their 
ancestral land claims are relevant to the definition of the border. The 
correspondence around the 1914 Order also made clear that this provi-
sion should only be a guide for an anticipated demarcation of the most 
convenient line, which might entail relocating settlements to create a 
clear border. Had this demarcation occurred, the 1914 Order might have 
little relevance at present. Instead, its emphasis on an ethnic definition 
resurfaced to deadly effect in 2014, placing customary land claims at the 
centre of the conflict. 
Administering an uncertain border
In the absence of a clearly defined or demarcated border, local government 
officials have repeatedly attempted to agree upon a workable administra-
tive boundary on the ground. In 1931, ‘the District Commissioner, Kajo 
Kaji and the District Commissioner, West Nile, without committing their 
respective governments, came to a “working arrangement” mutually 
acceptable to themselves’.29 As the then assistant district commissioner 
in Yei and Kajokeji, John Winder, later recalled:
Sitwell, the District Commissioner, West Nile District, Uganda 
and I decided we ought to carry out a border march and, 
28 Stigand, Equatoria, 69–92. Also see interview with two clan elder landlords, Wudu, 
Kajokeji County, 19 September 2014.
29 B.H. Bourdillon, Governor Uganda, letter to Governor-General of Sudan, 10 July 1933, 
UKNA FO 141/723/22.
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taking our chiefs with us, decide, provisionally, where the 
boundary was. … One of our troubles soon became apparent—
our maps did not agree. … Another of our troubles was to 
find sufficiently obvious points on our boundary. We blazed 
prominent trees and identified a number of rocky outcrops, 
and so managed to make the border pretty comprehensible to 
everyone.30
The district commissioners’ agreement became known as the Red Line 
in subsequent border negotiations between the Sudan and Uganda 
governments.31 It caused intense dispute, however, over its westernmost 
portion, just before it reached the River Kaya—the area that presently 
forms the border between Yumbe District of Uganda and Liwolo Payam 
of Kajokeji County in South Sudan. The people of Liwolo are typically 
described as Kakwa, although they are also considered to be part of the 
Kuku tribe because of their inclusion in Kajokeji County. 
In 1933, the Sudan government claimed that the Red Line had alienated 
the ancestral lands and sacred sites of these people by taking the border 
too far north. With some prescience, the then governor general of Sudan 
warned that this would only cause problems in the future:
If, as I understand to be the case, the Koisi river was, until 
about the beginning of the present century, the boundary 
dividing the Lugbari of Uganda on the south from the two 
closely interrelated communities commonly referred to by the 
collective title of ‘Kuku’, I must confess to grave misgiving as 
to the advisability of adopting a line of boundary which would 
award so large a proportion of this uninhabited area to the 
Lugbari and would deprive the Sudan tribes of the ancestral 
rain-making sites to which they attach so much importance. In 
saying this, I refer not only to the claims of the Gneelai but also 
30 John Winder, ‘Fifty Years On: Service in Mongalla Province, A–E Sudan 1930–33’ 
(1979), 22–23, Sudan Archive Durham 541/7/1–32.
31 This western Red Line should not be confused with the contemporaneous Glenday 
Red Line drawn to represent the northern limit of Turkana grazing in relation to the 
Sudan–Kenya–Ethiopia boundaries in the Ilemi area.
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to those of the Kambala, Mingale, Lowinya, Rorodo, Kunyoro 
and Loikur sections, and it appears to me that a settlement 
which omits to take account of these would contain an element 
of unfairness which could not fail to be a source of constant 
inconvenience in future years.32
The Sudan government therefore proposed a line as far south as Mount 
Midigo in order to include these Kakwa/Kuku lands in Sudan (see Map 
2). The Uganda government, however, objected to this. The governor of 
Uganda was willing to concede territory as far south of the Red Line as 
Lodwa Hill and Chei Hill (in return for Ma’di fishing rights on the Sudan-
controlled Nile) but not as far as Mount Midigo, where he reported 
that Ugandans had recently settled on the southern slopes. In another 
foreshadowing of the problems that would emerge many years later, he 
added ‘that the population of the West Nile District is increasing, and 
that the area now offered to the Sudan has a potential value as a region 
for future settlement’.33 
The issue remained unresolved. The next proposal from the Uganda 
government was instead that the Red Line be adopted as the border 
but that the Kakwa be offered the opportunity to migrate permanently 
to Uganda and settle with their relatives there.34 In 1936, the governor 
general of Sudan agreed to accept the Red Line ‘subject to detailed exami-
nation and exact demarcation by representatives of both Governments’.35 
This never took place and the Red Line was never formally recognized 
as the border or properly mapped, though the two governments had 
come close to adopting it in the mid–1930s. On the ground, however, it 
32 H. Macmichael, Civil Secretary, for Governor-General of Sudan, Khartoum, letter to 
B.H. Bourdillon, Governor of Uganda, 26 October 1933, UKNA FO 141/723/22.
33 B.H. Bourdillon, Governor Uganda, to Governor-General Sudan, 10 July 1933, UKNA 
FO 141/723/22.
34 B.H. Bourdillon, Governor Uganda, to Governor-General Sudan, 1 May 1935, UKNA 
CO 822/2534.
35 M. Lloyd for Director of Colonial Surveys to I.S. Wheatley, Colonial Office, 9 April 
1956, enclosing notes on ‘The Uganda–Sudan and Kenya–Sudan Boundaries’, UKNA CO 
822/954.
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remained the de facto border. In particular, Jale Hill on the main road from 
Moyo to Kajokeji became the site of a border post—no doubt because the 
hill forms a conspicuous landmark. But Sudan maps continued to show 
the border running some way south of Jale Hill, rather than through it.
After the Second World War, and with the acceleration of reforms 
intended to introduce more representative government in the colonies, 
the colonial government of Uganda began to again request that the 
border be properly demarcated.36 From 1955, these largely peaceful 
borderlands would be caught up in larger conflicts, when Southern 
Sudanese troops stationed at Torit—north of the Uganda border and 
east of the Nile—mutinied, sparking a violent uprising against northern 
Sudanese administrators and traders, in particular in the southernmost 
province, Equatoria. The British and Sudanese authorities used the army 
to restore control, and following Sudanese independence in January 1956, 
the southern provinces continued to be governed under emergency 
measures and tight military security. 
In the period between 1956 and 1962, relations between the newly 
independent state of Sudan and the continuing British colonial govern-
ment in Uganda were strained by Sudanese suspicions that Uganda 
was harbouring fugitive mutineers, which the Ugandan administration 
sought to disprove. The British and Ugandan authorities were keen to 
resolve the outstanding issue of the border before Ugandan indepen-
dence, but efforts to establish a boundary commission were hampered by 
the fact that Uganda’s border with Kenya also needed to be delineated. 
The British government in Kenya was wary of stirring up the unresolved 
issue of its own borders with Sudan and Ethiopia. Once again, several 
years of government correspondence over the Sudan–Uganda border 
failed to produce a resolution.
In 1958, district officials made another administrative agreement, 
following disputes over the location of the border in relation to the 
36 J. Hathorn Hall, Governor of Uganda, to Governor-General Sudan, 7 September 1945, 
UKNA FO 371/46041.
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collection of taxes by chiefs.37 The problem of tax collection recurred in 
1960, when a Sudan chief tried to collect taxes from Kuku people who had 
already paid taxes to the Ugandan government. This time the problem 
reached the level of the acting governor of Uganda, who wrote to the 
British colonial secretary to highlight lingering border questions:
The course of the Khor Nyaura (Kigura) has not been 
identified, and this will have to be done by the proposed 
Boundary Commission. Moreover, considerable difficulty has 
been experienced over the interpretation of the phrase ‘the 
southern boundary of the Kuku tribe’, especially as no attempt 
was made to identify this tribal area boundary for some 15 years 
after the Order was made in 1914. … The issue has of course 
been greatly complicated by the southern movement of the 
local tribes during the past twenty years … with the result that 
the people in the northern part of Madi District as far south as 
Moyo are a mixture of Madi and Kuku. If the Commission is set 
up we should argue that the boundary should be the southern 
limit of the Kuku tribe as it existed in 1914 and should certainly 
concede no more than the red line which was almost ratified in 
1936.38
By this time, then, the two governments appear to have adopted rather 
more combative positions than their predecessors. While there was 
a degree of wrangling and partiality towards the claims of their own 
subjects in the 1930s correspondence, the governments at that time were 
more prepared to concede territory to one another, not least as both were 
British colonial administrations. By 1960, however, negotiations took 
on a harder edge, with the Ugandan side claiming that the Kuku were 
37 Acting Governor Uganda, letter to Iain Macleod, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
20 December 1960, enclosing ‘Notes of a meeting held at Kajo Kaji on November 7th 
between Sudanese and Uganda representatives to discuss the Sudan/Uganda border’, 
UKNA CO 822/2818; Interview with customary chief and clan landlords, Lefori, Moyo 
District, 15 October 2014.
38 Acting Governor Uganda, letter to Iain Macleod, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
12 February 1960, UKNA CO 822/2818.
 ContestinG the line 33
pushing southwards. Nonetheless, the description of a mixed population 
above sounds similar to the situation Stigand described before 1914.
A meeting was held at Kajokeji in 1960 to agree a working administra-
tive line. The Sudanese representatives disputed the way in which the 
two hills of Keriwa in the west, and Jale on the main Moyo–Kajokeji road, 
had become de facto border markers: 
[T]he boundaries as shown on the maps of both countries 
ran south of Jale, while Uganda claimed that the boundary 
which had been administered for some years was marked on 
the road by a stone immediately to the east of Jale. The Sudan 
representatives denied that the stone had any validity.39
The meeting nevertheless resulted in an agreement that ‘an admin-
istrative line should be recognised as a purely temporary expedient 
running from Yingibay to the Jebel Jale’, existing tax arrangements in 
the borderlands should try to be preserved and new settlements in the 
disputed areas should be deterred.40 Clearly this agreement did not solve 
the problem. Just one year later, a member of the West Nile District 
council asked whether the chair was aware ‘that there is dispute in Kerua 
[Keriwa] because there is no definite boundary lines in the County’, and, 
if so, ‘what steps are being taken to stop such a confusion?’41
By late 1962, such disputes were being eclipsed by the first reports 
of Sudanese rebel activities and refugees crossing the border into the 
39 Acting Governor Uganda, letter to Iain Macleod, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
20 December 1960, enclosing ‘Notes of a meeting held at Kajo Kaji on November 7th 
between Sudanese and Uganda representatives to discuss the Sudan/Uganda border’, 
UKNA CO 822/2818. 
40 Acting Governor Uganda, letter to Iain Macleod, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
20 December 1960, enclosing ‘Notes of a meeting held at Kajo Kaji on November 7th 
between Sudanese and Uganda representatives to discuss the Sudan/Uganda border’, 
UKNA CO 822/2818. 
41 West Nile District Council, ‘Minutes of the 7th meeting of the West Nile District 
Council’, Question No. 2, Councillor B. Moro, West Nile, 17–19 January 1961, Uganda 
National Archives, Entebbe (hereafter UNA), Northern Province B3 002.
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newly independent Uganda.42 Meanwhile the Sudan government had 
reportedly become reluctant to pursue border demarcation in case it 
led Egypt to raise the issue of the Halaib triangle on the Egypt–Sudan 
border.43 From this point onward, district-level intelligence reports from 
Uganda focused on the new pressures and insecurities resulting from 
the accelerating influx of refugees from both Sudan and Congo. In the 
midst of the insecurity and displacement of the mid–1960s, the new 1967 
constitution of the Ugandan government described its own firm defini-
tion of the border, running across Keriwa Hill and Jale Hill, each marked 
by ‘surface beacons’ (see Map 2).44
This delimitation remains the reference point for Ugandan claims up 
to the present that the border coordinates are clear and that a boundary 
marker used to exist on top of Jale Hill. There is, however, no evidence 
that this 1967 definition of the border was ever formally and legally 
accepted by the Sudan government. It does not appear on Sudan govern-
ment maps from the 1970s, which continued to follow the line shown 
since the 1930s.45 Instead the Ugandan definition seems to be based on 
the informal working agreements made by—largely British—administra-
tors on the ground over preceding decades. Reference to the two hills, 
Keriwa Hill and Jale Hill, as boundary markers represents the adoption of 
a more northerly line than the Sudan government was willing to accept 
in 1933 and had continued to contest up to 1960. This is not to say that 
any alternative legal delimitation of the border exists. Rather it is to 
emphasize that the Ugandan constitution of 1967 does not provide a 
legal basis for the border in itself, even though it may represent the line 
that has been practically constructed and enforced over many decades.
42 East Africa Command to Commander in Chief Mideast, 16 November 1962, UKNA 
FO 371/165693.
43 J.G.S Beith, Foreign Office, to British Embassy, Khartoum, 7 November 1962, UKNA 
FO 371/173190.
44 Uganda Constitution 1967, Section I, reproduced in Ian Brownlie, African Boundaries:  
a legal and diplomatic encyclopaedia, London: C. Hurst & Co., 1979, 1007.
45 Sudan Government Survey Office, 1:250,000 map series, Sheet 86-A: Arua, Khartoum, 
1976, copy held in Sudan Archive, Durham, PF 8/7.
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Displacement, migration and cross-border relations
Uncertainties about the border line have been exacerbated by prolonged 
periods of displacement both into and away from the borderlands over 
the past century. Historical narratives on both sides of the border, for 
example, make reference to the extensive resettlement operations and 
restriction of movement enforced by the colonial governments as part of 
their campaign to prevent the spread of sleeping sickness, thus creating 
a wide uninhabited borderland between Moyo and Kajokeji from the 
1920s to 1940s.46 Since around 2007, the issue of these sleeping sickness 
displacements has come up repeatedly in debates over the border. Given 
the extent to which occupation and cultivation have provided vital 
markers of usufruct land rights, this prolonged period of displacement 
may have produced considerable uncertainties over land rights in the 
borderlands. The process of return also may have involved changes to 
former settlement patterns. 
The sense that these forced removals produced such uncertainties and 
opportunities for encroachment has only been reinforced by the subse-
quent repeated displacements and returns in more recent decades. The 
first wave of Sudanese refugees in the 1960s took advantage of their close 
relations across the border to settle locally. There was clearly consider-
able sympathy in the border districts of Uganda for their plight and for 
the cause of the emerging Southern Sudanese rebel groups. It is nonethe-
less striking that the refugee presence almost immediately began to 
arouse concerns among local authorities over their effect on cross-border 
relations and the potential for problems over land. 
Already in 1964, the joint district intelligence report recommended the 
removal of Sudanese refugees from West Nile District. This would not 
only prevent the Sudanese conflict ‘spilling over onto Ugandan soil’ but 
also avoid the possibility of refugees ‘claiming in future that they are part 
of Sudan. The border struggle between Kenya and Somali [sic] seems to 
46 Sudan Government, ‘Sleeping Sickness Annual Report 1922–24’, National Records 
Office, Khartoum (hereafter NRO), Mongalla Province 1/6/39; Leopold, ‘Crossing the 
Line’, 470; Interview with area land committee chairperson, Moyo Town, 11 October 2014.
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have shown that such a claim is not an impossibility.’47 In the same year, 
the Ugandan government expressed similar concerns to the Organisation 
of African Unity’s Commission on Refugees about the potential danger 
to Uganda’s relations with neighbouring states posed by the refugee 
influx (by this time there were 20,650 documented Sudanese refugees 
in Uganda, including 7,000 in the West Nile and Ma’di districts) and 
the potential for internal tensions resulting from competition for land 
between refugees and Ugandans.48
  In 1966, the Ugandan authorities used the army to attempt to 
clear Sudanese refugees from the borderlands, at the same time as the 
Ugandan army was cooperating with the Sudan army against the Southern 
Sudanese Anyanya rebels.49 This is another episode in the border history 
that is prominent in current narratives in Kajokeji County, where it is 
bitterly remembered as a time when the Ugandan army forcibly evicted 
people from the borderlands and seized their cattle and crops. Even some 
Ugandan respondents in Moyo District criticized the extent of force used 
to remove the refugees, claiming that the local Ma’di population did not 
support the operation.50 
In the midst of this insecurity and displacement, the question of the 
border seems to have remained a latent source of tension, according to 
one report from Moyo in May 1966:
It is also rumoured that some refugees of Afoji and Chunyu 
[Sunyu] have refused to move inward and claimed that those 
places belong to the Sudan and if the Madi would try to 
47 Joint District Intelligence report as at 15th September 1964, UNA Presidential Office 
Confidential B41 S.6190/19, West Nile District Intelligence Reports.
48 Ministry of Planning and Community Development, Kampala, ‘OAU Commission 
on refugees 16–21 November 1964: Notes on refugees in Uganda’, Gulu District Records 
Office B533 S.INT.9: Intelligence Refugees. 
49 West Nile District Intelligence Committee meetings September–October 1966, UNA 
Presidential Office Confidential B41 S.6190/19. 
50 Interviews with group of chiefs, elders and youth, Keriwa, Kajokeji County,  
26 September 2014; and former district government leader, Moyo Town, 10 October 2014. 
Also see: Kuku Community, ‘Position of the Kuku Community on the disputed land’.
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interfere with their settlement they are prepared to fight by 
any means. It is believed that the Anyanya would be willing to 
assist them in case of any fight.51
These areas are among the same ones that are currently disputed between 
Moyo District and Kajokeji County, demonstrating the long history of 
their contested ownership.
The 1972 peace agreement in Sudan led to the reopening of the border 
and gradual return of Sudanese refugees. In subsequent years, peace and 
‘cordial relations’ were reported between the Ma’di and their Sudanese 
neighbours, with ‘free movement and contact’ across the border.52 Presi-
dent Idi Amin, himself from the Uganda–Sudan borderlands, employed 
many Sudanese in his military and security forces and administration. 
His overthrow in 1979 led to reprisals against the people of north-west 
Uganda, who in turn sought refuge across the Sudanese border. Strik-
ingly, the Ma’di from Moyo District who became self-settled refugees, 
rather than entering refugee camps in Sudan, mainly settled on the west 
bank among the Kuku of Kajokeji instead of among the Sudanese Ma’di 
on the east bank. Some may have even ‘adopted a Kuku identity for a 
period (repatriation figures indicate that there may have been around 
15,000 of these self-settled Madi West Bank refugees)’.53 
By around 1986, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) attacks 
forced a reverse migration once again, with both Ma’di and Kuku 
returning to Uganda over subsequent years. At this time, there were 
largely positive relations between Ma’di and Kuku: ‘[W]hen most of 
the Kuku fled Sudan as refugees at the end of the 1980s, many managed 
to settle outside of the official settlements among local Ugandan Madi 
51 Madi District Intelligence Report for the period 6th May to 31st May, 1966, private 
archive of Professor Tim Allen, copy of files held in the Uganda National Archive, Office 
of the Prime Minister–Madi District Intelligence Committee reports 1960s. 
52 Madi District Annual Reports 1968–74, Makerere University Library, Kampala, 
Africana section: G.EAU/M (058) 1.
53 Allen, ‘Social upheaval’, 216.
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families in the mountains or in Moyo and Adjumani towns.’54 One Kuku 
respondent emphasizes the close cross-border relations at the time:
People always crossed back and forth across the border. In 1987, 
we ran with some Ma’dis who had come earlier to our side. At 
that time, we were not hearing something about a border. I am 
from Litoba and people came from there to the market on our 
side and those from here went up to Moyo market. There was 
no checkpoint, just a few soldiers.55
The experience of Sudanese refugees in Uganda both underscored the 
value of cross-border relations of kinship and friendship, and began to 
strain those relations. Several respondents in Kajokeji County claim that 
the Ma’di of Moyo District had been less welcoming of the Sudanese 
refugees than the Ma’di of neighbouring Adjumani District, an impres-
sion that seems to have emerged from attempts in the late 1990s to move 
refugees into particular camps: ‘The Madi of Moyo town tried to chase 
us but the Madi of Adjumani said we have land. Refugees are welcome. 
Some understand the refugees and some don’t.’56 This was a period 
of considerable hardship and insecurity, with refugees and returnees 
vulnerable to rebel groups in northern Uganda (for example, the West 
Nile Bank Front and the Lord’s Resistance Army [LRA]), as well as to 
the SPLA who forcibly recruited in the refugee camps.
There are hints that the border itself was becoming a renewed focus of 
concern by the late 1990s, as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/
Army (SPLM/A) consolidated its administration of Kajokeji and neigh-
bouring areas. An example is the disputed area at Keriwa Hill, where ‘the 
local people [Sudanese] believe that these areas have been encroached 
upon’ by the Ugandans, according to a researcher in the early 2000s: 
54 Allen, ‘Social upheaval’, 55.
55 Interview with male and female youth leaders, Wudu, Kajokeji County, 28 September 
2014.
56 Interview with elder from Kajokeji, Juba, 31 July 2013.
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The situation has been alarmed by the fact that Uganda local 
government authority has extended services—schools, health 
clinics and roads—to these areas which are believed to be 
beyond or outside its international borders. Furthermore, it is 
believed that the government of Uganda has even gone further 
to encourage the local Sudanese people to pay tax known in 
Uganda as ‘Machoro’. … [I]n an interview with some Sudanese 
officials, the researcher was informed about the previous 
meetings which took place in 1997 between the Sudanese and 
Ugandans authorities. These meetings were meant to look 
back into Sudan–Uganda border issues, including the alleged 
Uganda expansion. Nothing materialised from the discussions 
and all these sensitive issues were left pending. The failure 
is attributed to the fact that these meetings were locally 
initiated.57
The extension of Ugandan administration, taxation and service provision 
to the border areas was interpreted by many respondents in 2014 as a 
deliberate strategy to extend the border northwards. It has remained a 
complaint by people in Liwolo Payam of Kajokeji County, who claimed 
that part of their territory and people had become the sub-county of 
Keriwa in Uganda’s Yumbe District:
The Uganda government brought services, so people considered 
Uganda as the only government which helps them but people 
in that sub-county are on their own land, not Ugandan land. 
They did not go there as refugees. But the Uganda government 
created positions for them as LCs [local council chairs] and 
village chiefs. That is the Uganda administration. Up to now, 
people here still consider those people as brothers. They 
still go there for family things. The only difference is the 
57 Malual Ayom Dor, ‘Conflict and Cooperation between Uganda and Sudan: the impact 
of transnational ethnicity, 1962–2002’, MA dissertation, Makerere University, 2003, 92–93. 
The author was an SPLA officer at the time.
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administration. Some people here are registered as South 
Sudanese, others as Ugandans to get services.58
On the Ugandan side, however, respondents in Moyo District assert that 
Sudanese refugees had once again settled in the borderlands before 2005 
and then began to lay claim to Ugandan territory, which is also seen 
as a deliberate ploy: ‘When somebody of theirs dies, they put concrete 
[graves] and they also plant mangoes. This is their trick.’59 Graves and 
fruit trees are commonly understood markers of long-term land rights. 
The question of the status of those displaced during the second Sudanese 
civil war has thus become a focus of dispute. Were they internally 
displaced within Sudanese territory or refugees on Ugandan soil? 
In 2011, a Ugandan report suggested that several individual and 
sometimes fatal conflicts between Southern Sudanese and Ugandans over 
land ownership in areas claimed by Lefori sub-county in Moyo District 
had occurred between 1989 and 1997.60 While there may have been smoul-
dering tensions over land ownership and sovereignty in the borderlands 
during the 1990s, it was only after the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in 2005 and subsequent departure of the LRA from northern 
Uganda that the dispute became more serious, as displaced populations 
returned to both Kajokeji County and Moyo District. The border areas 
became a new focus of cultivation and settlement. Respondents on both 
sides of the border emphasized the relative fertility of these lands, which 
had previously been largely uninhabited hunting grounds.61 Around 2005, 
58 Interview with group of chiefs, elders and youth, Keriwa, Kajokeji County,  
26 September 2014. 
59 Interview with male and female sub-county government officials, Lefori, Moyo 
District, 13 October 2014.
60 Moyo District Internal Security Officer, ‘Sub: The Boarder Land Dispute Between 
Moyo District (Madi Community) and South Sudan (Kuku Community)’, Moyo,  
31 August 2011, copied on 13 October 2014 at the Lefori sub-county local council 3 office, 
Lefori, Moyo District. 
61 Interviews with county agriculture department official, Mere, Kajokeji County,  
18 September 2014; local councillor, Logoba, Moyo District, 14 October 2014; and 
customary chief and clan landlords, Lefori, Moyo District, 15 October 2014. 
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the enforcement of a forest reserve in the Metu area of Moyo District 
displaced many people, some of whom resettled in the borderlands. Local 
investors—often government officials—on both sides of the border also 
began to invest in commercial agriculture in the borderlands.62
With increasing settlement and cultivation in the borderlands, 
particular ventures became triggers for dispute and conflict because they 
appeared to represent assertions of sovereignty by rival state authori-
ties. In 2007, under the Ugandan North West Smallholders Agricultural 
Development Project, the Uganda National Roads Authority attempted 
to construct a new road through the borderlands between Afoji and 
Lefori, with the reported aim of connecting cultivation sites to main roads 
and the market in Lefori. In 2008, road construction was halted by the 
Kajokeji County authorities on the grounds that it was entering Sudanese 
territory. In 2009, the construction of a mast by Ugandan telecommu-
nication firm MTN at Jale Hill was also stopped by the Kajokeji County 
commissioner. 
At this point, the crisis led to a meeting between President Yoweri 
Museveni of Uganda and President Salva Kiir of the semi-autonomous 
Southern Sudan. Both leaders urged local reconciliation and resolved that 
no major economic activities should occur in the contested borderlands 
until official demarcation was undertaken. Incidents of SPLA soldiers and 
police evicting or detaining Ugandans cultivating in these areas continued 
to be reported by the Ugandan authorities. In 2011, tractors belonging to 
a group of Kajokeji-based Kuku commercial farmers, including promi-
nent politicians and government officials, were confiscated by the Moyo 
authorities after being used to clear and plough a large area for maize 
cultivation in one of the contested areas of A’baya. This led to another 
high-level meeting between representatives of the two governments just 
after South Sudan’s independence in July 2011. The meeting called for 
the two governments to ‘expedite the demarcation’, while emphasizing 
62 Interviews with male and female sub-county government officials, Lefori, Moyo 
District, 13 October 2014; local councillor, Logoba, Moyo District, 14 October 2014; local 
government officer, Moyo Town, 13 October 2014; headman, Umbuku, Kajokeji County,  
27 September 2014; and chief, Kangapo 2 Payam, Kajokeji County, 26 September 2014. 
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that ‘[w]e are the same people, same blood, and can not [sic] afford to 
spill the blood of our brothers & sisters.’63
In September 2014, however, blood would be spilled. The chair of the 
district local council (LC 5) in Moyo accompanied Ugandan national 
census officials to the disputed area of Sunyu to try to conduct the census 
there. Detained by local police and security forces, they were marched on 
foot to the Kajokeji county headquarters in Mere, a distance of several 
miles. The councillors and officials were released the following day and 
returned to Moyo claiming to have been physically abused and held 
in poor conditions. The district local council had meanwhile begun 
organizing a demonstration in Moyo in protest at their leader’s mistreat-
ment. Organizers of the event claimed it was primarily intended to attract 
the attention of the Ugandan government but Kuku inhabitants of Moyo 
District interpreted the march as a threat against them. 
Led by members of parliament and local councillors, demonstrators 
marched to the border post at Afoji. The situation deteriorated into 
threats and attacks on South Sudanese houses and shops, amid rumours 
that South Sudanese were being evicted from the district. This was the 
result of a district council resolution that foreigners should leave Moyo 
or be registered.64 An estimated 8,000 to 10,000 Kuku fled into Kajokeji 
County65 and cross-border attacks were launched by fighters armed with 
bows and arrows, spears and machetes. Several people were killed and 
many more injured. Thousands of Ma’di living in Moyo District also took 
temporary refuge across the Nile in Adjumani District in Uganda. On 20 
63 Government of the Republic of South Sudan and Government of the Republic of 
Uganda, ‘Joint Communiqué’, border land dispute involving the citizens of Kajokeji 
County of Central Equatoria State, Republic of South Sudan and Moyo District of the 
Republic of Uganda, in the meeting held on 21–23 July 2011 in Kajokeji County, Central 
Equatoria State, Republic of South Sudan, copied at Moyo District records office on 10 
October 2014. 
64 Interview with district councillor, Moyo District, 14 October 2014. 
65 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Report 
on the human rights situation in South Sudan’, report of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 9 March 2015. Accessed 4 June 2015, http://www.ohchr.
org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session28/Documents/A_HRC_28_49_en.doc. 
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September 2014, Ugandan and South Sudanese government delegations 
met in Moyo and agreed to form joint army border patrols. They also 
resolved that the border issue ‘be addressed internationally urgently 
by the Uganda–South Sudan joint border verification and demarcation 
team’.66 As of February 2016, the joint border committee had reportedly 
begun holding consultative meetings with border communities, prior to 
planned verification and demarcation by 2017.67
Making and debating boundaries
The September 2014 conflict marked a culmination of processes set in 
motion a century earlier, when the British colonial authorities sought 
to establish a tribal boundary between the Ma’di and Kuku as the inter-
colonial boundary between Sudan and Uganda, thus dividing people 
whose migrations and interrelations tended to belie any clear tribal 
boundary. A member of one of the clans that straddle the current border 
explains how the British establishment of the border at Jale Hill divided 
the clan of Moipe: ‘They divided us into Uganda and Sudan. We became 
Ma’di or Kuku.’68 This process was reinforced by the previous sleeping 
sickness campaign. Clan members on the Sudan side were taken far to 
the north, while those on the Ugandan side were moved further south. 
These divisions were again entrenched during the first Sudanese civil 
war, when people were moved away from the border. Although clan 
members increasingly came to identify as either Kuku and Sudanese 
or as Ma’di and Ugandan, they nevertheless maintained close relations 
across the border, relying on each other during war and displacement, 
66 Moyo District and Kajokeji County governments, ‘Resolutions of the Moyo District–
Kajokeji County Joint Meeting on the Uganda–South Sudan Common Border Areas 
Security, held in Multipurpose Training Centre Hall, Moyo District on 20 September 
2014’, copied at Kajokeji County office on 25 September 2014.
67 Miraya FM, ‘South Sudan – Uganda demarcation committee consults with border 
communities’, 9 Feb 2016. Accessed 31 May 2016, http://radio-miraya.org/national/south-
sudan-uganda-demarcation-committee-consults-with-border-communities/; Catholic 
Radio Network Evening News Service, ‘South Sudan–Uganda border demarcation takes 
place in 2017’, 11 February 2016 (transcript in authors’ files).
68 Interview with local councillor, Logoba, Moyo District, 14 October 2014.
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and continuing to come together for rituals and to maintain the exogamy 
that indicates common clan membership. The tragic consequence of the 
post–2005 tensions and the conflict in 2014 is that the respondent quoted 
above now fears to visit his clanspeople and relatives in Kajokeji, lest he 
be identified by other Kuku as a Ma’di.69
The same man emphasized the importance of the positive relations 
and communication that he claimed had been maintained by local-level 
Ugandan and SPLA authorities across the border before 2005, arguing 
that the only solution to the border problem was for lower-level (parish 
or sub-county) authorities to cooperate in handling disputes and avoid 
escalation to district or county levels. Unlike many others, he did not see 
border demarcation as the solution per se but rather emphasized the need 
to revert to the historic experience of peaceful relations and cooperation 
by local authorities in the borderland.70 Implicit in his recommendation 
for local-level solutions is the criticism made by many other respondents 
of district and county-level politicians, who were accused of exacerbating 
the conflict for their own political ends and economic gains.
The 2014 conflict has done much to unite the people of each district 
and county in opposition to their neighbours across the border, to the 
benefit and enhanced popularity of local government leaders. There are, 
however, important counter narratives on both sides that are suppressed 
and silenced by the dominant narratives of conflict and competition. 
These counter narratives emphasize common interests in preserving 
peace in the borderlands. In July 2015, a respondent in Juba told of a 
local-level initiative to negotiate such a peace along one stretch of the 
border, involving acceptance by a Kuku clan that their lands were divided 
by the border but could be looked after by their nephews on the other 
side.71 In 2014, one clan leader on the Ugandan side of this stretch of the 
border had similarly acknowledged that Kuku clan lands extended south 
of the current border, a claim that was contradicted by other Ugandan 
69 Interview with local councillor, Logoba, Moyo District, 14 October 2014.
70 Interview with local councillor, Logoba, Moyo District, 14 October 2014.
71 Interview with state government employee from Kajokeji, Juba, 25 July 2015.
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clan leaders. Indeed, some Ugandans were prepared to acknowledge 
the possibility of Kuku clan land ownership extending into Uganda but 
argued that this ‘does not affect the boundary. If clan land was cut in two 
by the boundary, those on each side belong to each country’.72 
The same argument was even made by a South Sudanese government 
official in 2015, who advocated accepting the existing boundary line, even 
if it cut through Kuku ancestral lands, in order to avoid the conflict that 
might ensue from an alternative demarcation.73 In essence, such views 
represent an important overturning of the original colonial principle that 
the border should be a strictly tribal one. The first principle that needs 
to be agreed upon, in this view, is that Ma’di can be South Sudanese and 
that Kuku can be Ugandan.
A related proposition is that the first step in resolving the conflict is 
to acknowledge ancestral clan land claims, distinct from the question 
of the border. Some argue that if these land claims are recognized and 
respected on both sides of the border, then there would be no conflict 
over the border itself, regardless of its location. Ugandans wishing to 
access land on Kuku clan territories in Uganda should simply approach 
the clan leaders following customary conventions and be granted land 
to use for cultivation or other purposes. This may well have been the 
practice followed since the 1940s, in the vague borderland zone, when 
people were more concerned with obtaining the blessings of the clan land 
authorities to ensure the fertility of their fields than with the arbitrary 
and often irrelevant line of the international boundary. 
In the past decade, however, land rights in general have become more 
politicized and contested, with the international border now a focus of 
conflict. It seems unlikely that enough Ugandans will be willing to risk 
recognizing Kuku clan land ownership in Uganda. The reverse is also the 
case, especially since South Sudanese claims regarding the international 
72 Interviews with customary chief and clan landlords, Lefori, Moyo District,  
15 October 2014; and local government officer, Moyo Town, 13 October 2014.
73 Interviews with state government official, Juba, 23 July 2015; and CBO staff from 
Kajokeji, Juba, 22 July 2015.
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border have tended to emphasize colonial references to the southern 
boundary of the Kuku tribe, ensuring that ancestral land claims are 
inseparable from the issue of the border. There are increasing concerns 
and fears, also beyond the borderlands, that the recognition of clan land 
claims can become entangled in political assertions of territorial sover-
eignty, which may in turn prove exclusive and exclusionary, leading to 
the denial of land rights on the basis of nationality, ethnicity or clan. 
Two key points of contention in continuing debates over the inter-
national border exemplify the broader issues of land governance and 
boundary disputes examined in the remainder of this report:
1. The relationship between customary land boundaries and 
administrative boundaries
One MP from Kajokeji County admits that the Kuku arguments for 
the relevance of their ancestral clan boundaries to the definition of the 
international border ‘will come round to haunt us internally’, as similar 
questions over the congruence of clan and administrative boundaries 
have provoked disputes and conflicts over boma, payam and county 
boundaries within Kajokeji and South Sudan more broadly.74 On both 
sides of the international border, local government authorities have 
harnessed customary laws and institutions of land governance to exert 
greater control over land and territory. In the process, they have given 
greater prominence and power to clan leaders and customary authori-
ties, as well as greater political salience to their versions of historical 
boundaries.
2. The land rights of maternal nephews and clan affiliates who do not 
have patrilineal descent 
Some of the contestation over land rights in the international borderlands 
centres on claims that land was allocated by clans to their daughters, 
sisters or nephews (sisters’ sons) from the other side of the border. 
Their occupation of this land has ultimately shifted the border because 
74 Interview with MP from Kajokeji, Wudu, 24 September 2014.
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they retained their own national and clan identity and now claim that 
the land they were allocated belongs to them and hence to their national 
territory.75 Such relations between maternal uncles and nephews have 
provided vital networks of support, particularly during periods of war 
and displacement. These relations bind the borderland communities 
together and can be, and have been, harnessed as a resource for peace. 
In recent years, such relations have also come under increasing strain 
due to unprecedented competition for and disputes over land, leading 
to widespread debate about the meaning and strength of land rights 
acquired by maternal relatives and other non-clan members. While some 
Kuku may argue that the international boundary is unimportant if their 
Ugandan nephews are managing their clan lands on the other side, others 
may see this as an erosion and betrayal of the clan’s territorial integrity 
and land rights.
These two issues have become so contentious in the borderlands, and 
more widely in both South Sudan and Uganda, for a number of reasons. 
These include growing population densities in particular areas, policies of 
decentralization and increased opportunities—or perceptions of oppor-
tunities—for commercial exploitation of land and natural resources. 
Many South Sudanese are convinced that ‘the Ugandan government is 
claiming part of [South] Sudan to get resources’.76 The activities that 
have tended to spark off conflict in the borderlands have not been small-
scale subsistence agriculture or even cattle grazing but those that appear 
to represent commercial exploitation and the assertion of state sover-
eignty: ‘If Uganda hadn’t built the road, no one would complain.’77 This 
tendency is replicated within South Sudan and northern Uganda in other 
disputes over land and boundaries.
75 Interview with MP from Kajokeji, Juba, 7 September 2014.
76 Interviews with elder from Kajokeji, Juba, 31 July 2013; and leading Kuku community 
elder, Juba, 3 August 2013.
77 Interview with MP and former senior county official in Kajokeji, Juba, 5 August 2013.
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3. The politics of territory and identity: 
Disputes over international and  
internal boundaries
The conflict over the international boundary between Kajokeji County 
and Moyo District is far from exceptional, even as the long-term enforce-
ment and experiences of that boundary have had distinctive effects on the 
identities and relations in these borderlands. In fact, the conflict could 
be seen as a triangular set of boundary disputes between Moyo District 
and Yumbe District in Uganda and Kajokeji County in South Sudan. It 
is more obviously driven by local leaders and decentralized government 
institutions than by the two national governments. Respondents in the 
western part of Moyo District seem to be just as concerned about their 
boundary dispute with Yumbe District as they are about the international 
border. Lugbara and Aringa from Yumbe District, along with Kuku from 
Kajokeji County, are all seen as foreigners in Moyo District. This is not 
to downplay the significance of national identities, which have become 
more important than ever in the recent conflicts. Rather, it is to suggest 
that there are significant commonalities between such international 
border disputes and the proliferating disputes over internal boundaries 
in both South Sudan and northern Uganda.
Since the 1990s, the effects of decentralization policies and the 
fragmentation of decentralized local government units have begun to 
fulfil the old colonial vision of tribes as administrative, political and terri-
torial units. Decentralization has driven the increasingly popular ideas 
that ethnic and administrative boundaries should be contiguous and that 
control over territory gives people access to government positions, funds 
and services. In both countries, decentralization has been accompanied 
by the fragmentation and multiplication of administrative units, such 
as districts and counties, as political leaders demand that their own 
ethnic or sub-ethnic communal division should have an independent 
local government and be in control of its own resources.
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As territory has gained new political value, so too have the boundaries 
between these administrative units become increasingly contested.78 
This is where the ethnicized politics of decentralization intersect 
with broader perceptions of changing land value and the potential for 
commercial exploitation of natural resources. Many boundary conflicts 
are understood locally in one or two ways. First, they are seen as a result 
of politicians and government officials attempting to expand existing 
administrative sub-units in order to fulfil the demographic criteria to 
become a new independent unit. Second, they are seen to be a result 
of struggles for control over potentially lucrative natural resources or 
development opportunities. Conflicts over boundaries tend to erupt at 
specific sites along roads and where there is some visible sign of develop-
ment or resource exploitation.
The tensions of decentralization
It is possible to see some of the roots of contemporary boundary disputes 
in the policies of colonial administration in Sudan and Uganda in the 
first half of the twentieth century. The British administrators of the 
Anglo–Egyptian Condominium of the Sudan and the Uganda Protec-
torate assumed that African society was structured into distinct tribes 
and sought to harness this tribal organization to their own rule. District 
officials soon reported difficulties in achieving this goal on the ground, 
however, where most tribes proved to be fragmented, overlapping, inter-
mingled and lacking centralized or hierarchical leadership. As the district 
commissioner of Bor District in Southern Sudan complained in 1938, 
it was difficult to identify clear authority structures beyond extended 
family groups:
I have searched in vain in the writings on N.A. [Native 
Administration] for some help and guidance with a people 
78 Johnson, When boundaries; Mareike Schomerus and Tim Allen, Southern Sudan at Odds 
with Itself: Dynamics of conflict and predicaments of peace, London: Development Studies 
Institute, London School of Economics, 2010; and Rolandsen, ‘Land, Security and Peace 
Building’.
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like this. All the theory tacitly assumes a background of social 
organisation with a hierarchy of chiefs who are chiefs and not 
just family headmen, and who issue orders and carry them out 
over units far wider than the family group.79
There were forms of authority that did extend much more widely, such 
as the spiritual authority of Dinka and Nuer prophets or the rain chiefs 
of Equatoria but the colonial authorities were generally reluctant to 
employ such religious leadership in the Native Administration, doubting 
the loyalty of such leaders or their administrative efficiency. Instead they 
appointed as chiefs men seen to possess the loyalty and background 
necessary for their new role as tax collectors, executors of government 
orders and enforcers of colonial law and order.80 
Chiefs were not appointed as the heads of tribes nor were they 
necessarily even the heads of sub-tribal sections or clans. The colonial 
governments envisaged instead a territorial administrative system in 
which these smaller clans and sections with their own headmen would 
be amalgamated under the territorial jurisdiction of a chief. Yet British 
administrators also believed that patrilineal kinship was the glue that 
held African society together and that they could construct tribes as 
hierarchical administrative entities by using smaller lineage groups as 
‘the bricks’.81 
The result was a continual tension between territoriality and blood 
descent as the organizing principles of colonial administration. Clans and 
lineages might define themselves in terms of kinship but their members 
were often scattered across wide territories and even across different 
tribes. Territories were inhabited by people of different clans, sub-tribal 
sections and sometimes even tribes. Communities commonly assimilated 
79 B. V. Marwood, District Commissioner Bor, to Governor, Upper Nile, 9 May 1938, 
NRO Bahr el-Ghazal Province 1/5/28.
80 Cherry Leonardi, Dealing with Government in South Sudan: histories of chiefship, community 
and state, Woodbridge: James Currey, 2013.
81 M. Parr, Governor Equatoria, to Civil Secretary, 7 April 1938, NRO Equatoria Province 
2/2/8. Also see: Catherine Boone, Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the 
Structure of Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, 35.
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outsiders, with kinship or marital ties often linking together different 
ethnic groups rather than dividing them.82 The colonial authorities found 
it impossible to map territorial units onto descent-based groups and 
instead tried to enforce chiefs’ jurisdiction over all the inhabitants of 
the territorial chiefdom, regardless of clan or ethnicity.83 Consequently, 
they continually faced challenges from people who argued—often in 
genealogical terms—that they did not belong under a particular chief 
and should join a different chiefdom or be recognized as an independent 
section with their own chief. This is a politics of territory and identity 
with continued resonance in contemporary reality.
The challenge of delimiting territorial administrative units is exacer-
bated by the nature of indigenous boundaries and landholding. In 
Kajokeji County and Moyo District, for example, land is parcelled out 
among the various clans and sub-divided into family holdings. Some of 
the boundaries between these clan territories, fields and homesteads 
take a visibly linear form, such as by following streams or field drainage 
channels—the word for ‘drainage channels’ and ‘boundaries’ is the 
same in Kuku, lokokoritan. The clan authorities responsible for the land 
are said to point out boundaries when they allocate land to people. Yet 
respondents also emphasize that it is spiritually and culturally offensive 
to draw boundaries on the ground or to construct fences. ‘The owner 
doesn’t make any cross line, no straight line. He just says you have up 
to that tree.’84 Boundaries are therefore often indistinct or non-linear, 
with perhaps only particular clear points such as hills or prominent trees 
claimed, and sometimes disputed, as boundary markers. In other words, 
boundaries form a kind of patchwork pattern—even if the boundaries 
between the patches are vague or contested.
82 Douglas Johnson, ‘Tribal Boundaries and Border Wars: Nuer–Dinka relations in the 
Sobat and Zaraf Valleys, c. 1860–1976’, Journal of African History 23 (1982), 183–203 (183–84).
83 B. V. Marwood, Governor Equatoria, to District Commissioner Juba, 29 March 1947, 
South Sudan National Archive, Juba, Equatoria Province 66.D.8.
84 Interview with MP from Kajokeji, Juba, 7 September 2014.
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In Aweil East County, in contrast, the territories associated with the 
various sections of the Dinka Abiem or with smaller lineage groups 
often take an interspersed rather than patchwork form. Dinka concepts 
of territorial boundaries are based on points in the landscape, which 
do not necessarily join up in a linear way.85 Section and clan territories 
are often discontinuous and form fragmented patterns: ‘The border is 
interchanging. Some Makuach Athian [section] villages are in Wunanei 
and some Wunanei villages are in Makuach Athian. So it is nothing that 
you can say this is Makuach and this is Wunanei.’86 In the past, some 
boundaries between sections also took the form of uninhabited zones,87 
as one chief explains, ‘You have certain points where people know, this 
belongs to Makuach Athian and this belongs to Apuoth. Then when 
someone comes in the middle of a forest and wants to make a new place 
you will discuss where it belongs to because the border in between is 
not really known.’88 Boundaries are therefore constantly negotiated and 
made anew. Each time individuals from two different sections disagree 
over the boundary of a field and the chiefs are called to settle the dispute 
and divide the land, a new part of the inter-sectional boundary is negoti-
ated and defined.
In some areas, including Kajokeji County and Moyo District, the 
picture is further complicated by previous colonial resettlement initia-
tives such as the sleeping sickness campaign or the drive to make people 
live closer to roads in order to be more accessible to the government. 
In Yei District of colonial Sudan, for example, people were moved onto 
the main roads, and even came to refer to their communities in terms of 
85 Zoe Cormack, ‘Borders are galaxies: Interpreting contestations over local 
administrative boundaries in South Sudan’, Africa 86/3 (2016; forthcoming); Martina 
Santschi ‘Encountering and “capturing” hakuma: Negotiating statehood and authority 
in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State, South Sudan’, PhD thesis, University of Bern, 
Switzerland, 2013.
86 Interview with CBO Staff, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 13 August 2014.
87 Interviews with community leader, Warawar, Aweil East County, 14 August 2014; and 
chief, Mabil, Aweil East County, 26 August 2014.
88 Interview with chief, Mabil, Aweil East County, 26 August 2014.
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the mileposts on the roads, such as Mile 6. Nonetheless clans retained 
an important spiritual relationship with the original territories from 
whence they were moved and their land authorities continued to go back 
to perform rituals for the health and fertility of the land, even after other 
clans had moved into those territories.89
The colonial authorities were little aware of these indigenous authorities 
and systems of landholding. The first British administrator of Kajokeji 
was one of the few to draw attention to what he called a ‘chief of the 
land and water’:
Although he is supposed to own all the land, by doing so he 
does not interfere with other people’s rights. He would be 
applied to in the case of deciding on any movement of the 
people. ... The ‘father of the land’s’ power is seldom noticed or 
heard of, and so little does he interfere, that one might remain 
for long in ignorance of his presence, and the ‘chief of the 
people’ would alone appear in administrative cases. However, 
the latter consults the ‘land chief’ on all important points 
and sometimes even takes to him cases he is unable to decide 
himself.90
Another British official emphasized that this father-owner-chief of the 
land (monye kak in Bari; monye kujöŋ in Kuku; vudipi in Ma’di) was ‘not 
the clan “head” in such matters as rendering labour to chief or govern-
ment or the collection of tax’, which is partly why the government was 
little aware or interested in such figures.91 Land disputes rarely entered 
the colonial records, suggesting either that land disputes were indeed 
rare or that they were handled at the local level without reaching the 
89 Cherry Leonardi, ‘Paying “buckets of blood” for the land: moral debates over 
economy, war and state in Southern Sudan’, Journal of Modern African Studies 49/2 (2011), 
215–40.
90 Stigand, Equatoria, 34.
91 Leonard Fielding Nalder, ed., A Tribal Survey of Mongalla Province, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1937, 125.
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formal chiefs’ courts or escalating into conflicts. The obvious exception 
to this was the recurrent conflict over grazing land in cattle-keeping areas 
of Southern Sudan such as Aweil East County, which the government 
sought to suppress or resolve, including by marking boundary points 
between different sections’ territories.
The early Condominium government also sought to prevent such 
conflicts by enforcing province boundaries as tribal boundaries. Just as it 
tried to make the Sudan–Uganda border correspond to ethnic boundaries, 
so it forcibly resettled Nuer and Dinka to try to ensure that they were 
separated by the boundary between Upper Nile Province and Mongalla—
later Equatoria—Province, which ran to the north of the town of Bor at 
the time. In 1919, the inspector of Bor declared that it was impossible to 
define a tribal boundary between the Nuer and Dinka, noting that, ‘The 
tendency of the Nuers and Dinkas is to fuse with one another. This has 
always occurred in the past in the intervals of fighting. To support the 
idea of a tribal boundary is merely to strive to keep open a sore which 
could otherwise tend, with proper treatment, to heal itself.’92 It would be 
some time before the policy of tribal separation was gradually abandoned 
by colonial authorities. More broadly, they came to recognize instead that 
bringing conflicting communities under the same administration was a 
more effective means of managing conflicts than attempting to divide 
them along provincial lines.93
In fact, the colonial districts encompassed multiple ethnic groups and 
sub-ethnic sections. Increasingly, the governments sought to instil ideals 
of local citizenship and civic participation through local government 
councils that brought together chiefs and other leaders from these various 
communities. The extent to which politically active Southern Sudanese 
came to identify with their territorially defined district and province is 
apparent in the enduring prominence of the old colonial provinces of 
Equatoria, Bahr el-Ghazal and Upper Nile in South Sudanese politics, 
92 Stevenson Hamilton to Governor of Mongalla Province, 14 September 1918, Malakal 
Archives SCR 14.A, cited in Johnson, ‘Tribal boundaries’, 197.
93 Johnson, ‘Tribal boundaries’ and Johnson, When boundaries, 21.
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as well as in the July 2014 proposal from the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) to reinstate the 21 former colonial 
districts in a new federal system.94 
The colonial system of local government councils was largely retained 
by postcolonial governments, as were the centralizing tendencies of the 
colonial states, leaving local governments with little autonomy and few 
resources. Campaigns to redress this through federalism were unsuc-
cessful in both Sudan and Uganda, contributing to grievances in regions 
marginalized from and by the central governments. These grievances in 
turn fed the rebellions in the 1980s by Yoweri Museveni’s National Resis-
tance Movement/Army (NRM/A) against Milton Obote’s government 
in Uganda and by John Garang’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/
Army (SPLM/A) in Sudan. 
In Uganda, the NRM/A was quick to establish its own local political 
and administrative structures in the form of resistance councils (RCs) 
at the village level, even before the National Resistance Army (NRA) 
had secured military victory in 1986. Subsequently the 1987 Resistance 
Councils and Committees Statute set up a five-tier structure of RCs, with 
RC 1 representing the village, RC 2 the parish, RC 3 the sub-county, RC 
4 the county and RC 5 the district. Greater financial decentralization to 
the district RC 5s was implemented in 1992–1993 and the 1995 constitution 
renamed RCs as local councils (LCs), which were to be directly elected 
at all five levels.
In Southern Sudan, by the late 1990s the SPLM, too, was instituting 
liberation councils in its newly named local administrative hierarchy of 
boma, payam and county. The SPLM decentralization agenda was part 
of the broader political vision for a New Sudan aimed at overturning the 
centralization and concentration of political power and state resources 
94 South Sudan News Agency, ‘SPLM-in Opposition Proposes 21 New States, Ramciel 
to be the National Capital’, 16 July 2014. Accessed 14 February 2016, http://www.
southsudannewsagency.com/news/top-stories/splm-in-opposition-proposes-twenty-
one-new-states. Led by Riek Machar, the SPLM-IO is a military and political opposition 
movement that split from the SPLM/A during the civil war, which started in December 
2013. 
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in Khartoum. The 1994 Chukudum National Convention had formally 
committed the SPLM to decentralization, as reiterated in its 1998 
Vision.95 The SPLM also increasingly acknowledged chiefs as traditional 
authorities. A conference of traditional leaders organized by the SPLM 
leadership in 2004 produced the Kamuto Declaration, which affirmed 
respect for ‘cultures’ and for the ‘role and responsibilities of Traditional 
Leaders and Chiefs in all aspects, particularly as regards the tenure 
and ownership of land and other resources belonging to their respec-
tive communities’.96 SPLM acknowledgement of traditional authority 
culminated in the recognition of chiefs as the sole executive and judicial 
authorities at the boma level in the Government of Southern Sudan’s 
Local Government Act of 2009.
In both Uganda and South Sudan, the institution of new local govern-
ment systems has been accompanied by the sub-division of administrative 
units at all levels—from districts and counties to parishes and chief-
doms. Even in the 1990s, disputes over administrative units were already 
erupting in the SPLM/A-held areas of Southern Sudan. For example, 
Mundri and Maridi were placed under a single SPLA Independent Area 
Command in 1992 but persistent agitation from Mundri led to its separa-
tion as a county after the 1994 Chukudum convention.97 Such disputes 
would increase as counties, payams and bomas became the focus for what 
limited services and relief were available and as the revenue from market 
and NGO taxes and customs, and any other perquisites of administrative 
95 SPLM Secretariat, ‘Vision and Programme of the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement (SPLM)’, Yei and New Cush, New Sudan, March 1998. Accessed 5 April 2016, 
http://www.splmtoday.com/index.php/vision-aamp-programme-splm-34. 
96 ‘Kamuto Declaration’, recommendations and resolutions from The Conference on 
Traditional Leaders and Chiefs of New Sudan, Kamuto, Kapoeta County, 29 June–10 July 
2004. Accessed 1 August 2012, http://www.houseofnationalities.org/kamuto_declaration.
asp. 
97 Helge Rohn, Peter Adwok Nyaba and George Maker Benjamin, ‘Report of the study 
on local administrative structures in Maridi, Mundri and Yei Counties–West Bank 
Equatoria, South Sudan’, Nairobi: Aktion Afrika Hilfe, 1997, 10.
 the PolitiCs of territory and identity 57
officers, became further sources of competition.98 People increasingly 
believed that they needed their own boma or payam in order to receive 
services and resources from government or agencies.
The number of districts in Uganda also increased from 34 in 1990 
to 112 in 2013. ‘While a variety of explanations have been given as to 
the extreme nature of district creation in Uganda, perhaps the most 
plausible is that new districts have been a source of electoral patronage 
for Museveni. The large number of local jobs that are created with the 
addition of each new district have [sic] led voters to respond positively 
to district creation over the years.’99 These districts have been demanded 
mainly on an ethnic basis and their creation has ‘reduced what were once 
ethnically heterogeneous districts to ones largely populated by only one 
or two major ethnic groups’, often sparking conflict in the process.100
Colonial administrators sought but mostly failed—and increasingly 
admitted the futility of trying—to make tribal boundaries the basis for 
administrative boundaries. Yet in the twenty-first century, such goals 
have been revived as politicians attempt to establish ethnic constituen-
cies and many different people seek to assert their rights to resources and 
government positions by claiming to speak as members or representatives 
of ethnic and sub-ethnic communities. The more that these communal 
identities are associated with territorial administrative units, the more 
this raises fears of exclusion among other inhabitants of these units. 
These other inhabitants either assert their own communal indepen-
dence and seek administrative separation or face a potential sense of 
insecurity in terms of their rights to access land and resources within the 
territorial jurisdiction of another ethnic or sub-ethnic group. In practice, 
98 Herbert Herzog, ‘Report: mission on governance to Western Equatoria, Southern 
Sudan’, Liebefeld, Switzerland: Herzog Consult, 1998, 17, 23.
99 Elliott D. Green, ‘Decentralisation and conflict in Uganda’, Conflict, Security & 
Development, 8/4 (2008), 427–50 (442). Also see Julian Hopwood, ‘Elephants abroad and 
in the room: explicit and implicit security, justice and protection issues on the Uganda/S 
Sudan border’, London: London School of Economics, Justice and Security Research 
Programme Paper 22, 2015, 6.
100 Green, ‘Decentralisation and conflict’, 444.
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territorial and co-residential communities remain heterogeneous—often 
increasingly so in contexts of urbanization, long-term displacement and 
relocation. The progressive flare up of underlying tensions and insecu-
rities over land rights and territorial belonging occurs at moments or 
sites where rights, resources and jurisdictions are contested, such as at 
disputed boundaries.
Disputed internal boundaries 
There are numerous disputes over administrative boundaries in Aweil 
East County in north-west South Sudan and, to the south, in Kajokeji 
County and Moyo District in the South Sudan–Uganda borderlands. 
These disputes include: The county boundaries between Aweil East, 
Aweil Centre and Aweil Municipality; the county boundaries of Kajokeji 
and its payam boundaries between Nyepo and Lire and between Liwolo 
and Kangapo 2; and the Moyo–Yumbe district boundary and the Moyo–
Metu sub-county boundary. 
These boundaries are contested in a discourse of ethnic or clan-based 
claims to territory, leading to inter-communal tensions and in one case 
even violent conflict. They tend to focus on particular sites where lucra-
tive resources are at stake, particularly newly urbanized areas where 
there is potential income from land sales or leases, taxes, customs and 
market dues. Respondents in these areas blame local political and admin-
istrative elites for trying to extend their boundaries to encompass more 
resources, land and people in order to increase their own income, expand 
their political constituencies and strengthen their claims for promotion, 
advocating for example that a payam become a county. Even if such 
political strategies are to blame, it is easy for the fears, insecurities or 
ambitions of ordinary people to become entangled in these boundary 
disputes because of the increasing association between ethnicity, territo-
rial administration and land rights.
In Kajokeji County, the most serious internal boundary dispute is the 
conflict between Nyepo Payam and Lire Payam over the location of their 
border on the main road to Juba. As is often the case, the disputed area 
is said to have been largely uninhabited in the past or at least during 
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the 1983–2005 war. Nyepo respondents claim that the area belonged to a 
Nyepo clan of Kansuk Boma and that the Kuku of Lire Payam had only 
recently started to settle and farm there. They had even built a small 
church. The conflict is said to have been sparked off in 2013 when a Kuku 
women farmers’ association erected a sign on or near the church on 
which was written in Kuku mörö taling (fighting quietly). This was taken 
as a direct provocation by some Nyepo and a subsequent meeting led 
to a violent confrontation, with Nyepo youth burning down the church. 
Kuku respondents indicate that the sign was simply a reference to the 
fact that women have to fight quietly for their rights and advancement, 
not a reference to fighting for land. They claim that the Nyepo had been 
pushing to gain recognition as an independent tribe, which they achieved 
in 2010, and consequently to have their own county: ‘So they said Nyepo 
Payam needs to be bigger. It needs to be big enough to be a county.’101 
Another Kuku respondent explains:
Current problems like conflict between payams are caused by 
the politicians. For example, the issue of land between Lire and 
Nyepo. Up to now this problem is not solved. The Nyepo have 
a small area so they want to grab more land so that their place 
becomes a county. They confused people and it almost led to 
conflict. People were beaten.102
Others blame politicians on both sides: ‘The politicians of the two 
payams fuelled the whole thing, to please the community so that they 
get votes.’103 The dispute has calmed down but was still unresolved in 
2014, despite the state parliament having summoned the former Kajokeji 
County commissioner to report on the problem. The people of Lire 
Payam were refusing to meet to resolve the issue until the Nyepo youth 
responsible for the violence and burning down the church were arrested, 
a demand the Nyepo refused. Since the conflict has simmered down, 
101 Interview with elder from Kajokeji, Juba, 31 July 2013. 
102 Interview with church leader, Mere, Kajokeji County, 13 September 2014. 
103 Interview with Kuku community youth leader, Juba, 30 July 2013.
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there seems to be a tacit strategy by the local authorities to leave it 
pending, rather than risk reopening it.
In Aweil East County, it might be expected that disputes over grazing 
territories would be the main source of conflict, as is often the case in 
such cattle-keeping areas. Instead there were striking commonalities 
between Aweil East County, and Kajokeji County and Moyo District 
in terms of the increasing disputes over administrative boundaries in 
arable and urban areas. One dispute between the counties of Aweil East 
and Aweil Centre did concern a grazing area containing an important 
dry-season water source. Yet respondents in Aweil East County empha-
size that grazing access was not the focus of the problem. Rather, they 
anticipated commercial farming in the contested area and feared that any 
taxes and revenue from this would be seized by Aweil Centre County, 
which was already collecting revenue from fishing licenses in the area. 
The dispute centres on administrative jurisdiction and the associated 
revenue collection opportunities. 
This dispute also has ethnic dimensions, with Aweil East County 
claiming that the disputed land belongs to Dinka Abiem sections and 
that those claiming it for Aweil Centre County are settlers from the Luo 
ethnic group. The latter are associated with the county government of 
Aweil Centre. In the past, the boundaries between such ethnic groups 
were porous and settlements interspersed. The disputed area, however, 
is said to lie in the central part of Aweil East County, not on its border. 
The fear now is that the inhabitants of such an area can place themselves 
under a different administration—in effect annexing the territory they 
inhabit to the neighbouring county. Since 2012, the dispute has been 
exacerbated and further complicated because maps were drawn showing 
the contested area to lie within the boundaries of the new Aweil Munici-
pality, rather than in either Aweil Centre County or Aweil East County.104
Boundary disputes are thus not simply or necessarily about rights to 
land for cultivation, grazing or settlement, although they can be sparked 
104 Interviews with chief, Mabil, Aweil East County, 27 August 2014; and elder, Wanyjok, 
Aweil East County, 28 August 2014.
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by individual quarrels over land and they frequently focus on communal 
land claims. The real issue at stake is more often one of competing admin-
istrative jurisdictions. As local government units have become closely 
associated with particular ethnic and sub-ethnic groups, the members 
of those groups who live in neighbouring administrations are seen as 
a potential means of expanding the boundaries of the unit with which 
they are ethnically identified. According to many respondents, people of 
other ethnic or sub-ethnic groups are welcome to remain or settle in any 
county or payam, provided they recognize its administration and do not 
try to establish their own administration or to annex the land they occupy 
to a neighbouring administration. Such concerns are heightened by the 
tactics of rival administrations, which sometimes each appoint their own 
chiefs or create competing administrative structures in disputed areas. 
This is the case in the contested areas of the South Sudan–Uganda border 
and in peri-urban areas of Aweil Town, which are claimed by both the 
Aweil Municipality and the county authorities in Aweil Centre.
Internal boundary disputes reflect a variety of factors, including 
political rivalries over decentralized administration, as well as growing 
perceptions of the commercial value of land and natural resources. 
Above all, they expose a long-standing underlying tension between 
recurrent government visions of a neat administrative chequerboard of 
ethnic territories and the much messier realities of social and residential 
community, in which sections, tribes and clans have never been stable 
or lived in clearly bounded territorial units. Of course there are impor-
tant relationships between people and land, and between identity and 
territory. These relationships, however, are complex and multi-layered, 
changing and not easily organized into administrative units. Ethnicity is 
not simply territorial and territorial communities are not mono-ethnic. 
The problem is that the policies and practices of decentralization recur-
rently, and increasingly, assume the opposite.
Disputed international boundaries
Competition over lucrative resources and administrative jurisdiction can 
be magnified when the disputed boundary is an international border, 
62 dividinG CoMMunities
particularly when the border itself is a source of revenue or when there 
are higher-level political tensions between national governments. Even 
in these cases, however, disputes frequently come to focus on local 
communal land claims and rights, with nationality adding an extra layer 
of complexity to the contested relationship between identity, territory 
and administrative jurisdiction, as in the Kajokeji–Moyo international 
boundary dispute. Moreover, this tendency is by no means unique, as 
a range of other international boundary disputes between South Sudan 
and Uganda and South Sudan and Sudan demonstrate.
The border between South Sudan and Uganda, for example, is also 
a site of dispute to the east of the Nile. The colonial governments did 
not attempt to make tribal boundaries the basis for the border immedi-
ately east of the Nile. Instead, the 1914 definition cuts through the Ma’di 
and the Acholi ethnic groups. Tensions have arisen in two particular 
sites on this border.105 One site is the village of Ngomoromo, on the 
border between Magwi County in the former Eastern Equatoria State 
in South Sudan and Lamwo District in Uganda. Land in Ngomoromo 
is claimed by one South Sudanese Acholi clan and two Ugandan Acholi 
clans. As in the Kajokeji–Moyo dispute, this intercommunal conflict 
has taken on international dimensions, with Ugandans alleging South 
Sudanese military incursions and relocation of the border post, while 
South Sudanese accuse Uganda of having shifted the border northwards. 
The recent history of cross-border military movements by both govern-
ment and rebel armies during the Sudanese and Ugandan civil wars has 
contributed to tensions and insecurities in the borderlands.106 There are 
further parallels with the Kajokeji–Moyo dispute in the way in which 
competing historical narratives are told by the rival clans to support 
their claims to what was formerly an uninhabited hunting ground in the 
borderlands but which has now been settled by returnees.
105 The details of these cases are taken from Hopwood, ‘Elephants abroad’.
106 Mareike Schomerus, Perilous Border: Sudanese communities affected by conflict on the Sudan–
Uganda border, London: Conciliation Resources, 2008.
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In another contested area east of the Nile, it is not the location of the 
international border that is disputed as in the Kajokeji–Moyo dispute, 
as much as the revenues to be gained from it. The main highway and 
thriving trade route between Uganda and South Sudan runs through 
the border post of Elegu, where the construction of a trading centre in 
2013 has fuelled a suddenly lucrative market in land sales and leases. In 
addition to lying on the north-south international border, Elegu is also 
located on the east-west boundary between Adjumani District, associ-
ated with the Ma’di, and Amuru District, associated with the Acholi. The 
district administrations are reported to have aligned themselves with two 
rival Ma’di clans claiming ancestral ownership of the land in Elegu. To 
further complicate the situation, one of these clans, Ma’di Oyapele, is 
located mainly in South Sudan but claims that its ancestral lands stretch 
into what is now Uganda. Some Oyapele clan members are exercising 
authority over land across the border in Elegu, selling and renting it to 
traders. This has provoked antagonism from the rival Ma’di Ofodro clan, 
which accuses them of being South Sudanese. 
Once again, the international border has added a new layer of 
complexity to the relationship between communal identity and territo-
rial land claims in an area where cross-border relations and movements 
make it impossible in any case to establish clear-cut national citizenship 
of individuals.107 In the absence of definitive individual nationalities, 
ethnic and clan identities are increasingly invoked as shorthand for 
defining nationality, whether to support or deny land claims. As in other 
cases, the dispute is exacerbated by neighbouring district administra-
tions competing for control of a newly lucrative source of revenue and 
manipulating communal tensions to gain popular support.
The role and position of national governments in these localized 
border disputes is often difficult to discern or define. Borderland peoples 
often interpret alleged encroachments into their territory as an indica-
tion of national government schemes to extend national boundaries and 
seize the resources of neighbouring states. At the same time, however, 
107 Hopwood, ‘Elephants abroad’, 13.
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respondents on both sides of the Kajokeji–Moyo dispute complain that 
their own respective central government is failing to support them 
effectively because each is more concerned with maintaining the diplo-
matic and military alliance between South Sudan and Uganda. These 
local perceptions encapsulate the tensions surrounding the new South 
Sudanese state borders with its neighbours. There are other potentially 
serious disputes, for example over the Gambela region on its border with 
Ethiopia and the Ilemi Triangle on its border with Kenya. So far, the South 
Sudanese government has prioritized the maintenance of good relations 
with Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda over the resolution of outstanding 
border issues. This can increase tensions and alienate borderland peoples 
from the central government, leading them to resort to the organization 
of armed local defence forces, as in Kajokeji County in 2014.108 On the 
other hand, it can enable the maintenance and negotiation of peaceful 
cross-border relations by local-level authorities.
Central and state-level government officials in South Sudan frequently 
justify the deferral of internal and international boundary dispute 
resolution on the grounds that the first priority is to resolve the new 
international border with Sudan. In the former north-south borders of 
Sudan, higher-level manipulation and instigation of local conflicts has 
been much more visible, both before and after the 2005 Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA): 
Differences over the shared use of land along the border, 
which might once have been resolved relatively easily between 
communities … are now complicated by national economic 
development policies that place a high priority on the 
exploitation of oil reserves and the expansion of mechanized 
agricultural schemes. Conflicts at the national level feed into 
competition at the local level and are exacerbated by the 
promise of state support to address local grievances and the use 
of state resources to mobilize local forces. … The idiom of the 
108 Also see: Schomerus, Perilous Border, 9–10.
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rights of local people … can be a screen behind which the battle 
over the control of oil or other resources is fought.109
Aweil East County borders one of the contested areas of the Sudan–South 
Sudan boundary, between the states of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and 
Southern Darfur. Here, too, the colonial government sought to map the 
province boundary onto an assumed tribal boundary between the Dinka 
Malual of Bahr el-Ghazal, including the Abiem of Aweil East County, 
and the Rizeigat of Darfur—both cattle-keeping peoples who depend on 
seasonal grazing migrations. Rizeigat from Darfur and Misseriya from 
Kordofan—known collectively as Baggara—move into Northern Bahr 
el-Ghazal for grazing during the dry season.110 The attempt by the British 
governors of the provinces of Darfur and Bahr el-Ghazal to agree this 
boundary in 1924 ran into all the challenges of present-day boundary 
resolution. ‘The governors attempted to solicit accounts of the bound-
ary’s history from local elites. But, as was so often the case, they were 
trying to find a stable historical precedent when in fact the boundary’s 
history was characterized by fluidity, contest, and almost certainly 
overlapping patterns of access to grazing.’111
The governors eventually fixed the boundary 14 miles south of the 
Kiir River—or Bahr el-Arab—an agreement named after the two gover-
nors and known as the Munro–Wheatley Line. The agreement was the 
focus for ‘persistent [Dinka] Malual resentment’ on the basis that it 
denied them access to the Kiir River and the grazing territories south 
of it, to which they claimed primary land rights.112 Local-level agree-
ments enabled shared grazing arrangements in the disputed territory 
but these were disrupted by the 1955–1972 and 1983–2005 civil wars, and 
109 Johnson, When boundaries, 10.
110 Sara Pantuliano, et al., ‘Put out to pasture: War, oil and the decline of Misseriyya 
Humr pastoralism in Sudan’, London: Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas 
Development Institute, 2009.
111 Christopher Vaughan, ‘The Rizeigat–Malual borderland during the Condominium: 
the limits of legibility’, in The borderlands of South Sudan, eds. Christopher Vaughan, 
Mareike Schomerus and Lotje de Vries, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 135.
112 Vaughan, ‘Rizeigat–Malual’, 136.
66 dividinG CoMMunities
by increasing pressures on grazing land to the north, leading Baggara 
herders to migrate south of the river for longer periods.113 During the 
1983–2005 civil war, the Khartoum government armed Baggara militias 
to raid Northern Bahr el-Ghazal.
In early 2008, fighting broke out between SPLA soldiers and Baggara 
herders. In consideration of this fighting, respondents of Aweil East 
County assume that the Government of Sudan and some sections of 
Misseriya and Rizeigat herders aimed to expel Dinka Malual and Dinka 
Abiem from the northern areas of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal. ‘They want 
to occupy land by force because they have force. They say that this land 
doesn’t belong to us.’114 Respondents fear the Government of Sudan 
wants to push Dinka Malual out of their land not only to control the 
pasture but also the oil fields that are believed to lie under the territory.115 
Subsequent Malual–Rizeigat and Malual–Misseriya peace meetings 
reaffirmed Baggara seasonal grazing rights within and across the disputed 
14 mile territory.116 The border is not only crossed by people for trans-
humant activities but also has a long history of movement of traders 
and other people in search for employment or refuge. Due to Northern 
Bahr el-Ghazal’s proximity to Sudan and the long distance to eastern 
Africa, the import of goods from Sudan is important to Northern Bahr 
el-Ghazal.117 After completing a peace agreement between Dinka Malual 
and Misseriya–Rizeigat in 2000, peace markets, including the peace 
113 For example, see: Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars: Peace or 
Truce, London: James Currey, 2012; Abdalbasit Saeed, ‘Challenges Facing Sudan after 
Referendum Day 2011. Persistent and Emerging Conflict in the North–South Borderline 
States’, Sudan Report, Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), 2010; and 
UNICEF, ‘Analysis of Nine Conflicts in Sudan’, Khartoum: UNICEF, May 2003.
114 Santschi, ‘Encountering and “capturing” hakuma’, 141.
115 Santschi, ‘Encountering and “capturing” hakuma’, 141. 
116 For example, see: Johnson, When boundaries; Martina Santschi, ‘Report: Dinka Malual–
Misseryia Peace Conference
11–14 November 2008, Aweil, Southern Sudan’, Bern: swisspeace, 2008.
117 Interview with community member, Mangartong, Aweil East County, 15 August 2014. 
 the PolitiCs of territory and identity 67
market in Warawar, were opened.118 Especially during times of crisis, 
Dinka Malual move to South Darfur to engage in sharecropping,119 while 
inhabitants from Darfur and Kordofan work in the transportation sector, 
catering and other fields in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal. Nevertheless, the 
borders between Sudan and South Sudan have repeatedly been closed 
during and since the interim period (2005–2011).120
As with other disputed areas along this Sudan–South Sudan border, 
debates over the boundary location have been intensely politicized by 
the history of war and government strategies but they also exemplify 
broader questions of land rights. The borderlands are part of a zone of 
long-distance transhumance, in which seasonal grazing rights are crucial. 
The nature of those rights has been intensely contested—sometimes 
violently—and periodically renegotiated. The colonial government 
sought to define tribal territories in Sudan, in which a particular ethnic 
group exercised dominant or primary land rights. It also recognized 
secondary rights to access land on a seasonal basis, whether by agreement 
with the holders of dominant rights or in an area of shared secondary 
rights. The negotiation of such agreements—rather than enforcement 
of exclusive dominant rights—has been crucial to the maintenance of 
peaceful relations: ‘The “dominant” and “secondary” rights paradigm is 
an important distinction in communal land ownership, access, and use 
in Sudan and adjoining countries.’121 
Even this paradigm, with its important recognition of multiple forms 
of land right, can risk imposing a simpler distinction than is neces-
sarily evident on the ground. It can also obscure the politics behind 
118 Peter Adwok Nyaba, ‘Report on the Trade Consultancy Conducted in Northern Bahr 
el-Ghazal’, London: Save the Children UK, 2002.
119 UNICEF, ‘Analysis of Nine Conflict Areas in Sudan’, 42.
120 Interview with returnee, Mangartong, Aweil East County, 15 August 2014. At the end 
of January 2016, the Sudanese government announced it would open the borders for free 
movement, including trade. It had restricted movement across the border for five years. 
See: Sudan Tribune, ‘South Sudan applauds opening of border with Sudan’, 28 January 
2016. Accessed 15 February 2016, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article57838.
121 Johnson, When boundaries, 24. 
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the categorization of land rights. The capacity to assert dominant or 
primary land rights, or to transform secondary rights into primary rights, 
or to label rival land claims as secondary rights, often depends on the 
relative power, status and influence of particular groups and individuals. 
The very attempt to distinguish primary and secondary rights is often 
highly contested, especially if the distinction is linked to the drawing of 
boundary lines—whether internal or international.
Many respondents, along with wider discussion of boundary disputes, 
see the solution to such contests and indeterminacy in the historical 
evidence of colonial boundaries, particularly in map form. Yet this faith 
in historic boundary maps and the increasing contemporary demands 
for boundary demarcation are driven by a changing conception of what 
boundaries are—a hardening and rigidifying of distinctions between 
peoples and the attempt to represent these territorially in what are often 
unprecedented ways.122 The demarcation of boundaries is promoted at 
the national and the international level. The CPA, the Local Government 
Act of South Sudan and the African Union (AU) Border Programme call 
for the demarcation of international and internal boundaries. According 
to the CPA the border between Sudan and Southern Sudan was to be 
demarcated within six months after the signing of the peace agreement 
in 2005.123 The Local Government Act calls for the demarcation of local 
level boundaries as key criteria for the establishment and warranting 
of local government councils. In an attempt to prevent conflicts over 
international borders in Africa, the AU—then the Organization of African 
Unity—stipulated in a resolution in 1964 that colonial borders ought to 
be respected by African states.124 In 2011, the assembly of the AU agreed 
122 Also see: Øystein Rolandsen, ‘Too much water under the bridge: internationalization 
of the Sudan–South Sudan border and local demands for its regulation’, in The 
Borderlands of South Sudan: Authority and Identity in Contemporary and Historical Perspectives, 
eds. Christopher Vaughan, Mareike Schomerus and Lotje de Vries, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan USA, 2013.
123 International Crisis Group, ‘Sudan: Defining the North-South Border’, Juba/
Khartoum/Nairobi/Brussels: Africa Briefing N°75, 2 September 2010.
124 Okumu Wafula, ‘Resources and border disputes in Eastern Africa’, Journal of Eastern 
African Studies 4:2 (2010), 279–297.
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that international boundaries of African states should be demarcated 
by 2017 with the help of boundary commissions. At the same time the 
AU promotes cross-border cooperation.125 The Uganda–South Sudan 
Joint Permanent Commission aims at settling border disputes between 
Uganda and South Sudan such as the contested border between Kajokeji 
and Moyo,126 while the Joint Border Commission of the Republic of South 
Sudan and the Republic of Sudan attempts to facilitate the demarcation 
of contested sections of the border between Sudan and South Sudan 
including the border between Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and South 
Darfur.127 
Despite the emphasis of the AU Border Programme on transforming 
perceptions of boundaries from ‘barriers’ to ‘bridges’,128 many people on 
the ground see demarcation as a means to secure land rights and political 
control of territory, and to exclude others. Similarly, there are increasing 
efforts to establish and distinguish more starkly between primary and 
secondary rights or to deny the latter altogether. In reality, the location of 
a boundary or the assertion of primary rights are all subject to debate and 
contending narratives, rather than being a discernible clear-cut objective 
fact. The danger is that more powerful individuals and groups can now 
assert their versions of historic boundaries and rights, which some do in 
increasingly exclusionary ways.
*
Disputes and conflicts over territorial control are not new in South Sudan 
or northern Uganda. Oral histories tell of violent processes of territorial 
conquest in which prior inhabitants were driven out or subordinated. In 
125 Commission of the African Union, Department of Peace and Security, Delimitation 
and Demarcation of Boundaries in Africa: General Issues and Case Studies, Addis Ababa: African 
Union Commission, 2014.
126 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Uganda and South Sudan move towards resolving border conflict, 
Kampala: Government of the Republic of Uganda, 27 August 2014. 
127 Sudan Tribune, ‘Sudan, S. Sudan agree on technical details of border demarcation’, 20 
March 2015. Accessed 30 May 2016, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article54347.
128 Commission of the African Union, Delimitation and Demarcation of Boundaries in Africa, 
11.
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Aweil East County, respondents recall times when conflicts over grazing 
rights were far more prevalent than they are at present. This is a change 
that is often attributed to the authoritarian governance of the area by 
recent SPLM and state administrations. This only makes it more striking 
that recent conflicts here have focused not on grazing areas but on sites 
of commercial value and government administration. In these different 
and distant places—Aweil East County in north-west South Sudan, on 
the border with Sudan, and Kajokeji County–Moyo District in the far 
south, on the borderlands between South Sudan and Uganda—there are 
strong commonalities in the focus, causes and discourses of boundary 
disputes. In particular, these disputes demonstrate the increasing polit-
ical value of territory and the resulting politicization of communal land 
rights. Tensions over land rights thus result from a two-way process as 
top-down political manipulation intersects with bottom-up ambitions 
and fears of exclusion from rights to land and other resources.
In this context, demarcating clear territorial boundaries and distinc-
tions between primary and secondary rights might seem like a solution 
to disputes and uncertainties. This assumes that such boundaries and 
distinctions already exist, or that they did in the past. From this perspec-
tive, the challenge is simply to find evidence for them. It is, however, 
obvious that boundaries between people and the distinctions between 
different land rights are far from clear-cut or objective. Harder bound-
aries and more rigid distinctions are emerging as competition for land 
increases and people seek to assert more exclusive and exclusionary 
definitions of territorial belonging, administrative sovereignty and 
communal land rights—not because they have always existed.
 71
4. Land belongs to the people? Hybrid 
land governance
Processes of decentralization and the tribalization of administration and 
politics have contributed to growing tensions over communal land rights. 
This has also been a two-way dynamic. As land has gained new kinds of 
value in some areas, land governance consequently has become increas-
ingly significant in generating the revenues over which local governments 
are struggling, particularly in and around the towns.
Recent legal and policy initiatives in South Sudan and Uganda have 
given unprecedented recognition to customary land tenure in a conscious 
effort to reverse the previous disregard of colonial and postcolonial 
governments for unregistered land rights. Yet paradoxically, by instituting 
systems of legal pluralism both governments have placed customary land 
governance under greater state control than ever before. The result is 
that customary land authorities have been drawn into local government 
arenas as state actors seek to harness their authority and legitimacy in 
new hybrid land governance institutions for controlling land transactions 
and resolving disputes over land. 
 These statutory changes and the hybrid forms of land governance 
that they condition raise crucial questions about the compatibility of 
state and customary laws and institutions. The rhetoric and practice of 
legal pluralism, however, disguise the tensions and changes inherent 
in transforming customary land rights and authorities into laws and 
institutions of the state. 
Colonial land laws and governance
The current hybridity of land law has its origins in British colonial 
policies in Sudan and Uganda. These policies were largely focused on 
the central, commercially productive regions around the state capitals of 
Khartoum and Kampala. This contributed to regional inequalities, which 
are seen to have underpinned many of the region’s postcolonial conflicts. 
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In northern riverain Sudan, the registration of private land titles that 
had begun under Turco–Egyptian rule in the nineteenth century accel-
erated in the early colonial period. From the 1920s, a system of tenant 
farming was also introduced on Sudan’s Gezira cotton growing scheme. 
In Uganda, the British government made an agreement with the rulers 
of the Buganda Kingdom that gave landed estates to the chiefly elite, 
turning the peasants on this land into rent-paying tenants. In these 
economic heartlands of Sudan and Uganda demand increased for agricul-
tural labour on commercial farms, plantations and agricultural schemes. 
In other regions, including Southern Sudan and northern Uganda, 
the colonial governments were wary of this kind of commercialization, 
seeking to promote a much more limited extent of cash-crop production 
and to avoid disrupting the social structures they believed were vital 
to stability and security. Communal customary land rights were recog-
nized by these governments and there was no attempt to introduce land 
registration outside small urban areas. Customary rights were recog-
nized as usufruct rights rather than full ownership, with the land title 
instead vested in the government, which retained the right to appropriate 
unregistered land for its own purposes. In Sudan, the Land Settlement 
Ordinance of 1905 and the Land Settlement and Registration Ordinance of 
1925 both state that ‘waste, forest, and unoccupied land shall be deemed 
to be the property of the government, until the contrary is proved’.129 In 
Uganda, the colonial Crown Land Ordinance of 1903 in effect made those 
exercising customary land rights into tenants on (British) Crown lands. 
Postcolonial politics of land
The implications of colonial land policies only became fully apparent in 
postcolonial Uganda and Sudan. Uganda’s Public Land Act of 1962 made 
Crown lands into public land, effectively retaining the colonial treatment 
of Ugandans living under customary land tenure as ‘tenants-at-will of the 
129 Land Settlement Ordinance § 7(ii); Land Settlement and Registration Ordinance 
§ 16(c), cited in David K. Deng, ‘“Land belongs to the community”: Demystifying the 
“global land grab” in Southern Sudan’. LDPI Working Paper 4. Cape Town, South Africa: 
Land Deals Politics Initiative, 2011, 8.
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state’.130 Government policies designed to promote large-scale farming 
culminated in the Land Reform Decree passed by President Idi Amin’s 
government in 1975, which vested all land in the state as government 
or public land to be administered by the Public Lands Commission, 
abolished customary land tenure and replaced freehold titles—where 
they existed—with government leases.131 
In Sudan, similar measures became highly contentious. President 
Gaafar Nimeiri’s ambitious agricultural development policies necessi-
tated the appropriation of large areas of unregistered land for irrigated 
and mechanized schemes. The 1970 Unregistered Land Act essentially 
reaffirmed the colonial law that all unregistered land belonged to the 
government. Although the colonial government had simultaneously 
recognized customary land rights and the principle of compensation, 
the 1970 Act repealed the 1925 provisions allowing for compensation and 
for claimants to subsequently prove ownership of unregistered land and 
strengthened the assertion of government ownership over such land, 
regardless if it was occupied.132
The effects of this legislation were most apparent in the peripheries 
of present-day Sudan. Large areas in southern Kordofan and southern 
Darfur were leased out for mechanized farming schemes, displacing 
thousands of people who had been living on and from that land.133 The 
resulting grievances are seen to have been crucial in galvanizing political 
and military opposition to the government in the 1980s and 1990s, so that 
130 Patrick McAuslan, Land Law Reform in Eastern Africa: Traditional or Transformative?, 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2013, 26.
131 McAuslan, Land Law Reform, 27–8.
132 Gaim Kibreab, State intervention and the environment in Sudan, 1889–1989: The Demise of 
Communal Resource Management, Vol. 18, Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002; 
and Guma Kunda Komey, Land, governance, conflict and the Nuba of Sudan, London: James 
Currey, 2010.
133 Paul V. De Wit, ‘Land and property study in Sudan, interim report, scoping of issues 
and questions to be addressed’, Norwegian Refugee Council, UNHCR and FAO, 2004; 
Sibrino Barnaba Forojalla and Kennedy Crispo Galla, ‘Scoping Paper’ (Section A), in Land 
tenure issues in Southern Sudan: Key findings and recommendations for Southern Sudan land policy, 
Washington, DC: USAID, 2010, 3.
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the rebellion in the south by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) 
gained support in northern areas such as the Nuba Mountains, Darfur, 
Southern Blue Nile and eastern Sudan.134 
The effects of the 1970 land legislation were always limited in Southern 
Sudan. In some towns, land had been gazetted and then allocated by the 
government since the colonial period, but most rural areas of Southern 
Sudan continued to be governed by customary law.135 The SPLA never-
theless claimed to be fighting to protect the land and its resources from 
northern government appropriation, a threat made more real by the 
discovery of oil under southern soil in the late 1970s, and by the subse-
quent displacement of communities living in the Unity State oilfields in 
the 1990s.
The principle that land belongs to the people was increasingly 
championed not only by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/
Army (SPLM/A) in Sudan but also by the government of President 
Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM), which seized 
power in Uganda in 1986. Uganda’s new constitution in 1995 changed 
the emphasis from state ownership of land to ownership by the people 
of Uganda and recognized customary land tenure alongside freehold, 
leasehold and the mailo (freehold land tenure) system prevailing in the 
Buganda Kingdom. It also provided for the devolution of land governance 
to the district level in the form of district land boards and tribunals for 
resolving land disputes.136
The SPLM/A ensured that land issues were prominent in the discus-
sions leading to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005.137 
134 For example, see Johnson, Root Causes; Johnson, ‘Decolonising the borders’; Liz 
Alden Wiley, ‘Making peace impossible? Failure to honour the land obligations of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Central Sudan’, Resource paper, Bergen: Chr. 
Michelsen Institute, 2010; Komey, Land, governance, conflict. 
135 De Wit, ‘Land and property study’, 10; Akechak Jok et al., ‘A study of customary law 
in contemporary Southern Sudan’. Juba: World Vision International and the South Sudan 
Secretariat of Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2004. 
136 McAuslan, Land Law Reform, 83–5.
137 Deng, ‘Land belongs to the community’, 11.
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As a consequence, the Agreement on Wealth Sharing (chapter III of the 
CPA) stated that new land policies and laws should be developed ‘that 
respond better to the realities of the different populations’.138 The CPA, 
however, did not specifically recognize customary or community land 
ownership:
[T]here is a common misconception among Southern Sudanese 
that the principle ‘land belongs to the community’ was 
enshrined in the CPA and the interim constitutions. Though 
the texts strongly favor community participation in land issues 
and the right of communities to share in the wealth created 
from land investments, they do not explicitly provide for 
community land ownership.139 
The CPA and the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan further 
stipulated that management of land and natural resources should be 
decentralized—although without defining the appropriate levels and 
their jurisdictions—and that two independent land commissions were 
to be introduced at the national—Sudan—and Southern Sudan levels.140 
Although the CPA land provisions were weak, they nonetheless allowed 
for legal and political change in government treatment of majority land 
rights, which ‘specifically included potential for redress for the land 
abuses which contributed so significantly to the North–South civil 
war’.141 In 2006, the new Government of Southern Sudan Ministry of 
Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development excluded Sudan’s 1970 
138 Cited in Paul V. De Wit, ‘Land Policy Development in Post Conflict Sudan: Dealing 
with Delicate Balances in a Fluid Environment’. Paper Presented at the World Bank 
Conference on New Challenges for Land Policy and Administration. Session: Land 
administration in post disaster and conflict environments, Washington, DC, 14–15 
February, 2008, 6.
139 Deng, ‘Land belongs to the community’, 12.
140 Lomoro Robert Bullen, ‘Jurisdiction of GOSS, state, county, and customary 
authorities over land administration, planning, and allocation: Juba County, Central 
Equatoria State’ (Section B), in Land tenure issues in Southern Sudan: Key findings and 
recommendations for Southern Sudan land policy, Washington, DC: USAID, 2010, B–v.
141 Alden Wiley, Making peace impossible?, 1.
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Unregistered Land Act from being applied ‘pending the enactment of a 
Southern Sudan land law’.142
The politics of land in South(ern) Sudan since 2005
While the Government of Southern—now South—Sudan appears to 
promote customary land rights in its policies and legislation, it is also 
accused of ignoring those rights in numerous cases of land grabbing by 
powerful actors. Land became an increasing focus of dispute and conflict 
during the interim period (2005–2011) as a result of population return 
and urbanization. In particular, there were tensions in the Equatorian 
states, where people displaced from other areas of Southern Sudan had 
moved during the war. Returnees often found their former plots of land 
inhabited by soldiers or displaced civilians, prompting accusations of 
land grabbing. 
There were virulent debates, with some asserting territorial rights 
of national citizenship and claiming the right to settle anywhere in 
Southern Sudan. Some declared that their part in the liberation struggle 
had earned them the right to land in the liberated area. Others seized 
upon the SPLM slogan ‘land belongs to the community’ to argue that 
land rights were defined by autochthony or antecedent first-coming.143 
In national political arenas and media this was often expressed in ethnic 
terms or in the broader regional categories of Equatorians and Nilotics. 
Tensions were further exacerbated by government and military actors’ 
142 David K. Deng, ‘Land belongs to the community: Demystifying the “global land 
grab” in Southern Sudan’, LDPI Working Paper 4, Cape Town, South Africa: Land Deals 
Politics Initiative, 2011, 6. 
143 On tensions over land elsewhere or more generally in South Sudan, see: Rolandsen, 
‘Land, Security and Peace Building’; Frode Sundnes and N. Shanmugaratnam, ‘Socio-
economic revival and emerging issues relating to land and customary institutions in 
Yirol, Southern Sudan’, in Between War and Peace in Sudan and Sri Lanka: deprivation and 
livelihood revival, ed. N. Shanmugaratnam, London: James Currey, 2008, 59–76.
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appropriation of land and reports of large-scale land deals with external 
investors.144
The limited efficacy or clarity of national legislation is interpreted by 
some South Sudanese citizens as an indication of the lack of political will 
on the part of the South Sudanese government to reform a situation of 
uncertainty that government and military elites may be exploiting. The 
South(ern) Sudan Land Commission was established in 2006 to mediate 
claims, arbitrate and make recommendations to government institutions 
‘concerning land reform policies and recognition of customary rights or 
customary land law’ and to ‘advise different levels of government on 
how to co-ordinate policies’.145 In practice, the land commission has 
been engaged in drafting the Land Act and related land policy rather 
than in addressing serious land disputes. In 2009, the most significant 
pieces of legislation relating to land were passed: The Land Act, the 
Local Government Act and the Investment Promotion Act. The Land Act 
recognizes and distinguishes between public, community and private 
land. Community land includes land registered in the name of a commu-
nity or a community representative or land used, managed and held by 
a ‘specific community as community forests, cultivation, grazing areas, 
shrines and any other purposes recognized by law’.146 The definition of 
the term ‘community’ is vague, however, with ‘communities identified 
on the basis of ethnicity, residence or interest’.147
While declaring its protection of community land rights and the 
grazing rights of pastoralists, the 2009 Land Act nevertheless provides 
the South Sudanese government with the legal basis to appropriate land: 
144 For example, see: Reuters, ‘U.S. investor leads Southern Sudan land lease deal’,  
12 January 2009. Accessed 23 February 2016, http://uk.reuters.com/article/jarch-sudan-
idUKN1233921220090112. 
145 Government of Southern Sudan, ‘The Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan’, Juba: 
Government of Southern Sudan, 2005, 73.
146 Government of Southern Sudan, ‘The Land Act 2009’, Juba: Government of Southern 
Sudan, 2009, 17.
147 Government of Southern Sudan, ‘The Land Act’, 17; also see: Rolandsen, ‘Land, 
Security and Peace Building’, 21–22.
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‘The government has the ability to expropriate land for use as long as 
investment activity “reflect[s] an important interest for the community” 
and “contribute[s] economically and socially to the development of the 
local community”.’148 The communities affected by land expropriation in 
relation to investment have to be consulted and a social, economic and 
environmental impact assessment should be conducted. Nevertheless, 
a shift of approach can be observed in SPLM and government attitudes 
to communal land: 
In the wake of the successful peace talks, the SPLM vested an 
almost exclusive right of ownership in land to ‘the people and 
communities’ of Southern Sudan. The position of the GoSS 
[Government of South Sudan] is now more subtle; it proposes 
the state takes a much stronger direct interest as a landowner 
and manager.149 
When the Republic of South Sudan gained independence on 9 July 2011, 
this stronger interest in government control of land was apparent in the 
new Transitional Constitution of South Sudan, which explicitly stated 
that ‘all land in South Sudan is owned by the people of South Sudan and 
its usage shall be regulated by the government in accordance with the 
provisions of this Constitution and the law’.150 
The 2009 Land Act provides that state laws should further specify 
the structure, functions and organization of land governance institu-
tions at the state, county and payam level. Yet state land laws have not 
been passed and enacted in most states. To try to address the remaining 
questions and uncertainties of the Land Act, the South Sudan Land 
Commission subsequently drafted a land policy, which was submitted to 
148 Land Act S.63, cited in Tiernan Mennen, ‘Customary law and land rights in South 
Sudan’, Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council, March 2012, 15; Deng, ‘Land belongs to the 
community’; and Forojalla and Galla, ‘Scoping Paper’.
149 De Wit, ‘Land Policy Development’, 11.
150 Government of Republic of South Sudan, ‘The Transitional Constitution of the 
Republic of South Sudan’, 42. 
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the Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development in 2011.151 It 
was adopted by the South Sudan Council of Ministries in February 2013 
and was then sent to the National Legislative Assembly to be reviewed.152 
As of 2015, it was still awaiting a second reading and had not yet been 
adopted and implemented.153 This is largely explained by the civil war in 
South Sudan that started in late 2013, which has contributed to delays 
in government processes. A broader lack of government will to address 
land issues may also be at work.
The 2011 land policy claims to be based on an extensive popular consul-
tation exercise in all ten states, which revealed people’s concerns about 
tenure insecurity. It also proclaims a vision of providing secure land 
rights for all South Sudanese. The policy states, ‘Secure property rights 
are essential to the region’s economic reconstruction and political and 
social development.’154 It also defines land as a ‘social right’, calling for 
informal squatters to be ‘granted permanent land rights’, and enshrines 
customary land rights in the sense that ‘communities, not government, 
should be the primary parties that enter into agreements with inves-
tors’.155 It further states that communities should engage with investors 
‘through their county and payam land institutions’,156 thus preserving a 
central role for government institutions. 
151 Mennen, ‘Customary law’, 15.
152 ‘Council of Ministers passes South Sudan land policy’, USAID, 25 February 2013. 
Accessed 17 August 2015, http://usaidlandtenure.net/commentary/2013/02/council-of-
ministers-passes-south-sudan-land-policy. 
153 Ajo Noel Julious, ‘Land ownership and conflict of laws in South Sudan’, Sudan 
Tribune, 1 August 2015. Accessed 20 October 2015, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.
php?article55887; and Francesca Marzatico, ‘A roadmap for the implementation of the 
South Sudan land policy: A step towards the land reform?’, Juba: Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Cooperation Development, 2015. 
154 Southern Sudan Land Commission, ‘Draft Land Policy 2011’, Juba: Government of 
Southern Sudan, 2011, 4.
155 Mennen, ‘Customary law’, 16; Southern Sudan Land Commission, ‘Draft Land Policy 
2011’, iv, 20, 7.
156 Southern Sudan Land Commission, ‘Draft Land Policy 2011’, 22.
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While the land policy affirms the role of the government in securing 
land rights for all citizens, it provides little detail as to the mechanisms, 
structures or laws to achieve this. Intended only as the basis for further 
legislative processes and the production of guidelines and regulations, 
the land policy calls for the creation of a Community Land Act to govern 
customary land tenure, a property mortgage law, multiple other pieces of 
legislation and the revision of existing laws. Recognizing the ‘unclear and 
overlapping lines of authority’ in relation to land governance, it makes 
only the general recommendation that the government shall ‘clarify the 
roles and jurisdiction of various national state and local level institutions 
over the administration and management of land’.157 Although the policy 
contains important core principles, it does little to clarify the practicali-
ties of land administration.
The politics of land reform in Uganda since 1995
In Uganda, the 1998 Land Act was celebrated in some quarters as the 
first full legal recognition of customary land tenure. Yet here, too, there 
are tensions and popular suspicions regarding government land policies 
and intentions. The recognition given to customary land tenure has been 
driven by a policy of encouraging land privatization and an increasing 
emphasis on land as a resource for (national) development.158
The 1995 constitution provides for customary land to be converted 
into freehold and registered to individual owners. The 1998 Land Act 
also provides for customary land rights to be converted into freehold.159 
‘Recently, this principle has been spelled out even more clearly in the 
157 Southern Sudan Land Commission, ‘Draft Land Policy 2011’, 26.
158 Ambreena Manji, The Politics of Land Reform in Africa: From Communal Tenure to Free 
Markets, London: Zed Books, 2006; Julian Hopwood, ‘Women’s land claims in the Acholi 
region of northern Uganda: What can be learned from what is contested’, International 
Journal on Minority and Group Rights 22 (2015), 387–409 (388); Judy Adoko and Simon 
Levine, ‘A Land Market for Poverty Eradication? A case study of the impact of Uganda’s 
Land Acts on policy hopes for development and poverty eradication’, Kampala: Land and 
Equity Movement in Uganda, 2005; McAuslan, Land Law Reform, 229–239. 
159 Simon Coldham, ‘Land reform and customary rights: The case of Uganda’, Journal of 
African Law 44:1 (2000), 65–77.
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Draft National Land Policy of 2011, which states that “public policy 
regards freehold as the property regime of the future”.’160 The national 
land policy, which was finally gazetted in 2013, is seen as the culmina-
tion of a national process of enquiry and discussion on land governance 
going back to the late 1980s. It emphasizes ‘legal recognition of the 
dual operation of both customary system and statutory system in land 
rights administration, land dispute resolution and land management 
by empowering customary authorities to perform their functions’.161 At 
the same time, though, the national land policy emphasizes the central 
importance of land for national development and hence strengthens the 
state’s role in administering land to promote its more effective use.162 The 
policy is focused on land use as much as on land rights, with an overall 
goal of ‘optimal use and management of land resources for a prosperous 
and industrialized economy’.163 It explicitly declares the ‘need to re-focus 
the discourse on land from over-emphasis on property rights per se, to 
its essential resource value in development’.164
While Uganda’s legislation over the past 20 years has given unprec-
edented recognition to customary land rights, its overall direction is to 
promote national development and more efficient exploitation of the 
land and its resources. The discovery of oil reserves furthers the asser-
tion of the state’s role in managing natural resources: ‘While article 237 
of the 1995 constitution gives all the land to the people of Uganda, all 
minerals still belong to the government, meaning, therefore, that citizens 
160 Rasmus H. Pedersen, et al., ‘Land Tenure and Economic Activities in Uganda: 
A Literature Review’, DIIS Working Paper 13, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for 
International Studies, 2012, 12.
161 Naome Kabanda, ‘Uganda’s National Land Policy: Background, highlights and next 
steps’, Focus on Land in Africa, no date. Accessed August 2015, http://www.focusonland.
com/fola/en/resources/ugandas-national-land-policy-background-key-highlights-and-
next-steps/.
162 Pedersen et al., ‘Land Tenure’, 30. 
163 Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, ‘The Uganda National Land 
Policy’, Kampala: Government of the Republic of Uganda, February 2013, 8.
164 Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, ‘The Uganda National Land 
Policy’, 5.
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have surface land rights only.’165 In 2014, President Museveni reportedly 
reminded Ugandans of this provision during a conference on mineral 
wealth in Kampala:
President Museveni has said the government will change the 
law to allow intending investors in the mining industry to 
access private land that contains minerals without negotiating 
with the land owners. … He said Cabinet would push for the 
amendment of the Mining Act 2001 so that investors negotiate 
directly with the government for access to the land where they 
intend to carry out mineral extraction. ‘The people who have 
to give you consent are the people who own the minerals, and 
that is the government’, said President Museveni. Currently, 
investors seeking to do mining business have to obtain consent 
of the private owners of the land where mineral deposits 
exist. ‘The mistake has been to make the investors deal with 
the landowners, they should deal with the government; and 
then the government will deal with the landowners. You just 
tell those villagers to get out. You cannot stop the State from 
accessing its assets…’166 
Such statements have generated growing suspicion among many people 
in northern Uganda that the government will appropriate their land for 
resource exploitation or commercial agriculture. This threat is seemingly 
epitomized by the government decision to lease land in Amuru District 
for the Amuru Sugar Project, a joint venture of the Madhvani Group and 
Government of Uganda, which has met with sustained opposition in 
Amuru.167 Some respondents in Moyo District suspect that the Ugandan 
165 Environment Department, ‘Moyo District State of Environment Report’, Moyo 
District: Moyo District Local Government, 2004, 41.
166 Nelson Wesonga, ‘Owners will lose rights over mineral-rich land—Museveni’, Daily 
Monitor, 2 October 2014.
167 Giuliano Martiniello, ‘Accumulation by dispossession, agrarian change and resistance 
in Northern Uganda’, MISR Working Paper No. 12, Kampala: Makerere Institute of Social 
Research, 2013; Hopwood and Atkinson, ‘Final Report’, 19–20. 
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government deliberately makes the process of registration costly and 
difficult in order to limit people’s land rights:
People have no papers for their land. They only know it is 
inherited. But if you have no paper and the government wants 
to do development, they will not compensate you as much as 
somebody with papers. There was a government circular to 
register land but then the government kept quiet. There will 
come a time when the government will come and see dormant 
land that is yours but not being used. They will say how do 
you prove that this is yours? Then they cannot compensate you 
for land, soil but only for trees, houses on it. But if you have a 
paper, then you have authority over the land.168
The solution to the threat of land grabbing is much debated within and 
beyond Uganda. Some, such as the Uganda Land Alliance, advocate the 
registration of individualized freehold land titles, while others, such 
as the Land and Equity Movement in Uganda, argue for more formal 
recognition and protection of customary land tenure systems.169 On the 
ground meanwhile, people are variously pursuing one or both of these 
avenues—seeking to formalize or semi-formalize individual land rights 
or to assert customary authority and communal rights to land. The insti-
tutions to which they turn for dispute resolution or land governance 
encompass similarly hybrid principles and strategies in their operations.
Hybrid local land governance
The 2009 Land Act of South Sudan and the 1998 Land Act of Uganda both 
recognize customary land rights alongside private land tenure, institu-
tionalizing a plural legal system of land governance. The implementation 
and enforcement of both laws have been largely delegated to local govern-
ment authorities, where the uncertainties and contradictions of land law 
have had to be worked out. The legislation has been interpreted and 
168 Interview with area land committee chair, Moyo District, 15 October 2014.
169 Martiniello, ‘Accumulation by dispossession’, 5.
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implemented in ways that have strengthened the authority both of local 
governments and customary leaders with whom these governments have 
allied, while also producing internal tensions and rivalries among these 
authorities.
South Sudan
South Sudan’s 2009 Land Act and Local Government Act provide for land 
governance institutions at state, county and payam levels. State-level 
government institutions are responsible for regulating, managing and 
coordinating land administration and land use, as well as developing laws 
and policies, boundary demarcation, surveys and registration.170 County 
land authorities are expected to engage in diverse activities, including the 
holding and allocation of public land, facilitating registration, supporting 
land surveys and advising traditional authorities and communities on 
land tenure and rights.171 The existing legislation also provides for 
different institutions responsible for settling land disputes. They include 
the land commission, different levels of the judiciary (including county 
courts), arbitration committees, county land authorities, payam land 
councils, chiefs’ courts, in addition to elders and other authorities who 
engage in customary justice.172
In practice, local land governance systems have been constructed 
largely through semi-formal arrangements between local governments 
and customary authorities, as this youth leader in Kajokeji County 
explains:
The [2009] Land Act of South Sudan specifies three types of 
land: public, private and community land owned by traditional 
leaders. Most areas are still owned by community leaders, 
landlords. People and the government come [to get land] 
through landlords and then you pay some money to own that 
170 Government of Southern Sudan, ‘The Land Act 2009’, 25/43.
171 Government of Southern Sudan, ‘The Land Act 2009’, 26/46; Government of 
Southern Sudan, The Local Government Act (2009). 
172 Government of Southern Sudan, ‘The Land Act 2009’, 42ff/91–99.
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land. Within town, the government gets land and then they 
demarcate and survey it. Most areas in Kajokeji were not 
demarcated, only a small area for the government in Mere. 
So now the government comes to the landlords, because land 
belongs to the people.173
In Kajokeji County, the primary customary land authorities recognized 
by the county government are the clan land custodians, or landlords, 
with the county-level paramount chief ’s court as the primary institution 
for settling land cases. A county land committee was formed under the 
previous county commissioner. In 2014, it was headed by the county-
level paramount chief, to whom most people referred as the primary 
authority in settling land disputes, though whether this was in his court 
or through the committee was less clear. Cases and appeals can also be 
brought to the county court, headed by a former chief, or ultimately to 
the state-level high court. At the time, this was Juba, the state capital of 
Central Equatoria State, to which Kajokeji County belonged until 2015. 
In practice, however, land disputes are settled largely in the local chiefs’ 
courts or at the family or clan level.
In Aweil East County—now Aweil East state—the close proximity of 
the former Northern Bahr el-Ghazal state capital, Aweil Town, ensured 
that a variety of institutions were settling rural land disputes there in 
2014. The court complex in Aweil Town comprises a high court and a 
town court that issue title deeds and settle disputes over both surveyed 
and un-surveyed lands. In Aweil East County, the county court is headed 
by a trained judge but it primarily uses customary law to settle rural land 
disputes.174 There is also a town bench court in Mabil, the headquarters 
of Aweil East County, that hears land disputes and referral cases from 
chiefs from across the county, along with a county paramount chiefs’ 
court made up of the seven paramount (sectional) chiefs of Aweil 
173 Interview with male youth leader, Wudu, Kajokeji County, 28 September 2014. 
174 Interviews with county local government staff member, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 
14 August 2014; and county staff, Mabil, Aweil East County, 13 August 2014.
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East County.175 Paramount chiefs are also members of the county land 
committee. At times, the chiefs are asked to form a temporary committee 
to settle larger land disputes about arable land that often involve different 
sections and payams.176
In South Sudan, up to now chiefs have remained the principal institu-
tion of local government at the boma, or village, level and their courts 
are the main judicial institutions at boma, payam and sometimes even 
county levels. They have long played a role in resolving disputes over 
land. They are not, however, the clan land custodians, as respondents in 
Kajokeji County emphasize:
Chiefs are there to administer people, not land.177 
Chiefs deal with people and landlords deal with land. Since 
creation, they [landlords] have a special responsibility for the 
land.178
Chiefdoms in Kajokeji County encompass multiple clan territories. In 
Aweil East County, chiefdoms correspond with the main Dinka sections 
(see Table 1). Even here, however, chiefs have not played a major role 
in allocating land and pasture to community members, as individuals 
mainly access land through their families and clans or by clearing 
new land. Where chiefs have played a role in relation to land, this has 
consisted of resolving disputes and conflicts or in mediating negotiations 
with government or other organizations concerning allocations of land 
for particular purposes; for example, government buildings, infrastruc-
ture development or forest reserves. Since 2005, chiefs have become 
175 Interviews with local government staff, Mabil, Aweil East County, 13 August 2014; 
county local government staff member, Wanyjok, Aweil East, 14 August 2014; several 
community leaders, Returnee Area, Aweil East County, 14 August 2014 (Dinka); group 
of chief court members, Mabil, Aweil East County, 19 August 2014; chief court members, 
Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 21 August 2014; and chief, Mabil, Aweil East County,  
26 August 2014.
176 Interview with public official, Mabil, Aweil East County, 26 August 2014.
177 Interview with chief from Kajokeji, Juba, 2 August 2013. 
178 Interview with elder from Kajokeji, Juba, 31 July 2013. 
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more prominent in distributing land, particularly around the towns. It 
is important to recognize that this is a relatively new role for them and 
in some cases has generated considerable opposition and contestation, 
especially from clan leaders and landlords. At the same time, chiefs’ roles 
in resolving disputes and conflicts over land have become increasingly 
important.
Uganda
In Uganda, customary chiefs are called ‘cultural leaders’ and do not play 
a formal role in local government. The term ‘chief ’ is more commonly 
used to refer to the civil servants appointed to run sub-counties, who 
are not traditional authorities. In Moyo District, the primary customary 
land authorities recognized by the district and sub-county governments 
are the clan land custodians. In addition, local councils (LCs) play a more 
significant role in land governance and dispute resolution, particularly 
at the village, parish and sub-county levels (LC 1–3). The 1998 Land Act 
outlines the process whereby an individual, family or community can 
apply for a certificate of customary ownership through a parish land 
committee and the district land board. The land committee is required 
to record the rights of other persons to occupy or use the land and to 
‘safeguard the interests and rights in the land … of women, absent 
persons, minors and persons with or under a disability’.179 The 1998 Land 
Act provides for land disputes to be resolved by district and sub-county 
land tribunals. Yet the costs and massive logistics of the new land gover-
nance mechanisms have stalled implementation. 
Further legislation followed the 1998 Land Act to clarify or amend its 
provisions. The Land (Amendment) Act 2004 abolished the parish land 
committees in favour of the sub-county level ‘where the recorder, that is 
the one registering rights and updating registers of customary certificates, 
is located’. In 2007, the district land tribunals were abolished, creating a 
vacuum in land dispute resolution, which is reported to have been filled 
179 Government of the Republic of Uganda, ‘Land Act 1998’, Kampala: Government of 
the Republic of Uganda, 1998, Article 5(1)(g).
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by multiple institutions and actors.180 According to the Ugandan national 
land policy drafted in 2011 and gazetted in 2013, this gap is supposed to be 
redressed by reinstituting district land tribunals. In 2013, the authority of 
parish council courts (LC 2s) to adjudicate land disputes was withdrawn 
because LC 1 and LC 2 elections had not been held since 2002.181 In 
practice, the various laws and policies have had a limited effect and have 
caused considerable confusion at the local level, leading to gaps between 
policy and practice. In Moyo District, it is clear that LC 1, LC 2 and LC 3 
councillors and officers often continue to handle land disputes, with an 
emphasis on mediation and customary principles, combined with semi-
formal recording.182 Area land committees (ALCs) have been formed at 
the sub-county level, as one sub-county administrative chief explains:
The sub-county uses the [1998] Land Act, which categorizes 
land as customary, leasehold, freehold or mailo. There are area 
land committees at the parish level and sub-county level. The 
LCs nominate able persons to the committees. One man and 
one woman from each parish. … They are trained by the district 
land officer. Their major role is solving land disputes and they 
measure land for leases and sign the form for approval.
We also have an LC 2 court in each parish, with nine members, 
to handle land cases, plus the LC 3 court with five members 
here for appeals. The courts are supervised by the magistrates. 
Their members are independent from the LC. … Sale of land 
involves the LC 1. He must sign and agree the size of the land. 
The written document is kept by the owner, the buyer and the 
LC. … When people have cases they pay a fee to the [area land] 
180 Government of the Republic of Uganda, ‘Land Act 1998’, 19, 25–6; Government of 
the Republic of Uganda, ‘Land (Amendment) Act 2004’, Kampala: Government of the 
Republic of Uganda, 2004, Section 27.
181 Hopwood, ‘Women’s land claims’, 395–96.
182 Hopwood, ‘Elephants abroad’, 7–8.
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committee. The committee is not permanent. It just meets 
when there are cases.183
An ALC chairperson explains that his ALC had only just started: ‘The 
training and swearing in takes time. The council executive committee 
nominates members and they are approved by the council. Then they are 
trained by the district land office and sworn in by the chief magistrate.’184 
The district council (LC 5) chairperson and others emphasize the 
recently enhanced role of clan landlords in local land governance. The 
chairperson of another ALC, formed in 2007, stresses that ALC members 
had to be over fifty years old and have close working relationships with 
landlords and other elders: ‘We are not quick to solve such disputes. It 
needs the elders to tell the history of that land—where the boundaries 
were, how to solve it.’185 He also claims that the former district land 
tribunals had been dissolved in 2007 because:
They always created a winner and a loser, which is not a good 
way when it comes to land, and they were being bribed. Later 
they created the LC 3 court, so if the ALC fail to resolve, the 
case is sent there. Usually the LC 3 court follows the judgment 
of the ALC. Now they even dissolved the LC 3 court. The ALC 
don’t resolve like a court but act as mediators between the two 
parties … because it may be two brothers rivalling. If you say 
one is right and the other is wrong, you may find later that one 
is killed.186
Moyo District demonstrates the dynamic nature of land governance, 
with new mechanisms and institutions evolving and replacing defunct 
or ineffective ones. The emphasis of the ALCs on mediation rather than 
183 Interview with sub-county official for Moyo, Moyo Town, 10 October 2014. Also 
indicated by interview with area land committee chairperson, Moyo Town, 11 October 
2014. 
184 Interview with ALC chairperson, Lefori, Moyo District, 13 October 2014.
185 Interview with area land committee chairperson, Moyo District, 15 October 2014.
186 Interview with area land committee chairperson, Moyo District, 15 October 2014.
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adjudication also reveals the importance of reconciliation as a central 
goal of customary dispute resolution, especially in terms of land. This 
supports the findings of other studies that suggest local-level and 
customary solutions to land disputes are more realistic and effective 
than centralized legal and judicial instruments.187
Rural versus urban practices
In both South Sudan and Uganda, rural land is still largely managed and 
allocated by family, clan or section and lineage authorities. Many people 
live and farm on land that has been passed down from their father or 
grandfather, often through their own mother. The governance of such 
land is largely a family affair, unless or until more serious disputes arise. 
Yet even the acquisition of rural land is beginning to take on more hybrid 
or semi-formal aspects, particularly when it is acquired for commercial 
purposes or by wealthy individuals. The customary practice of giving 
food, beer or livestock to the clan land custodian in gratitude for usufruct 
rights granted is being converted into money in such cases.188 A former 
senior county official in Kajokeji County, for example, had drawn up his 
own document declaring that the clan from which he purchased land 
could not reclaim the land—in other words a de facto property title, which 
he intended to have formalized by a lawyer.189
Land transactions and governance are most obviously hybridized in 
urban and peri-urban areas. The once very small towns of South Sudan 
and northern Uganda have expanded significantly in the past decade. 
The concept of urban commercial and residential plots as private lease-
hold property that can be bought and sold, surveyed and registered, is 
spreading from the old town centres to peri-urban areas and even to rural 
187 See, for example, Hopwood and Atkinson, ‘Final Report’; Hopwood, ‘Women’s land 
claims’; and Cherry Leonardi et al., ‘Local Justice in Southern Sudan’, Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace, 2010.  
188 Interview with university lecturer from Kajokeji, Juba, 6 August 2013 And  
14 September 2014.
189 Interview with politician and former county official, Leikor, Kajokeji County,  
23 September 2014. 
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market centres. These processes are multiplying the hybrid and legally 
plural practices of land governance, with the involvement of customary 
land authorities, local government officials, local courts and official or 
semi-official land survey practices. 
These various authorities both cooperate and compete to control the 
increasingly lucrative land market in and around urban, peri-urban and 
rural market centres. The privatization and registration of land rights—
whether formal or informal—gives the impression of providing greater 
tenure security to those with the money to purchase such rights. This 
security is frequently undermined, however, by the vagaries and malprac-
tices of urban land governance and the limited capacity of any local 
authorities to enforce land rights against powerful interests.
Aweil Town in north-west South Sudan is by far the largest town 
compared to any in Aweil East County, Kajokeji County or Moyo District. 
It is also the principal site of formal land survey practices. As the state 
capital of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal until 2015, it has seen the unique 
involvement of state-level government in the surveying and governance 
of town lands. The State Ministry of Physical Infrastructure engages in 
surveys, land allocation, registering, town planning and dispute resolu-
tion in newly developed areas of the town.190 In 2012, Aweil Town Council 
was granted the local government status of a municipality (equivalent 
to a county) under a mayor. The municipality authorities are mainly 
responsible for land governance and registration in old parts of the 
town that were demarcated in or since the colonial period, including the 
main market.191 Aweil Municipality and the State Ministry of Physical 
Infrastructure are engaged in a long-running contest over the authority 
190 Interviews with state official, Aweil Town, 8 August 2014; state government staff, 
Aweil Town, 8 August 2014; state official, Aweil Town, 11 August 2014; state government 
staff, Aweil Town, 11 August 2014; local government staff, Mabil, Aweil East County,  
13 August 2014; state government staff, Aweil Town, 18 August 2014; and local 
government staff, Aweil Town, 24 August 2014.
191 Interviews with state official, Aweil Town, 8 August 2014; county staff, Aweil Town, 
8 August 2014; state official, Aweil Town, 11 August 2014; state government staff, Aweil 
Town, 11 August 2014; local government staff, Mabil, Aweil East County, 13 August 2014; 
and local government staff, Aweil Town, 24 august 2014.
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to control surveys and registration, particularly in newly demarcated 
areas such as Maper Akot Arou.192 The state ministry has established 
precedence in surveying and allocating plots in such areas, and hence 
in controlling the lucrative fees paid by individuals when they apply for 
residential or commercial land. 
In some cases, the state ministry allocates land based on a lottery. 
Successful applicants receive a plot number and the land lease from the 
ministry and the title deed from the town court.193 The fees for first class 
plots (the largest plots) are the most expensive. One respondent had paid 
SSP 1,720 (about USD 380) for a first-class commercial plot in 2014.194 
Most people apply for third-class residential plots that are less costly at, 
for example, SSP 400 (just under USD 90).195 The application process is 
slow: ‘When one applies and pays it can take years until one gets a piece 
of land.’196 In general, applying for newly surveyed land is still less expen-
sive than buying surveyed land privately from a landowner but in 2014, 
the latter option was the only means of acquiring plots because all the 
newly surveyed land had already been allocated.197 Private land purchases 
are also registered by the State Ministry of Physical Infrastructure.198
In Aweil East County, some market towns such as Wanyjok and 
Warawar have been surveyed and allocated by the county land and survey 
192 Interview with local government staff, Aweil Town, 24 august 2014.
193 Interviews with state official, Aweil Town, 8 August 2014; state official, Aweil Town, 
11 August 2014; state government staff, Aweil Town, 11 August 2014; state government 
staff, Aweil Town, 11 August 2014; landowner, Maper Akot Arou, Aweil Town, 22 August 
2014 (Dinka); and local government staff, Aweil Town, 24 august 2014.
194 In August 2014 when the interview was conducted, the exchange rate of SSP to USD 
was 0.222. See: http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/.
195 Interviews with state government staff, Aweil Town, 11 August 2014; NGO staff, 
Aweil Town, 9 August 2014; and state official, Aweil Town, 11 August 2014.
196 Interview with landowner, Maper Akot Arou, Aweil Town, 22 August 2014 (Dinka).
197 Interview with NGO staff, Aweil Town, 9 August 2014.
198 Interviews with state government staff, Aweil Town, 11 August 2014; and landowner, 
Maper Akot Arou, Aweil Town, 22 August 2014 (Dinka).
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department, a branch of the State Ministry of Physical Infrastructure.199 Its 
director is automatically a member of the county land authority—headed 
by the county commissioner and including other county officials—and 
the county land committee—made up of several chiefs, women, elders 
and youth—which acts as an intermediary between the government and 
the community in relation to land surveys and settles land disputes.200 In 
un-surveyed peri-urban residential areas, hybrid or plural arrangements 
exist for acquiring land. Some individuals who buy land in such areas 
close to Aweil Town and Wanyjok try to safeguard their land ownership 
through documents from chiefs or other authorities.201 One respondent 
who bought an unsurveyed plot in Maluakon explains, ‘I processed 
a document from the market committee. There was an agreement 
document which we signed among ourselves. That document included 
our neighbours and relatives.’202
The same respondent also underlines the importance of having 
witnesses and signed documents:
It is not like in Wanyjok [which is surveyed]. You can agree. 
But if you do not want another problem, you get a document. … 
They [market committee] are aware of it. When he has another 
problem with me I can show that many people know about 
it. … 
199 Interviews with state official, Aweil Town, 8 August 2014; state official, Aweil Town, 
11 August 2014; state government staff, Aweil Town, 11 August 2014; state government 
staff, Aweil Town, 11 August 2014; county staff, Mabil, Aweil East County, 13 August 
2014; county staff, Mabil, Aweil East County, 13 August 2014; and group of chief court 
members, Mabil, Aweil East County, 19 August 2014.
200 Interviews with state government staff, Aweil Town, 11 August 2014; county staff, 
Mabil, Aweil East County, 13 August 2014; county staff, Mabil, Aweil East County,  
13 August 2014; CBO staff, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 13 August 2014; two community 
members, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 19 August 2014; chief court members, Wanyjok, 
Aweil East County, 21 August 2014; public official, , Mabil, Aweil East County, 26 August 
2014; SPLM official, Aweil East County, 28 August 2014; and chief, Awulic, Aweil East 
County, 28 August 2014.
201 Interview with group of chiefs, Maper Akot Arou, Aweil Town, 23 August 2014.
202 Interview with landowner, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 27 August 2014. 
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When you get a land now from somebody you need a paper 
because things are changing. People have now a different habit. 
Somebody may give you a land and next time they may deny 
that they gave it to you.203
The transfer of unsurveyed land in peri-urban contexts is becoming more 
formalized. In this sense, the practices related to the transfer of surveyed 
and unsurveyed areas in peri-urban and urban areas have become more 
similar. The South Sudanese government land policy that was drafted 
in 2011 allows for this hybridity, declaring that, ‘Peri-urban areas may 
be administered under community, public or private tenure, subject to 
principles of good land administration and planning and the comparative 
capacities of alternative tenure systems to administer land rights in given 
areas efficiently.’204
In Kajokeji County, a similarly hybrid form of land governance is 
apparent in and around the towns of Mere, the county headquarters, 
and the nearby market town of Wudu, where those seeking to obtain 
plots for residential or commercial purposes are supposed to go first to 
the relevant clan landlord and then bring a surveyor from the county 
government to demarcate the plot and make sure it is not in the way of 
any planned roads. Survey practices and plot registrations have largely 
been locally managed and not necessarily conducted by fully qualified 
surveyors.205 One local political leader was critical of the county chief 
for selling plots on land belonging to other clans in and around Mere.206 
Such accusations and tensions are far more common in relation to the 
activities of chiefs in the cities of Juba and Yei, as well as other places. 
In general, the Kajokeji County authorities, chiefs and clan land custo-
dians appear to have established more harmonious working relations 
than elsewhere in South Sudan. There are nevertheless considerable 
203 Interview with landowner, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 27 August 2014.
204 South Sudan Land Commission, ‘Draft Land Policy 2011’, 12.
205 Interview with MP and surveyor from Kajokeji, Juba, 24 July 2015.
206 Interview with politician and former county official, Leikor, Kajokeji County,  
23 September 2014. 
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tensions under the surface between these various authorities as they 
compete for control of increasingly lucrative land transactions. Some 
people also complained of disputes between multiple landlords, with 
some landlords behaving as if they are individual landowners: 
Greedy custodians are already dishing out land for money. … 
The Lilye area [between the towns of Wudu and Mere] was 
distributed by the custodians. There is competition between 
the custodians there. In the past, it seemed to be one family of 
custodians but now the land is monetized and the custodians 
are selling it like landowners.207
In Moyo District in Uganda, the 1998 Land Act gave freehold rights to 
tenants who had rented plots from the town council for at least 12 years:
The Land Act says if someone has stayed on the land for 12 
years before 1995 without disputes that land becomes his. 
Even the government has to buy land now. Even roads. The 
government compensates for the trees, houses.208
Urban land in Moyo Town is managed by the town council, district land 
board, area land committees and LC 1 councillors. The edges of the Moyo 
Town Council area are blurred and expanding, with formerly customary 
land turned into plots, often without formal title deeds. Many people 
have complained that the official process of registering plots with the 
Uganda Land Commission is simply too costly and laborious, involving 
repeated trips to Kampala, which is around 450 km away, and consider-
able fees:
Now the government is always talking of the need to register 
land but I want the government to read this: Is there a cheaper 
way of registering land? Now you have to go to the area land 
committee, the district and then to Kampala and back, and 
207 Interview with university professor from Kajokeji, Juba, 6 August 2013.
208 Interview with sub-county official for Moyo, Moyo Town, 10 October 2014. 
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then to Kampala again. People cannot manage. It needs the 
government to create a better system.209
*
It is striking that—often competing—local government authorities seek 
to strengthen and legitimize their control of land governance by recog-
nizing and cooperating with customary authorities, such as chiefs and 
clan land custodians, or landlords. This reflects the important wider 
state recognition of customary land rights in both South Sudan and 
Uganda. As a result, those individuals recognized as customary leaders 
and landlords may help negotiate and protect some customary land rights 
and compensate for their loss when land is alienated and privatized. At 
the same time, they are also frequently suspected of personally profiting 
from the sale or lease of land in urban and market areas, and of exercising 
an unprecedented individualized power over land. The historic role of 
chiefs, clan leaders and land custodians in land governance did not 
extend to managing the kind of monetized transactions in land that now 
occur nor did their role sanction them as a kind of corporate landowner. 
Therefore, government recognition of customary authorities can be seen 
as an attempt to legitimize what are in reality novel practices of land 
governance.
Both the South Sudanese and Ugandan governments have expressed 
a largely unprecedented commitment to customary land rights at a time 
when, paradoxically, those rights appear to be more than ever under 
threat. The precise nature of customary land rights and authorities is, 
however, often obscured in the generalized defence or criticism of these 
systems. In particular, there is a tendency at national and international 
levels to assume that customary land rights are simply held communally 
and are antithetical to individual land ownership. In some cases, this has 
given unparalleled opportunities for power and profit to the individual 
chiefs and clan landlords who claim control over community land by 
209 Interview with customary chief and clan landlords, Lefori, Moyo District, 15 October 
2014. Also see: Pedersen, et al., ‘Land tenure’, 23.
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deploying their own historical narratives and definitions of customary 
law. Yet the laws and principles that are emerging from this hybrid land 
governance are the product of change, debate, political strategy and 
legal pluralism in contexts of new and previously unheard-of land value, 
competition and dispute.
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5. From inclusion to exclusion? 
Changing and debating customary land 
rights
The effects of urbanization in South Sudan and the thrust of Ugandan 
government policies have been to promote processes of privatization 
and commoditization of land tenure, albeit frequently through hybrid 
and semi-formal mechanisms. The simultaneous recognition by both 
states of customary land rights disguises the extent of transformation 
and tension inherent in turning those rights into exclusive property 
ownership. This is why so many disputes and resentments have arisen 
over land transactions in towns and smaller market and administrative 
centres. Disguising these tensions also carries a real risk of creating new 
latent conflict that may surface in future. 
Even outside urban areas, perceptions and definitions of land rights 
have been changing and are increasingly debated and contested. The idea 
of more exclusive land rights has spread to areas where customary land 
tenure regimes formerly recognized multiple, often overlapping rights 
of land use, access and control. Some people are attempting to draw 
harder distinctions between primary or dominant rights and secondary 
rights—in some cases to deny the latter altogether. These distinctions are 
asserted on the basis of genealogical arguments about patrilineal descent, 
producing more exclusionary definitions of community and communal 
land rights than was previously the case.
The changing value of land
Changing land values are the product of multiple factors, including polit-
ical struggles for control of local government administrations, processes 
of return, urbanization and new patterns of population density, and new 
opportunities for—or anticipation of—resource extraction and commer-
cial agriculture. A widespread refrain among respondents is that people 
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have only recently realized the value of land—that is, the commercial or 
monetary value of land. 
Clearly land has always had productive value and been a vital resource 
for the peoples of this region. It could be inherited and allocated to 
individual family members. It could also be controlled by lineage or 
clan authorities. It was not, however, a measure of wealth per se. It was 
common for land to be abandoned temporarily or permanently due to 
migration or shifting cultivation practices. Respondents and the historical 
record both suggest that wealth was instead measured in cattle and other 
livestock or in people themselves. In contexts of plentiful land, it was 
the accumulation of wives, children and dependent or client followers 
that made the senior men of a lineage or clan wealthy, influential and 
militarily strong. 
For this reason, migrant newcomers and maternal or distant relatives 
were generally welcomed to settle on land already controlled by prior 
settlers. The Kuku of Kajokeji County have an expression for the way in 
which newcomers were given pieces of land to shelter an existing clan 
‘from the cold’ or to act like a ‘fence’, settling around the dominant clan 
to protect them from attack, mukö kindya ngutu lika. Similarly in Dinka 
areas, such as Aweil East County, the lineages claiming descent from 
the first ancestors to come to a particular territory are known as the 
koc wut cielic (the people in the centre of the cattle-camp), who often 
occupy the more secure and flood-proof locations in the middle of a 
cattle-camp.210 They include lineages of the Dinka spiritual authorities 
known as bany biith (spearmasters), members of which frequently wield 
political authority through chiefly office or government positions. Other 
individuals and groups are said to have later joined these first-comers 
and established consanguine ties through marrying the daughters of 
first-comers. Consequently, the first-comers are also referred to as the 
maternal uncles (naar wut) of the section by the descendants of these later 
210 Godfry Lienhardt, Divinity and experience: The religion of the Dinka, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2003, 9.
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incomers.211 It is these first-comer lineages ‘who are said to have the land’ 
of the section, not in the sense of landownership but rather in terms of 
authority and responsibility over territory and people.212 
In this sense, land has always also had a political value—by controlling 
access to and allocation of land suitable for cultivation or pastoralism, 
a powerful group could also exercise authority over people and gain 
strength in numbers. At the same time, there was no reason to estab-
lish exclusive rights over the land. Indeed, even a dominant lineage or 
clan needed to negotiate and maintain access to land beyond its own 
immediate territory, for grazing, hunting and fishing or to reach partic-
ular resources such as water or salt. No one had an interest in trying to 
assert exclusive property rights over land.
This is now changing, at least in some contexts, as land acquires 
a new monetary or commercial value. Alongside this, changing land 
values have given rise to increasing disputes over land. In particular, 
people are beginning to question the land rights of those said not to be 
members of the first-comer clan or lineage. There are multiple reasons 
for this. Sometimes particular individuals or groups are trying to monop-
olize the revenue from land transactions, particularly in areas where 
land is becoming a focus of investment, development or privatization. 
Sometimes interpersonal or intercommunal rifts become focused on land 
disputes, though this probably always happened to some extent. Oral 
histories frequently tell narratives of family disputes leading to splits 
and migrations. At present, however, underlying many land disputes 
and debates is a growing sense of fear and insecurity that land may be 
in diminishing supply as a result of actual or potential land alienations 
and population growth. 
Since the 1990s, and in particular during the past decade, many people 
in Aweil East County, Kajokeji County and Moyo District have returned 
211 Interviews A14, NGO staff, Aweil Town, 11 August 2014; A34, elder, Wanyjok, Aweil 
East County, 19 August 2014 (Dinka); and A73, elder, Wanyjok, Aweil East County,  
28 August 2014.
212 Lienhardt, Divinity and experience, 9.
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from internal or external displacement during the conflicts in Southern 
Sudan and northern Uganda. The process of return has been largely 
peaceful but it has produced new land disputes when returnees have 
arrived to find their original homes or fields occupied by other people.213 
In Kajokeji County and Moyo District, the period of returns is also associ-
ated with an unprecedented population increase, generating pressure on 
land, as these respondents indicate. 
Returnees want to come back to their ancestral land. But 
families have increased and this causes disputes over land.214
Land is now not enough. In the past, the population was little 
and people did not cultivate as much. Now people [have] 
realized land is not enough because people have [re]produced 
a lot, had more wives. Yet the land cannot increase. That’s why 
there is dispute. Also there is a lot of development going on 
now which [has] reduced land. Roads, school, health centre.215
When people came back from exile, they came in larger 
numbers. Ma’di used to be few. So that’s why people are 
claiming land now. Children [the younger generations] started 
evicting people who were given land by their father.216
All population and census figures in the region are problematic but 
they clearly confirm an increase. In 1952, the total population of the 
Madi sub-district, which then included Adjumani, was estimated from 
chiefs’ records at around 38,000.217 By 2010, the population of Moyo 
213 Schomerus, Perilous Border, 19.
214 Interview with state official from Kajokeji, Juba, 7 September 2014. Also indicated by 
interview with MP from Kajokeji, Juba, 7 September 2014.
215 Interview with area land committee chairperson, Moyo Town, 11 October 2014. 
216 Interview with area land committee chairperson, Moyo District, 15 October 2014.
217 Madi Sub-District Annual Report 1952, Makerere University Library, Africana section, 
G. EAU/M (058) 1.
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District alone was estimated at 354,300.218 Kajokeji County has seen a 
similar increase on colonial figures, reaching an estimated 196,000 by 
2010.219 Many respondents express concern that the increasing popula-
tion density is causing damage to soil fertility because people had less 
land on which to practice crop rotation and fallow periods, and because 
of increased deforestation.220
It is not simply the overall population increase that causes disputes. 
Settlement patterns also play a role. People increasingly want to live close 
to roads, markets and services, such as schools and medical facilities. 
The experience of life in refugee camps and cities has made returnees 
especially keen to maintain access to services and business opportuni-
ties, leading to increasing demographic pressures in and around market 
centres. A group of male returnees living close to Wanyjok in Aweil East 
County note, ‘We have been living in a town before. That is why we like 
to live here because this is close to the town.’221 A female returnee who 
moved back to the village explains that most other returnees do not know 
how to make a living in the village or how to farm because they lived in 
218 Directorate of Water Development, Ministry of Water & Environment, ‘Moyo’, 
Kampala: Government of the Republic of Uganda, 2010, 1.
219 United Nations Mission in Sudan, ‘Central Equatoria State: Kajokeji County’. 
Accessed 1 June 2015, http://unmis.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=4616.
220 Interviews with county councillor, Wudu, Kajokeji County, 14 September 2014; chief, 
Saregoro, Kajokeji County, 15 September 2014; county agriculture department official, 
Wudu, Kajokeji County, 18 September 2014; county agriculture department official,  
Mere, Kajokeji County, 18 September 2014; church minister, Wudu, Kajokeji County,  
20 September 2014; chiefs from Liwolo Payam, Wudu, Kajokeji County, 25 September 
2014; elder, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 19 August 2014 (Dinka); and chief court 
members, Mangartong, Aweil East County, 20 August 2014. Also see: Environment 
Department, ‘Moyo District’, 7, 16, 20, 30; Pedersen, et al., ‘Land tenure’, 34. 
221 Interview with community leader during a group interview, returnee area, Aweil East 
County, 14 August 2014 (Dinka). Also indicated by interviews with NGO staff, Aweil 
Town, 16 August 2014; trader, Mangartong, Aweil East County, 20 August 2014; chief, 
Mangartong, Aweil East County, 20 August 2014; group of male returnees, Wanyjok, 
Aweil East County, 21 August 2014; and landowner, Maper Akot Arou, Aweil Town,  
22 August 2014 (Dinka). 
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urban contexts in Sudan.222 Increasing urbanization and market activity is 
also driving more commercial agricultural production, as well as demand 
for construction materials, firewood and charcoal. All of these factors 
contribute to increasing competition for land and natural resources, 
albeit in geographically uneven ways.
In addition to raising specific land governance issues in towns and 
peri-urban areas, the rapid urbanization of recent years has had a more 
general effect in spreading the idea that land can have a monetary and 
market value. It has also heightened fears and concerns about land 
grabbing. Many people from Kajokeji County and some from Aweil East 
County (and Northern Bahr el-Ghazal more generally) have lived in Juba 
and witnessed or heard about the problems over land in the capital city, 
as one respondent elaborates:
Land is now proved as a resource. Before we only used land 
to survive but it is proved now as a resource. Now with the 
influence of money, even our own sons want to displace 
those who were settled by our ancestors, saying you are not 
part of our clan. And there is the development aspect. People 
come with a big scheme and don’t go in the right way to the 
[customary] landlord. They just make an agreement with some 
few. And in Juba there is the problem of land grabbing. People 
use guns. They believe that because we liberated the land we 
have authority to take land.223
Many more affluent individuals buy plots for investment in urban and 
peri-urban areas because the value of commercial and residential plots 
increases greatly after land surveys. An NGO employee working in Aweil 
Town was convinced that buying land there was a good investment. 
He also owns a number of plots in different towns in South Sudan. 
222 Interview with returnee, Mangartong, Aweil East County, 15 August 2014. Also 
indicated by interview with community member, returnee area, Aweil East County,  
14 August 2014.
223 Interview with retired teacher and local elder, Mere, Kajokeji County, 13 September 
2014.
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In the years immediately after the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agree-
ment (CPA), it was not difficult to acquire land in town. It is, however, 
becoming more and more difficult and expensive to buy plots.224 Individ-
uals who invested in residential plots in towns and surrounding areas 
early on were able to profit from the soaring values of urban land, even 
before the devaluation of the South Sudanese Pound.
In the broader economic context, however, most people in South Sudan 
and northern Uganda have scant means of earning a monetary income. 
What little they or their relatives can earn is needed for purchasing 
important commodities such as foodstuffs, soap and medicine. The 
great majority of people are not in a position to purchase land, making 
customary access to land even more essential for their livelihoods. The 
multiple factors underpinning that changing value of land, however, 
render this more complex, as growing disputes over primary and 
secondary land rights indicate.
Who owns the land? Debating dominant land rights 
Recent statutory legislation and wider discourse have deployed a language 
of communal land ownership and customary landlords. Even if this is 
intended to give equal respect and legal status to customary land rights, 
it has the effect of distorting the customary principles underlying those 
rights, in which ownership is largely an alien concept. This has led to 
considerable debate and dispute over what constitutes land ownership 
and who has the right or authority to speak on behalf of a landowning 
community, which is itself a novel conception.
One prevalent definition of the landowning community is based 
on patrilineal descent from the first-comer ancestors who established 
primary rights to a particular territory by first clearing the bush, settling, 
cultivating or herding on the land. Sometimes these primary rights were 
instead obtained through conquest and driving out previous inhabit-
ants. In Aweil East County, each section of the Dinka Abiem claims 
first-comer rights to particular lowland grazing areas (toic). Each section 
224 Interview with NGO staff, Aweil Town, 9 August 2014. 
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and sub-section has its own cattle-camp locations (wutic) within their 
territory, where they tether their cattle during the night. These primary 
grazing rights, however, are not generally exercised in an exclusive way 
and other sections may move into these areas to share grazing, exercising 
secondary rights based on friendly relations, marital ties or long-standing 
agreements. Herders move with their cattle to other sections’ territories 
when their own pasture becomes limited, as this respondent explains:
Grazing of the pasture is still divided in the lowland. Ajuongthi, 
Apuoth and Makuach [sections] all have their own toic. He [a 
member of Makuach] can go to Ajuonghti when there is no 
pasture on his side because Makuach and Ajuonghti share the 
pasture at the toic.225
While pasture is jointly used by members of sections and sub-sections, 
arable land and housing plots are generally accessed by individual house-
holds through clan and lineage membership. In Aweil East County, 
sub-clans and lineages are usually associated with specific smaller settle-
ments and areas of arable land that are scattered within the territory of 
the section.226
In Kajokeji County and Moyo District, first-comer land rights are 
claimed by patrilineal clans and by a particular lineage within each clan, 
which claims descent from the first settler. A senior male elder is identi-
fied as the custodian of the clan land, or landlord. Even the colonial 
government in Sudan became vaguely aware of the chief, father or owner 
of the land (as they variously translated the Bari term ‘monye kak’) and 
compared this figure to those known as earth priests in other regions. 
As the latter term perhaps better conveys, the authority of the monye kak 
is based on their special spiritual relationship with the land. This also 
endows them with political power because their capacity to curse and 
bless is a powerful sanction, giving them an important role in decisions 
and disputes over land: ‘If someone does something bad to the landlord 
225 Interview with senior chief, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 26 August 2014 (Dinka).
226 Interview with two teachers, Mangartong, Aweil East County, 15 August 2014.
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he can utter word of curse and that person will die.’227 The role of clan 
land custodians does not involve estate owning or leasing land in the 
contemporary sense implied by the English word ‘landlord’. As the first 
British colonial administrator of Kajokeji emphasizes in describing the 
chief of the land, ‘Although he is supposed to own all the land, by doing 
so he does not interfere with other people’s rights.’228
Recently, however, landlords of Kuku and Ma’di clans have begun to 
assert greater authority in land transactions. This has proved controver-
sial because it risks treating clans as collective property-owning entities, 
overriding the complexity of the relationships between individual and 
collective land rights. Customary land rights across South Sudan and 
northern Uganda are layered or nested. Clans and sections retain an 
underlying authority over the land in their territory, especially if there is 
any question of it being alienated. At the same time, usufruct rights to 
the land on which people live and farm have often been inherited over 
one or more generations. 
In Kajokeji County and Moyo District, for example, individual men 
tend to inherit the land cultivated by their own mother, which they 
can then in turn allocate to their own wife or wives. If a woman has 
several sons, some might need to access other land but this is largely 
allocated within the wider land held by the extended family or obtained 
from maternal relatives or friendly neighbours, rather than necessarily 
involving the clan authorities. A senior local government official in Moyo 
District emphasizes the individualization of land rights among Kuku and 
Ma’di: ‘Sale of land depends on the individual who has authority over 
land because his father, grandfather left it to him.’229
In Aweil East County, the maintenance of communal authority over 
land among the Dinka is stronger, while the exercise of usufruct rights 
by individual members of a lineage or section is said to be more flexible. 
In rural areas of Aweil East County, community members who wish 
227 Interview with chief, Saregoro, Kajokeji County, 15 September 2014.
228 Stigand, Equatoria, 34.
229 Interview with sub-county official for Moyo, Moyo Town, 10 October 2014. 
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to build a new house or cultivate a new field have the right to freely 
access ancestral land: ‘You are from there and are entitled to own land 
there.’230 In practice, community members often acquire uncultivated 
and uninhabited land next to relatives’ houses and fields or other areas 
associated with their extended family and lineage. Elders direct them 
to available plots. The right to use land is therefore inherited within 
families and lineages, as this respondent asserts: ‘That land is the land 
of my grandfather. I can stay there.’231 It is common for individuals who 
want to establish their homesteads in rural areas to just build a house 
next to their father and mother’s homestead, in effect extending the 
area of the father.232 It is mainly the last born son who remains on his 
parents’ plot.233 Consequently, smaller settlements in rural contexts are 
often inhabited by close relatives.
Individuals may also clear land in more distant uninhabited and uncul-
tivated areas of their sections, even if these areas are not necessarily 
associated with their clan.234 They can do so without asking permission: 
I found a good place. … I did not ask anybody. Because this 
land is for Apuoth [section] and I am from Apuoth. You only 
ask when you go to a certain place and somebody might have 
been living there before you. Then this is the person who has 
the right to ask you. But for a place which has never been 
230 Interview with two chiefs, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 13 August 2014 (Dinka).
231 Interview with landowner, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 27 August 2014.
232 Interviews with NGO staff, Aweil Town, 9 August 2014; and NGO staff, Aweil Town, 
11 August 2014.
233 Interviews with three women, Mangartong, Aweil East County, 20 August 2014 
(Dinka); former chief, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 27 August 2014; and elder, Wanyjok, 
Aweil East County, 28 August 2014.
234 Interviews with state government staff, Aweil Town, 11 August 2014; elder, Wanyjok, 
Aweil East County, 19 August 2014 (Dinka); landowner, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 
19 August 2014; landowner, Mangartong, Aweil East County, 20 August 2014; chief, 
Mangartong, Aweil East County, 20 August 2014; senior chief, Mabil, Aweil East County, 
21 August 2014; group of chiefs, Maper Akot Arou, Aweil Town, 23 August 2014; former 
chief, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 27 August 2014; elder, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 
28 August 2014; and SPLM official, Aweil East County, 28 August 2014.
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inhabited before and you belong to this place, you do not need 
to ask somebody.235
Clearing forest land allows for a long-term exercise of land tenure that 
can be passed down to offspring: ‘Once you clear the land it belongs 
to you. … You can transmit this right of the land to your offspring.’236 
Over time, a new settlement emerges as relatives move next to the 
new homestead and sons build their own homesteads adjacent to the 
homestead of the individual who cleared the land.237 
Similarly in Kajokeji County, individuals might clear new land for 
cultivation in more distant uninhabited or previously uncultivated areas 
(lowu), where they only erect temporary shelters for use during the 
cultivation season; in some cases, these temporary fields might become 
permanent settlements if people relocate to them.238 Such individual or 
familial tenure rights do not mean, however, that the land is a property 
or commodity that could be alienated without wider consultation: ‘You 
can sell a cow but not a plot.’239
Newcomers and nephews
The recent assertion of greater authority over land rights by Kuku and 
Ma’di clan landlords points to another area of contention: The relationship 
235 Interview with landowner, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 19 August 2014. Also 
indicated by interview with elder, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 19 August 2014 (Dinka).
236 Interview with state government staff, Aweil Town, 11 August 2014. Also indicated 
by interview with two chiefs, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 13 August 2014 (Dinka); CBO 
staff, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 13 August 2014; elder, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 
19 August 2014 (Dinka); landowner, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 19 August 2014; and 
former chief, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 27 August 2014.
237 Interviews with two teachers, Mangartong, Aweil East County, 15 August 2014; and 
landowner, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 19 August 2014.
238 Interview with former district government leader, Moyo Town, 10 October 2014. 
239 Interview with elder, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 19 August 2014 (Dinka). Also 
indicated by interviews with two chiefs, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 13 August 2014 
(Dinka); community member, Mangartong, Aweil East County, 15 August 2014; local 
government official, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 19 August 2014; and landowner, 
Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 27 August 2014.
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between first-comers and later-comers, and their respective land rights. 
This is not only an issue in the shared borderlands between South Sudan 
and northern Uganda but is also an increasing source of dispute in 
northern South Sudan. In some cases the claim to be the first-comer clan 
is itself contested by other clans with competing historical narratives of 
arrival and precedence in an area.240 Even where a particular clan is widely 
recognized to be descended from the first-comer ancestor and respected 
for its consequent spiritual relationship with the land, there are disputes 
and debates over the rights of other clans or immigrants. Some of these 
contests concern long-term clan histories of the original processes of 
settlement and acquisition of land rights. Such histories often recount 
a friendship established between the first settler and another individual 
who came later to the area and was given land by the first-comer. 
Descendants of the later-comer may claim that this represented a 
permanent gift of land, made in recognition of friendship, intermar-
riage, military assistance or some other contribution that their ancestor 
made to the emerging community. Some later-comers are said to have 
brought a particular valuable skill, such as control over rain, or paid a 
bull in exchange for the land. At present, however, opinions differ as to 
whether this constituted a permanent land transaction or was simply a 
gift to recognize and thank the clan land authority for granting usufruct 
access. This respondent explains: 
There was no paying for land in the past. Only that, for 
example, there is a stream here that never dries up, even in the 
dry season, so people bring their cattle there to drink. They 
used to bring these small hoes, lumöŋöt, to offer so that their 
cattle can take water. It was given to the landlord but it was not 
that they were buying the land.241
240 Interview with customary chief and clan landlords, Lefori, Moyo District, 15 October 
2014.
241 Interview with clan elder landlord, Mondikolok, Kajokeji County, 13 September 2014.
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A Kuku chief likewise emphasizes that a newcomer might offer a he-goat, 
small calf or bull to the landlord: ‘This is part of the relationship between 
them but it is not for paying [for] the soil.’242 One clan leader in Kajokeji 
County explains that land transactions were primarily a means of incor-
porating new people into the clan:
If anyone wants a piece of land, we don’t just sell to him. We 
don’t demand for payment. It’s up to that person to give what 
they like. They make a traditional dish of cowpeas and kwete 
[local beer] to give to the landlord. Such a person who stays 
becomes like a brother. Giving that food and drink is like a 
commitment to staying in that clan and becoming part of it. 
If that person has a friend who comes and finds him there, he 
cannot just give that friend land, even out of his own land. He 
has to ask the landlord. That is friendship—we become like 
brothers—that is how many people have come to be here.243
Similarly, Dinka respondents in Aweil East County stress that when 
individuals move to land that does not belong to their section, they have 
to be welcomed by friends and accepted by the host section authorities, 
demonstrating the centrality of social relations to the acquisition of land 
rights: ‘You need people who welcome you. When you do not know 
anybody you will not get a place. … If I know him, I can give him part of 
my place.’244 Communities also want to be assured that newcomers are 
not troublemakers: ‘You must live with somebody whom you know to 
242 Interview with chief, Mere, Kajokeji County, 16 September 2014. 
243 Interview with clan landlord, Leikor, Kajokeji County, 21 September 2014. 
244 Interview with community member, Mangartong, Aweil East County, 15 August 2014. 
Also indicated by interviews with county local government staff member, Wanyjok, Aweil 
East, 14 August 2014; state government staff, Aweil Town, 8 August 2014; returnee, Aweil 
Town, 9 August 2014; NGO staff, Aweil Town, 9 August 2014; two chiefs, Wanyjok, Aweil 
East County, 13 August 2014 (Dinka); two teachers, Mangartong, Aweil East County,  
15 August 2014; returnee, Mangartong, Aweil East County, 15 August 2014; elder, 
Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 19 August 2014 (Dinka); restaurant owner, Wanyjok, Aweil 
East County, 19 August 2014; landowner, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 19 August 2014; 
chief, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 26 August 2014; and SPLM official, Aweil East County, 
28 August 2014.
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make sure that he does not cause insecurity to you and you do not cause 
a problem to him. When there is a problem coming from outside you 
will be able to face it.’245 The children of these individuals can inherit the 
land but their original section cannot claim that land; in other words, 
they become part of the new section.246 It in this way that land has 
been a means for sections, clans and lineages to expand and absorb new 
members. 
A profound shift has been occurring, however, from a context in 
which land was relatively abundant and people were the most important 
resource to a context in which land itself is increasingly perceived to hold 
real or potential monetary and productive value, and in some cases even 
to constitute a form of property. As a result of this shift, progressively 
heated debates are occurring over the nature of land agreements made 
in previous generations: 
Previously if you need land, you go to the owner and organize 
white stuff [beer] and food to host the landlord. Then the 
landlord decides on a piece of land and you go there to be 
shown it. After offering the meal, you assume that you 
have already bought the land but the drink and food are not 
payment. We don’t sell land. If the same person later needs 
land for his children, he goes to the landlord in the same way.
Now people consider that they have bought the land with that 
food which was paid in their parents’ or grandparents’ time and 
they want to sell the land as if it is their own. This makes the 
landlord very angry.247
A further source of debate concerns the nature of land rights acquired 
through maternal relations, whether in the distant or more recent past. 
This has also been a means of enlarging a lineage or clan, by absorbing 
maternal nephews. In Aweil East County, Dinka who move to their 
245 Interview with landowner, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 19 August 2014.
246 Interview with chief, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 26 August 2014.
247 Interview with clan elder landlord, Mondikolok, Kajokeji County, 13 September 2014.
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maternal uncles’ areas become members of the latter’s section and their 
sons can inherit their land there.248
Pajou [my clan] have joined Ajuonghti [section] as children 
of their daughters. We also own that land. We are members 
through the mother’s side. … That means that I am accepted,  
I am part of them, I can share. We are part of Ajuonghti. We 
have the same rights in everything in Ajuonghti. That is why 
we also have [chiefly and administrative] positions.249
In Kajokeji County and Moyo District, it is also common practice for 
families and clans to give land to their daughters or sisters in cases of 
divorce or where their husbands lacked access to land for some reason. 
Adult men might also seek assistance from maternal uncles to get land 
if they lack good relations with their own paternal relatives or if there is 
not enough land on that side, as this respondent explains:
My mother was from a landowning family, so when she 
married, my grandfather gave some land to her and her 
husband. ... Nowadays the uncles might try to claim it back or 
say that it means you must belong to them. But I inherited it 
from my mother and I am now cultivating 20 acres there.250
While such origins may have been overlooked or may have become 
increasingly irrelevant over generations, they can resurface in disputes 
and competition over land or in local politics. In this sense, rights in the 
clan or section and its land are subtly differentiated according to whether 
membership was gained patrilineally or matrilineally and how long ago 
this took place. One respondent from Aweil East County explains that if 
248 Interviews with state government staff, Aweil Town, 8 August 2014; two chiefs, 
Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 13 August 2014 (Dinka); two teachers, Mangartong, Aweil 
East County, 15 August 2014; elder, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 19 August 2014 (Dinka); 
chief, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 26 August 2014; and elder, Wanyjok, Aweil East 
County, 28 August 2014. 
249 Interview with elder, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 19 August 2014 (Dinka). 
250 Interview with state official from Kajokeji, Juba, 7 September 2014.
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someone goes to their mother’s place and then becomes ‘involve[d] in 
politics and run[s] for an MP, then some people will be jealous and will 
send you back to the place where you are from. If you are a normal and 
humble person and you do not involve yourself in their political affairs 
then it will not be a problem.’251
Increasingly, however, the land rights of nephews—people said to 
have originally acquired their land from their mother’s brothers, their 
maternal uncles—are being called into question, sometimes after several 
generations:
In the past, these disputes were not there but now numbers 
have increased and some want to cultivate big areas. My sister 
got married somewhere [else] and then returns with the 
children and we allocate land to them. Later these children 
want to sell the land and that brings friction. They were given 
land to use, not to sell. They have their own land in their 
father’s area.252
Many respondents assert that people have now realized or learned the 
(monetary) value of land and consequently have begun to question the 
gifts of land made by their grandparents and ancestors to their daughters 
and nephews or to friends and newcomers from outside the patrilineage: 
People have come back from East Africa where they learned 
the value of land. So they say their grandparents were ignorant 
of the land values when they gave it out to other people. In 
Kuku, they could give land to a stranger who comes because of 
misunderstanding or persecution in his own place. They accept 
him and give him land. They say he is to be there at the corner 
to keep the cold off them. Or land was also given to in-laws … 
and then also to those who come only to cultivate. They say 
it is like shaving hair. It will grow back. … [But] younger 
251 Interview with county local government staff member, Wanyjok, Aweil East,  
14 August 2014.
252 Interview with customary chief and elders, Moyo Town, 11 October 2014 . Also see: 
Hopwood, ‘Women’s land claims’, 402–5.
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people who grew [up] outside don’t understand why their 
grandparents gave land to outsiders. And it is also the fault of 
the elders for not explaining it properly to them.253
Trees, tractors and graves: Staking land claims
The assertion of historic first-comer precedence and patrilineal descent 
is not the only discourse in which to claim land rights. There is also a 
potentially competing basis for land tenure—that of usage, investment or 
development of the land and longevity of occupation. Regardless of the 
original means of acquiring land, many would argue that they or their 
forebears’ long-term exercise of usufruct rights constitute as equally 
valid a basis for permanent land tenure as any genealogical argument for 
precedence in land rights. A common form of evidence cited in support 
of such assertions is the burial of relatives on the land and the long-term 
growth of trees planted by the claimant or their father or grandfather: 
‘What indicates ownership are mango trees, lemon trees, teak trees—this 
shows that that man is owner of the land.’254
Such principles are recognized to some extent by the hybrid local land 
authorities. In Kajokeji County, the owners of urban land in Mere—the 
county headquarters—for example, are forbidden from burying relatives 
on their plots because the land has to remain transferable.255 A local elder 
explains the significance of family graves in establishing land rights:
We say if somebody has lived for over 50 years in a place and 
their dead have been buried there they should not now be 
evicted. That is not there in our constitution, in our law. They 
253 Interview with politician and former county official, Leikor, Kajokeji County,  
23 September 2014. 
254 Interview with retired local government officer and clan elder, Wudu, Kajokeji 
County, 16 September 2014. 
255 Interview with county government employee, Mere, Kajokeji County, 18 September 
2014.
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will say, ‘Will we take our bones?’ This is a curse. So we settle 
such cases through discussion and we don’t allow it.256
One headwoman in Kajokeji County outlined the compromise reached 
by local authorities in the case of her own family:
Our parents were given land by the landlord to be a fence. At 
that time, they give you a piece of land to be like a defence 
for them. They don’t sell land. During the war, we ran and 
now people realized the value of land. So the landlords didn’t 
want my family to come back. We had to search instead for 
our grandfather’s original place. But we are all young and the 
parents died without telling us where our former area was, so 
now we have no land. The government leaders came in and 
talked to the landlords that we should not be chased because 
we have stayed there long. … The chiefs were involved in 
resolving it, and the landlords with their committee. We were 
allowed to stay but we were not allowed to build a permanent 
house. So we can’t build a concrete house there.257
As this indicates, the local authorities, including the county chief, appear 
to have negotiated specific rules and principles for handling such cases. 
On the one hand, they support the increasing differentiation between 
primary and secondary land rights, as reflected in the order for the family 
above not to construct permanent buildings on land to which they had 
only secondary rights. On the other, the local authorities also attempt 
to use longevity as a determinant of land rights: ‘We tell people that if 
someone has stayed on the land for over 50 years, you cannot now chase 
him from that land. They have even buried their people on it.’258 
In general, the approach of the chiefs and other authorities in Kajokeji 
County is to try to reach a compromise in such disputes, often by dividing 
256 Interview with retired teacher and local elder; and church leader, Mere, Kajokeji 
County, 13 September 2014.
257 Interview with headwoman, Mere, Kajokeji County, 18 September 2014.
258 Interview with chief, Mere, Kajokeji County, 16 September 2014. 
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the land between uncles and nephews.259 Similarly in Aweil East County, 
chiefs settle some conflicts by dividing contested fields between the 
parties. Chiefs also verify claims by checking for evidence of long-term 
rights, such as field boundary markers, graves, walls or mango trees.260 
When individuals claim fallow fields or abandoned homesteads, the 
individuals who cleared the field and constructed a house may bring a 
claim even after having left the location for decades.261 Usufruct rights 
therefore endure even during the absence of the respective land claimants. 
Others would argue, however, that land rights have to be maintained by 
using and developing the land, a principle that is invoked in particular in 
Kajokeji County to justify the oft-criticized allocation of urban plot titles 
to more than one purchaser. As the county paramount chief explains:
Now things are changing. Now there is money. People want 
to sell land. There are so many challenges. If a plot is given to 
one person ... then another comes and says it is their plot. We 
advise them, ‘Someone can acquire a plot and have paper only 
but they are doing nothing with it. So if another one comes 
with money, we say to the first one, we are giving this plot to 
259 Interviews with chief, Mere, Kajokeji County, 16 September 2014; and county chiefs’ 
court members, Mere, Kajokeji County, 17 September 2014. 
260 Interviews with state official, Aweil Town, 8 August 2014; state government staff, 
Aweil Town, 8 August 2014; county staff, Mabil, Aweil East County, 13 August 2014; two 
chiefs, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 13 August 2014 (Dinka); community member, area 
inhabited by returnees, Aweil East County, 14 August 2014; community leader, Warawar, 
Aweil East County, 14 August 2014; community member, Mangartong, Aweil East 
County, 15 August 2014; landowner, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 19 August 2014; chief, 
Mangartong, Aweil East County, 20 August 2014; senior chief, Mabil, Aweil East County, 
21 August 2014; chief, Mabil, Aweil East County, 26 August 2014; and former chief, 
Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 27 August 2014.
261 Interviews with CBO staff, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 13 August 2014; CBO staff, 
Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 14 August 2014; chief, Mangartong, Aweil East County,  
20 August 2014; chief court members, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 21 August 2014; chief, 
Mabil, Aweil East County, 26 August 2014; and chief, Wanyjok, Aweil East County,  
26 August 2014.
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this one who can develop it and we will find another one for 
you.’262
People who use all their resources in purchasing a plot of land therefore 
face problems if they fail to start building on it within a year or two of 
obtaining the land. 
Yet the converse of this principle is that developing the land can also 
be a major spark for disputes. The more virulent and serious disputes 
over claims to land usually come up when there is some form of devel-
opment, construction or other commercial or government activity on 
a piece of land. One dispute in Kajokeji County between nephews and 
uncles erupted when the nephew brought a tractor to plough land that 
had been originally given to his father by his maternal grandfather, whose 
own descendants are now trying to reclaim the land. The use of tractors is 
often a trigger for land disputes because it stimulates the perception that 
the land is a source of value and income, and because it is a particularly 
visible demonstration of using investment and development to stake a 
claim to land in a way that might exclude other users. 
Similarly, the land dispute files in the Moyo District and Lefori 
sub-county record offices were full of claims and complaints over the 
sites of government buildings, market centres and so on. This respondent 
reinforces the point:
In the village setting where I stay, there is not much problem 
or issue over land, unless people find minerals or forestry 
resources, like gold, which is marketable. Then there may be 
conflicts over who owns the land. … Things are changing now. 
Development was not there [before] and people didn’t care 
about land. Now if a place is identified to be developed into a 
262 Interview with chief, Mere, Kajokeji County, 16 September 2014. There is a long 
history to such rules. The Condominium government’s 1899 town land ordinances 
required owners of urban plots to construct a building on them within two years of 
registration. Steven Serels, ‘Political landscaping: land registration, the definition 
of ownership and the evolution of colonial objectives in the Anglo–Egyptian Sudan, 
1899–1924’ African Economic History 35 (2007), 61–62.
118 dividinG CoMMunities
small town or centre, people come up saying it is their land. 
They want to sell it.263
Increasing investment in commercial agricultural production is also a 
cause of dispute not only in Aweil East County but throughout the entire 
former state of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal. Individuals and farmer groups 
rent arable land to invest in agricultural production. At times, interna-
tional NGOs also organize community members and support them to 
cultivate and sell agricultural products. Individual farmers and groups 
of farmers can approach the chiefs of the respective areas to arrange to 
rent land but such arrangements frequently lead to disputes, particularly 
if the original occupants of the land were absent and not consulted.264
In Moyo District, the land rights of non-clan members are seen to 
have been strengthened by the 1998 Land Act of Uganda. Its provisions 
for the greater security of rent-paying tenants on freehold and mailo land 
have been misinterpreted to apply to customary land and are believed to 
transform ‘bona fide occupants’ of land into landowners.265 Unsurpris-
ingly, this has caused controversy and opposition from clan leaders and 
members:
The government said in the [1998] Land Act that if you had 
been there for 12 years, the land belongs to you. If it is less 
than 12 years, the owner can evict but he must compensate for 
any building or other development on it. That brought many 
disputes. Somebody who settled but the land is not his, now 
it becomes his land. We in the north think the government is 
doing this because they don’t have enough land, so they want 
to grab our land. We know very well that the land may have 
263 Interview with county councillor, Wudu, Kajokeji County, 20 September 2014.
264 Interviews with two state officials, Aweil Town, 11 August 2014; county local 
government staff member, Wanyjok, Aweil East, 14 August 2014; two teachers, 
Mangartong, Aweil East County, 15 August 2014; NGO staff, Aweil Town, 16 August 2014; 
local government official, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 19 August 2014; and chief court 
members, Mangartong, Aweil East County, 20 August 2014.
265 See also Hopwood and Atkinson, ‘Final Report’, 12.
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been given to someone by our father or grandfather but it is not 
his. They are squatters.266
Use of the terms ‘bona fide occupants’ and ‘squatters’ has been adopted 
from other very different contexts of land governance in southern 
Uganda and beyond. It is, however, now being applied to debates over 
the relationship of different land rights in local customary law, including 
in northern Uganda. The interpretations of the 1998 Land Act have 
generated particular concern by appearing to recognize the land rights 
of non-clan members:
What we are not happy about is the government Act which 
says that if someone has stayed for 12 years, that place becomes 
theirs. Only this president has done this. Museveni is giving 
away the land of the people. How can someone take your land 
that you were born in? Your parents and grandparents were 
born there! Our problem is that we don’t keep records but I 
know eight generations. Those who came from outside the clan 
and now claim land. They are the ones now selling the land.267
Clan leaders and landlords have therefore been seeking to assert their 
authority over land, often by promoting recourse to rituals and cursing 
to evoke fears of spiritual sanctions against those who wrongfully claim 
or sell land: ‘The landlord can get a ram and the seller brings a ram and 
they slaughter to see who is the real owner, and the land will eat you up 
[i.e. bring harm to the wrongful claimant].’ 268 ‘It is taboo to claim other 
people’s land or fight over it. It can bring a curse.’269 Landlords try to 
insist that their permission must be sought before anyone can sell the 
land they occupy or use by inherited usufruct rights:
266 Interview with area land committee chairperson, Moyo District, 15 October 2014.
267 Interview with clan elder, Moyo Town, 14 September 2014. Also indicated by 
interview with customary chief, landlords and elders, Moyo Town, 11 October 2014. 
268 Interview with clan landlord, Moyo Town, 11 October 2014. 
269 Interview with MP from Kajokeji, Juba, 7 September 2014.
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Here land is communal and the landlord is in charge and the 
chief oversees it. Land is apportioned. So if you are desperate 
and need money for school fees or hospital, you can go to [the] 
landlord to request permission to sell land. The elders assess 
and if it is genuine they will accept and inform the chief. But if 
you want to sell just to booze in town, they will not allow!270
Why asking who owns the land may be the wrong 
question
The spiritual consequences of transgressing land laws and moral codes 
have been, and often remain, an important sanction and means of 
enforcing systems of rights and obligations. These consequences have 
served both to construct and maintain the authority of senior lineage or 
clan elders and to enable ordinary people to access the land they need 
for cultivation, settlement, grazing and exploitation of natural resources. 
These systems have been structured around obligations as much as rights: 
The obligation of men to provide land for their wives and children; the 
obligation of maternal uncles to support their nephews; the obligation of 
a deceased man’s relatives to provide for his widow(s) and children; the 
obligation of hunters or farmers to give a portion of their hunt or harvest 
to the primary land authorities; the reciprocal obligation of  sections to 
share their grazing and water resources with other sections, and so on. 
The failure to meet such obligations may not only cause rifts and fights 
but might also bring dishonour, shame or even harmful spiritual conse-
quences upon individuals, families and communities. Funerals are often 
an occasion for senior relatives to debate the cause of death and identify 
past transgressions that might have brought illness or misfortune upon 
the deceased. Such internal governance has been as or more important 
in regulating and enforcing land rights as the more formal institutions 
for dispute resolution, such as chiefs’ courts.
270 Interview with clan landlord, Moyo Town, 11 October 2014. 
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Customary land claims and obligations are subject to negotiation and 
interpretation, as well as to the influence of more powerful members of 
families and communities.271 This is reflected in any differentiation of 
primary and secondary rights. Those who can assert primary land rights 
and uphold these through spiritual sanctions are also likely to wield 
political authority in the community, and vice versa, whereby those with 
political authority are more likely to be able to assert a dominant version 
of history that privileges their ancestors as first-comers.
These historical narratives and the customary land tenure systems 
that they support are therefore continually in flux. They shift according 
to political and social change within communities and the changing 
wider context of resource governance, settlement and migration 
patterns, economic opportunities and state governments. This is 
particularly apparent in the past decade but it has always been the 
case. Customary legal and tenure systems should not be imagined as 
pristine, unchanging codes but as the continual reflection of changing 
and evolving circumstances.
In reality, there are multiple rights vested in any one piece of land, 
with subtle or disputed gradations of customary recognition according 
to their longevity or the social standing and strength of the occupants 
or users. The result is that if a particular field or homestead is pointed 
out in order to ask ‘who owns this land?’ the answer will be various 
people. Most immediately, an individual woman is likely to be exercising 
usufruct rights to live on and cultivate that land with her children. She 
would have been granted that right by her husband when she married or 
when they moved to that site. He, in turn, might have been granted his 
rights to the land by his father, brother or other male relative and often 
because the land was previously used and occupied by his own mother. 
Alternatively, he might have obtained rights to the land from his 
mother’s father or brother—perhaps because his own father had died 
or was not providing for the family. He might also have negotiated with 
friends, neighbours or clan or section land authorities to use a piece of 
271 See also Hopwood, ‘Women’s land claims’.
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land on a temporary basis. In such cases, those who granted him this 
usufruct right could in theory demand the land back, though this is 
unlikely to happen unless they ran out of land for their own needs or 
there was some breach of relations with the occupants. If any dispute 
developed over the land and its boundaries or if the occupants all died 
or newcomers wanted to settle on it, then the underlying rights of the 
first-comer clan or section and its senior family might be invoked to 
exercise authority over the piece of land. 
Asking to whom a particular grazing or forest area belongs likewise 
yields an answer that involves many different people—from the clan or 
section claiming primary rights to graze, hunt or otherwise exploit the 
land to members of other communities recognized as having secondary 
rights to access the land and resources. The transhumant, seasonal or 
occasional use of land for grazing and watering livestock or for hunting, 
fishing, gathering or logging raises a particularly complex set of questions 
over rights and therefore often exemplifies the extent of negotiation—
and sometimes conflict—over secondary land rights.272 The whole system 
of grazing and natural resource exploitation relies upon there not being 
exclusive rights of ownership over pasture, water, forests and wild 
resources. Instead, this system depends on the continual negotiation, 
recognition and legitimization of multiple layers of land rights. In other 
words, land rights and conflict prevention rely not on securing exclusive 
property rights but on the effective functioning of mechanisms for the 
negotiation and recognition of multiple layers of rights, and for dispute 
resolution.
Land, power and exclusion
It is clear that the local land governance mechanisms and laws operating 
in Aweil East County, Kajokeji County and Moyo District are working to 
resolve many disputes, particularly within families and clans. They also 
uphold some of the principles of customary land rights and obligations, 
272 Douglas H. Johnson, ‘Why Abyei matters: the breaking point of Sudan’s 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement?’, African Affairs 107/426 (2008), 1–19.
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as well as partially integrate national policies into their procedures. Given 
the growing pressures and conflicts over land, local governments and 
customary leaders play an important role in mediating and mitigating 
tensions and disputes. At the same time, the combination of this growing 
pressure and the enhanced recognition given to customary landlords and 
chiefs by local governments does seem to be favouring the primary land 
rights of patrilineal descent groups at the expense of the maternal kin 
and migrants who had also been able to acquire usufruct land rights in 
the past.
Many of these local authorities, at least in some contexts, have a 
vested interest in emphasizing the primacy of patrilineal clan or lineage 
descent, seniority and hereditary spiritual and political authority in land 
governance. Others, or in other contexts, have an interest in asserting 
the primacy of state control over land or promoting privatization and 
commercial exploitation of land. These competing interests contribute 
to some of the uncertainties and contingencies of local land governance. 
On the one hand, this often makes it confusing and difficult for ordinary 
people to navigate their land rights. On the other, the struggles and 
compromises between competing interests perhaps result in a more 
balanced overall outcome, which lies somewhere between one extreme of 
patrilineal and patriarchal exclusivity and the other extreme of compre-
hensive privatization of land rights. Importantly, however, this also 
leaves room for exploitation by the more powerful and influential at 
the potential expense of poorer, marginalized and less well-connected 
people.
The political contingencies of land rights
The political contingencies of land rights are particularly apparent in 
the case of displaced populations and returnees in South Sudan. In 
some contexts, people displaced during the 1983–2005 civil war who 
have resettled in parts of the Equatoria region in the south are seen to 
be better connected to high-level military and government powers than 
the patrilineal clan authorities of the host communities. In such cases, 
the settlers may be able to assert land rights on the basis of national 
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citizenship rights or their part in the liberation struggle. In general, 
military and government positions are seen to trump even the most 
authoritative local land governance structures. 
This also appears to be the case in northern South Sudan. In Aweil 
East County, for example, a member of the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army (SPLA) arrived in a village before harvest time and told a relative 
to move from his garden. According to established practices, individuals 
who are asked to leave a garden can wait until after the harvest to avoid 
losing their crops, along with their land. As this respondent recounts:
But they [leaders] could not do anything because of his status 
as an army member. … The complainer does not follow the 
law. He can shoot you. It is his personality. … They tried to 
talk. But he came with all his things and put them there with 
his bodyguard. [Laughing]. They feared him. They could not 
do anything. The bodyguard is still there. The other person 
is now resettled. … Liberators [i.e. SPLA soldiers] can reside 
anywhere. Nobody can ask them questions.273
In other cases, less well-connected migrants may find themselves vulner-
able to exclusion and discrimination. In Moyo District, a former district 
land board chairman emphasizes that the first question to ask in any 
dispute over land is ‘what tribe are you?’ An LC 1 chairwoman similarly 
explains:
The Uganda Land Commission owns the land and mandated 
town councils to rule the land, until the 1995 constitution 
said that land belongs to the people. Now even somebody 
who is not a landowner or even a Ma’di claims that it is their 
land. But if you are a different tribe, you are a squatter. This 
village has Lugbara and Kuku, as well as Ma’di, and they 
are very problematic. They don’t understand. Some of their 
grandparents came during colonialism and my grandfather gave 
273 Interview with a trader, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 19 August 2014. Also indicated 
by interview with community member, Mangartong, Aweil East County, 15 August 2014.
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them small land but they extended, digging. Then the town 
council allocated plots and some had many.274
In Aweil Town, too, those who originate from other states have the 
perception that they face specific challenges to get a plot through an 
official application: ‘I believe that I cannot successfully apply but have to 
buy a plot. It is a bit more difficult to get land without connections.’275 In 
areas where migrants had previously been welcomed to help expand and 
grow small populations, such as in Lefori sub-county in Moyo District, 
landlords and other authorities have declared new, more restrictive 
policies for allocating land to newcomers:
The need for land has increased and many people come asking 
for land. We don’t sell land. But from now on my policy is 
changing. If someone wants agricultural land, he will have 
to sign a paper to use the land for five years and then renew. 
Because we learned a lesson. Some have stayed on land and 
now they or their children claim that they own the land. But 
there may not be enough land for our own children soon.276
The local government in Moyo District reported an increase in the 
practice of denying the secondary rights that have been so crucial in 
customary land systems:
Now even if there is a good grazing area, the landlord may 
refuse to let animals there. … There are people without land 
but the customary leaders will not let them farm, so that’s why 
you still see bush areas. The indigenous all have land. Those 
who don’t are those from outside.277
274 Interview with village council chair, Moyo Town, 12 October 2014.
275 Interview with NGO staff, Aweil Town, 9 August 2014.
276 Interview with customary chief and clan landlords, Lefori, Moyo District, 15 October 
2014.
277 Interview with area land committee chairperson, Moyo District, 15 October 2014.
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Returnees in Aweil East County and Aweil Town have faced particular 
challenges to obtain secure land rights, despite having the same ethnic 
origins as the wider population. Since 2010, thousands of returnees from 
Sudan have arrived in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal.278 Many returnees were 
brought by government authorities to transit settlements in Aweil East 
County and Apada, which is close to Aweil Town. The Government of 
Southern Sudan and later the Government of the Republic of South 
Sudan saw this as a temporary solution and expected them to return 
to their home villages. Yet many of the returnees were born in Sudan 
and had little desire or capacity to move to a rural life. Instead they 
have remained in the transit settlements on a long-term basis. Even 
though plots have been provided by the government, land rights in these 
transit settlements are insecure. The land is not demarcated, surveyed or 
registered. Returnees can use the land but do not have a title deed and 
therefore believe that they cannot sell their plot.279 
In Apada and Aweil East County, returnees have been challenged and 
even evicted by people claiming to be the original landowners—that is, 
to have primary rights to the land.280 Returnees have complained that 
such cases have not been heard fairly by the chiefs’ courts: ‘When cases 
of host communities go to the alama thiith [executive chief], the chief 
supports the host community and not the returnee. As a consequence, 
things can happen, such as the fact that somebody is sent away without 
278 For example, see: World Health Organization, ‘Southern Sudan: Health Cluster 
preparedness for returnees to Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal’, January 2011. Accessed 6 April 
2016, http://www.who.int/hac/crises/sdn/highlights/2_january2011/en/; Abraham 
Agoth, ‘Trains Carrying Over 2,000 Returnees Arrive In NBGS’, Gurtong Trust–Peace 
and Media Project, 19 March 2012. Accessed 6 April 2016, http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/
Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/6651/Trains-Carrying-Over-2000-
Returnees-Arrive-In-NBGS.aspx; Abraham Agoth, ‘South Sudanese Returnees Arrive 
In Aweil’, Gurtong Trust–Peace and Media Project, 13 November 2013. Accessed 6 April 
2016, http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/
articleId/13747/categoryId/9/South-Sudanese-Returnees-Arrive-In-Aweil.aspx.
279 Interview with local government staff, Aweil Town, 23 August 2014.
280 Interviews with returnee, Aweil Town, 9 August 2014; CBO staff, Wanyjok, Aweil 
East County, 13 August 2014; community member, returnee area, Aweil East County,  
14 August 2014; and NGO staff, Aweil Town, 16 August 2014.
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receiving compensation.’281 In Apada and other returnee settlements, 
returnees only have residential plots and not enough land for cultivation. 
In theory, they can rent arable land beyond the settlement but in practice 
most returnees cannot afford the rental costs.282 They also cannot easily 
access land for cultivation on a customary usufruct basis because they 
have remained in the transit settlements under their own authorities 
rather than integrating into the sectional chiefdoms and lineages that 
govern the surrounding rural land.
Women and land rights
Other urban dwellers can experience a similar combination of monetary 
poverty and insecure land rights.283 This can likewise be a problem for 
some widowed, divorced and unmarried women. In principle, women 
are entitled to usufruct land rights, secured by their father and family 
before marriage, and by their husband and his family during marriage 
and widowhood. Rights over a particular piece of land are seen to be 
inherited exclusively by men, since women leave their own lineages 
and clans when they marry. In order to maintain the integrity of family 
and clan territories, an important principle is that women do not take 
their father’s land away from the family and clan upon marriage. This 
respondent elaborates:
The issue of women and land came up since 2005. Before 
women were not allowed to have a plot because women are 
not permanent and are not living in a particular community 
281 Interview with NGO staff, Aweil Town, 16 August 2014.
282 Interviews with returnee, Aweil Town, 9 August 2014; CBO staff, Wanyjok, Aweil 
East County, 13 August 2014; community member, area inhabited by returnees, Aweil 
East County, 14 August 2014; several community leaders, returnee area, Aweil East 
County, 14 August 2014 (Dinka); community member, returnee area, Aweil East County, 
14 August 2014; NGO staff, Aweil Town, 16 August 2014; and elder, Wanyjok, Aweil East 
County, 19 August 2014 (Dinka).
283 Also see: Timm Sureau, ‘New forms of exclusion in Torit: contestation over urban 
land’, in Forging two nations: insights on Sudan and South Sudan, 143–159, ed. Elke Grawert, 
Addis Ababa: Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa, 
2014.
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for long. Daughters only stay temporarily with their parents. 
A wife may not stay always. There may be a divorce. Before 
there was a saying ‘Tik acin akeu’—a wife has no boundaries. The 
positive aspect of this is that women can mediate in conflicts, 
can cross territorial boundaries and ownership.284
An equally important principle has also always been recognized: Women 
have usufruct rights to land because they are the primary cultivators 
and providers for their children. It is vital to understand that the lack of 
property rights over land for women does not obviate their recognized 
right to access land; and that no one, including men, exercises exclusive 
property rights over land, in any case.285 Each married woman living in 
a rural area has a homestead and a garden where she can cultivate, and 
where she has the right to remain with her children if she is widowed.286 
Her sons later inherit that land and other property. The resources of the 
deceased husband should allow his wife and her children ‘to continue 
to live a good life’.287
There are, however, grey areas that can increase women’s vulner-
ability in some situations. The right of widows to remain on their land 
is predicated to some extent on having sons to inherit that land; widows 
without children or with only daughters can find themselves in a more 
insecure position, as these young men and women in Kajokeji indicate: 
284 Interview with NGO staff, Aweil Town, 16 August 2014.
285 Also see: Hopwood and Atkinson, ‘Final Report’, 13–14; Hopwood, ‘Women’s land 
claims’, 389.
286 Interviews with NGO staff, Aweil Town, 9 August 2014; state government staff, Aweil 
Town, 11 August 2014; returnee, Mangartong, Aweil East County, 15 August 2014; elder, 
Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 19 August 2014 (Dinka); restaurant owner, Wanyjok, Aweil 
East County, 19 August 2014; chief court members, Mangartong, Aweil East County,  
20 August 2014; three women, Mangartong, Aweil East County, 20 August 2014 (Dinka); 
tea room owner, Mangartong, Aweil East County, 20 August 2014; two state government 
staff, Aweil Town, 24 August 2014; and widow, Malualkon, Aweil East County, 27 August 
2014.
287 Interview with three women, Mangartong, Aweil East County, 20 August 2014 
(Dinka).
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My sister was recently widowed. Her husband was staying on 
his [maternal] uncle’s land, so after he died the uncles chased 
her [away]. She tried to go to her husband’s own area but his 
father had two wives, so they didn’t want her there either. 
It’s difficult if you only have girls [daughters] because boys 
inherit the land. There can also be conflicts if someone married 
two wives. And problems can come if you stayed in your uncles’ 
place for long and then you are chased [off the land]. If the man 
is not there, it can be difficult for the woman.288
One young widow in Kajokeji described her own struggles to remain 
on her husband’s land with her daughters—despite having the support 
of her father-in-law—because the land had become subject to a contest 
between rival claimants to be the clan landlord of the area.289 Widows 
can be among the most vulnerable when their land rights are threatened. 
If they lack support from relatives and in-laws or the financial means to 
go to higher authorities, widows may be unable to effectively claim their 
rights. Much depends on their individual status and relations, as one 
young man from Kajokeji County explains:
Traditionally people treat you according to your behaviour. 
If you are well behaved, you are OK but if you are badly 
behaved you can be ignored and that is the worst thing for 
us. Widows who speak well earn a lot of rights in the clan [of 
their husband]. But no automatic rights are given to them. It 
depends on their behaviour.290
The situation of women who leave, or are left by, their husband is even 
more uncertain. In rural areas of Aweil East County, divorced women 
also do not have any rights to claim land of their former husbands. It 
is assumed that divorced women will marry again and can access land 
288 Interview with young male research assistant in discussion with male and female 
youth leaders, Wudu, Kajokeji County, 28 September 2014.
289 Interview with female youth leader, Wudu, Kajokeji County, 28 September 2014.
290 Interview with CBO staff from Kajokeji, Juba, 22 July 2015. 
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through their new husbands or that they will return to their parents.291 
Asked what happens with unmarried or divorced women, one respon-
dent notes, ‘That woman will roam around everywhere and will move to 
town where women who are without husbands stay.’292
In Kajokeji County, respondents suggested that fathers or brothers 
would give land to a daughter or sister who needed it but emphasized 
that her children would not be entitled to inherit that land. In Moyo 
District, respondents put greater emphasis on women’s right to access 
land from their father’s family in case of divorce or widowhood but added 
a similar proviso about the lack of inheritance rights for their children. 
This respondent elaborates:
If I have four sons and two daughters, the brothers have to keep 
some of my land for their sisters. In case she has problem there 
[where she married], the brothers should give her land. If I 
have all daughters and they marry somewhere, if I die they can 
come back to claim the land. Women have land at their father’s, 
not at their husband’s. … If my daughter is married to another 
clan and comes back with her children, she can be given land. 
But the children cannot have land there because their land is at 
their father’s. The land is only for my daughter.293
Some women respondents do not see access to land as a major problem, 
however. A female district councillor in Moyo District says, ‘Women 
come to my office for other problems like child neglect but not for land 
issues. Women are not so worried about land so long as they can get some 
to use.’294 Similarly, a state government employee working on gender 
issues explains, ‘Women face problems in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal. Land 
291 Interviews with three women, Mangartong, Aweil East County, 20 August 2014 
(Dinka); and two state government staff, Aweil Town, 24 August 2014.
292 Interview with woman in a tea room with two friends, Mangartong, Aweil East 
County, 20 August 2014 (Dinka). 
293 Interview with area land committee chairperson, Moyo District, 15 October 2014.
294 Interview with district councillor, Moyo District, 14 October 2014.
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is not the main problem. It is rather violence, education, power-sharing 
and so on.’295
Women are also investing in urban plots. In Aweil East County, for 
example, a number of women are the owners of commercial plots, shops, 
restaurants and farms.296 Asked about the importance of owning surveyed 
plots, a female landowner notes, ‘I can make them as my home. If I have 
the resources for building, I can make a concrete building and rent it 
to organizations. … That can bring income, which I can use for other 
things and also to create other activities that can let the community have 
benefits.’297 Another female respondent from Kajokeji County explains, 
‘I have my own plot in Mere, a residential one. I paid SSP 600 (about 
USD 130) for it, between the landlord, housing and surveyor. I have all 
the documents. It was done legally. And I have land where I am married 
at Kenyiba. That is mine. No one can cultivate there.’298
However, the hybrid local land governance mechanisms can be inher-
ently discriminatory even in the case of private land purchases. Women 
in Kajokeji County, for example, explain that it is difficult for a woman 
to get plots of land registered in her own name without her husband’s 
formal consent or if she is unmarried.299 There are ways around this 
obstacle, however, as this female respondent says:  
I own a plot in Mere. You go to the traditional landlord and 
get a receipt and then you go to the [county] department of 
physical infrastructure and then a copy is sent to the judiciary 
295 Interviews with two state government staff, Aweil Town, 24 August 2014.
296 Interviews with county staff, Mabil, Aweil East County, 13 August 2014; CBO staff, 
Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 13 August 2014; community member, Mangartong, Aweil 
East County, 15 August 2014; NGO staff, Aweil Town, 16 August 2014; and restaurant 
owner, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 19 August 2014.
297 Interview with widow, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 26 August 2014 (Dinka). Also 
indicated by interview with local government staff, Mabil, Aweil East County, 27 August 
2014.
298 Interview with county government employee, Mere, Kajokeji County, 18 September 
2014.
299 Interview with county government employee, Mere, Kajokeji County, 18 September 
2014.
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and to the payam. Some landlords here will not give to women 
on their own but some will give. You just need to come with a 
witness. I also got a plot in Leikor through the landlords, in the 
traditional way, not through the government.300
Some husbands in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal also refuse to register 
surveyed plots under the name of their wives.301
Women without independent income are particularly reliant on 
appealing to social obligation rather than asserting their rights to land, 
as this LC 1 chairwoman in Moyo District asserts: ‘Women can get land 
if they have money. … If you have no money, you go on knees to your 
uncles, your mother’s brothers and they will sympathize with you.’302 As 
this statement underscores, social and kinship relations and obligations 
continue to structure access to land in practice, together with access to 
financial resources. 
While gender can be a factor in determining the strength of land 
rights, it must be understood alongside these other, often more 
significant factors. Access to land depends first and foremost on social 
relations. Conversely, those who lack strong kinship and social relations 
are the most vulnerable in South Sudanese and northern Ugandan 
society, including in terms of their capacity to access land.303 In this 
sense, customary land systems have been a powerful force for cohesion, 
friendliness and mutuality among clan members, relatives, neighbours 
and in-laws, and for the integration and assimilation of maternal kin 
and non-kin into patrilineal descent groups. Amicable relations are not 
guaranteed, however. Competition for land can strain those relations. 
300 Interview with male and female youth leaders, Wudu, Kajokeji County, 28 September 
2014.
301 Interview with local government staff, Mabil, Aweil East County, 27 August 2014.
302 Interview with village council chair, Moyo Town, 12 October 2014.
303 Simon Harragin and Chol Changath Chol, ‘The Southern Sudan vulnerability study’, 
Nairobi: Save the Children Fund (UK), South Sudan Programme, 1998.
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The contradictions of surveying land
Surveying and leasing land provides new opportunities for both men and 
women to acquire land as their own property on a leasehold basis. Some 
businesswomen and female wage earners are seizing the opportunity 
to acquire and register their own land in and around the towns. While 
land may be a new source of property rights for women, only those with 
money can readily access this land. As in other places, land registration 
may remedy gender discrimination for the wealthy but at the expense of 
denying access to land for the poorer majority of both men and women.304
During the past few years, state government officials in Northern 
Bahr el-Ghazal have promoted surveys in new urban areas, arguing that 
they enable greater security of tenure and the provision of more govern-
ment services and infrastructure. In reality, however, many people find 
themselves evicted from land they had previously occupied to make 
way for plot demarcation and road construction, without receiving the 
promised compensation or resettlement. As one respondent explains in 
reference to the newly surveyed town quarter of Maper Akot Arou in 
Aweil Town, ‘People who were living here before and have no money did 
not get land. The land was given to people with money.’305 In Aweil Town, 
surveyed plots are costly: ‘Only people who work for NGOs or those who 
have good government posts can afford to buy land.’306 Individuals who 
are not able to pay the fees are evicted from their plots as a result of the 
survey and have to try to get free land in unsurveyed areas.307 Others stay 
304 For example, see: Birgit Englert and Elizabeth, Daley, eds., Women’s land rights and 
privatisation in Eastern Africa, London: James Currey, 2008; Robert Home and Hilary Lim 
Demystifying the mystery of capital: land tenure and poverty in Africa and the Caribbean, London: 
GlassHouse Press, 2004.
305 Interview with landowner, Maper Akot Arou, Aweil Town, 22 August 2014 (Dinka). 
Also indicated by interviews with NGO staff, Aweil Town, 11 August 2014; group of chief 
court members, Mabil, Aweil East County, 19 August 2014; tea room owner, Mangartong, 
Aweil East County, 20 August 2014; group of chiefs, Maper Akot Arou, Aweil Town,  
23 August 2014; and chief, Wanyjok, Aweil East County, 26 August 2014.
306 Interview with NGO staff, Aweil Town, 11 August 2014.
307 Interview with group of chiefs, Maper Akot Arou, Aweil Town, 23 August 2014.
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with relatives or colleagues who have land. Many families living in Aweil 
Town host relatives and friends.
In Moyo District, land has already been sold to a greater extent than 
in South Sudan, often out of poverty or necessity. Individual families 
or even individual family members are said to have sold land because 
they needed money for some reason: ‘Sometimes people sell land to pay 
school fees or buy a boda-boda [motorbike] or something. So individuals 
can acquire land from clan members. One family can decide to sell their 
land.’308 There are growing concerns about the effect of these land sales: 
‘There are many land disputes because the population increased and 
people are selling farmland. They want to get money. People around the 
town here have sold all their own land because they are poor.’309 This 
conclusion is supported by wider studies of land sales in Uganda, which 
report that the majority were ‘distress sales from economic hardship’.310
There is, then, a real danger that ordinary people who cannot afford to 
purchase land may themselves invest in asserting membership in their 
community in order to secure their own land rights. An obvious way to 
do this is to affirm their patrilineal credentials, while simultaneously 
questioning the identity, descent and rights of other people living on 
community land. Where the idiom of kinship was once used to absorb 
outsiders into lineages and territorial communities, it is now being used 
to differentiate and exclude them
What is evident is that it is not possible to promote a single version 
of land rights as the solution to insecurity or inequality. In one context, 
it might be clear that strengthening patrilineal clan rights would be 
a means of protecting poor and vulnerable clan members from losing 
land to powerful outsiders seeking to alienate land for profit. In another 
context, strengthening patrilineal clan rights might enable the exclusion 
and eviction from their land of poor and vulnerable people labelled as 
outsiders. Registering private land titles might give those who can afford 
308 Interview with senior district government official, Moyo Town, 10 October 2014. 
309 Interview with area land committee chairperson, Moyo District, 15 October 2014.
310 Adoko and Levine, ‘A Land Market’, 17; Hopwood, ‘Women’s land claims’, 406.
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to pay for them greater security of land rights. Even a land title, however, 
is unlikely to fully protect someone from the risk of land alienation by 
more powerful actors. Approaching land rights as a purely legal or statu-
tory question thus ignores the broader political economy to which land 
increasingly belongs and which determines security of land tenure more 
than any legal apparatus. It also risks perpetuating disputes and conflicts 
over land. The complexity of land rights and access to land in both South 
Sudan and northern Uganda strongly suggest that any singular approach 
will be inadequate, as is reflected in the general tendency to hybrid forms 
of land governance and dispute resolution.  
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6. Conclusion 
Since the research for this report was completed in 2014, the decision to 
create 28 new states out of South Sudan’s former 10 states has led to new 
tensions and conflicts over boundaries and land claims in some areas, 
such as Malakal. The civil war in South Sudan, which began in December 
2013, and the worsening economic crisis have also fuelled new displace-
ments and migrations. This may present challenges for land governance 
in relation to hosting the displaced or in terms of future returns.
These features of the recent crisis in South Sudan are by no means 
unprecedented. The challenges of displacement and return are recur-
ring issues in the recent history of South Sudan and northern Uganda. 
New tensions over administrative boundaries and communal land 
claims were already emerging across the region before 2014. Indeed a 
widespread demand for new administrative subdivisions was cited by 
the South Sudanese president to justify the creation of 28 states. It is 
important, then, to situate these new or latent conflicts over territorial 
boundaries not only in the context of the recent civil war and political 
divisions in South Sudan but in the broader recent historical context 
of changing land values and governance in the region. The fact that 
tensions over land claims and boundaries are just as—or more—preva-
lent in northern Uganda indicates the wider changes underlying these 
new concerns, which transcend international boundaries. New percep-
tions of the value of land have emerged from the combined effects of 
urbanization, increasing population densities, commercial agriculture, 
external investments, exploitation of natural resources, infrastructure 
and service development, and changing livelihood strategies. Land has 
simultaneously gained new value as administrative and political territory, 
which political elites seek to control through decentralized government 
structures.
The wide reach of these effects and changing perceptions is apparent 
from a comparison of the different areas on which this report focuses. 
Aweil East County is located hundreds of miles to the north of the South 
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Sudan–Uganda borderlands where Kajokeji County and Moyo District are 
situated. Inhabited predominantly by Dinka Abiem, Aweil East County 
is associated with the wider cattle-keeping societies of northern and 
central South Sudan, and in the past it experienced some of the conflicts 
over grazing territories common among these societies. Kajokeji County 
and Moyo District are characterized instead by a greater emphasis on 
cultivation, a contrast which is often highlighted in contemporary South 
Sudanese political discourse as a distinction between Nilotic pastoralists 
and Equatorian farmers. This contrast is an over-simplified one, however. 
Livestock have also been crucial for livelihoods in Kajokeji and Moyo, 
so that customary land rights there have included shared or secondary 
rights to access territory for grazing, hunting and fishing, as in Aweil 
East County. Similarly, cultivation is also important for the cattle-keepers 
of Aweil East County, where rights to land for farming and permanent 
settlements are held by lineages and extended families in much the same 
way as in Kajokeji County and Moyo District. It is striking that land 
disputes in Aweil East County are largely focused not on grazing terri-
tories but on arable land and urban or peri-urban areas. The perception 
that such land has real or potential commercial value thus seems to be 
the predominant driving factor behind land disputes in all three areas.
There are also considerable similarities in the practices of land gover-
nance across these different areas, despite their contrasting customary 
landholding structures and the different national laws and policies of 
South Sudan and Uganda. In all of these areas, there is uncertainty, 
confusion and sometimes misunderstanding about these national laws 
and policies. This results from the limited capacity or political will on the 
part of central government to disseminate or enforce land laws, as well 
as from the vagueness of those laws. On the one hand, this uncertainty 
provides opportunities for corruption and abuses by powerful actors, 
whether these are national or local elites and whether they are seeking 
to appropriate land for their own interests or to control the lucrative 
processes of local land governance. On the other hand, uncertainty has 
left considerable room for local, hybrid forms of land governance to 
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emerge, which both represent and enable compromises between different 
models of land rights and governance. 
The formal processes of registering land titles provided for by national 
legislation—particularly in Uganda—are simply too costly and protracted 
to be an option for most people in these areas. These processes also repre-
sent a fundamental change in the nature of land rights, from the multiple, 
overlapping sets of claims and obligations that have prevailed in these 
areas, to the more exclusive concept of property rights inherent in land 
titling. What is instead emerging in practice is a mixture or spectrum 
of these different models of land rights. Particularly in urban and peri-
urban areas, land rights are increasingly being privatized, individualized 
and partially commodified through formal or semi-formal practices of 
surveying, purchase and registration. These practices are controlled by 
various arrangements between local government officials and customary 
authorities. In rural areas, land rights are still largely claimed on the 
basis of kinship, marriage and social relations, and governed by lineage, 
clan and section authorities. Even here, however, the changing value of 
land is leading to increasing dispute among and between families and 
neighbours, and to increasingly stark distinctions being asserted between 
dominant and secondary land rights, and between insiders and outsiders. 
It is primarily the local governance structures of chiefs’ courts in 
South Sudan and local councils or their courts in northern Uganda—
as well as specific land governance institutions formed largely by the 
same personnel—that are negotiating solutions to these disputes. Such 
solutions often take the form of compromises between different kinds of 
land claim. They also prioritize the maintenance or restoration of social 
and familial relations. 
Contemporary land governance in practice therefore cannot be divided 
into distinct customary laws and statutory laws but entails an evolving 
and largely flexible negotiation of different kinds of land claims and the 
different legal and moral discourses that disputants draw upon to stake 
these claims. The uncertainties of the legal and institutional land regimes 
in South Sudan and Uganda leave room for corruption and control by 
more powerful actors and institutions. At the same time, they also leave 
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room for the negotiation of compromises that continue to recognize 
multiple rights and obligations. This not only secures people’s access 
to land but has held together territorial communities, enabled them 
to absorb relatives and outsiders, and maintain peaceful relations with 
neighbouring communities. In the latest contexts of economic hardship, 
insecurity and conflict, this capacity is more important than ever. It is, 
however, crucial to recognize the unprecedented strain on such principles 
presented by the increasing trends towards exclusionary definitions of 
land rights and community belonging, which have been encouraged 
by local, national and international political discourse in recent years. 
This strain reached breaking-point in the 2014 conflict between Kajokeji 
County and Moyo District over the international boundary, revealing the 
broader potential for violent conflict over land and territorial boundaries 
even in areas where land pressure may seem relatively insignificant. Land 
disputes and conflicts are not simply a factor of population increase and 
demographic pressure but of the multiple other factors explored in this 
report.
A number of key insights and observations emerge from the empirical 
evidence and archival materials that inform this report. 
International and internal boundary conflicts have similar causes 
In 2014, violence erupted in the South Sudan–Uganda border region 
between Kajokeji County and Moyo District. One root cause was the 
original colonial attempt to make the border correspond to a tribal 
boundary. This misunderstood the nature of boundaries, identities and 
social relations in the area, leading to a century of uncertainty over the 
precise location of this international boundary. It has, however, only 
recently become a source of conflict. This indicates that there are new 
factors influencing conflict dynamics over land rights and administrative 
boundaries. Similar factors have also caused disputes and conflicts over 
many other boundaries, both internal and international, in South Sudan 
and northern Uganda. 
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Decentralization increases the political value of land, contributing to 
boundary disputes
Territory is becoming the focus of political and ethnic competition. The 
increasingly prevalent boundary conflicts in and between South Sudan 
and northern Uganda do not reflect ancient tribal conflicts. Rather, these 
conflicts are a product of new factors: government decentralization 
combined with the unprecedented value of land and natural resources. 
Control over territory provides access to both local and higher govern-
ment revenues and a political constituency. Internal and international 
boundaries have become more politicized and contested, as neighbouring 
local administrations seek to maximize their territorial and resource 
control. Paradoxically, however, the mitigation of boundary conflicts 
also lies in the systems of decentralized local government that have been 
implemented in both countries since the 1990s.
The value of land is changing and competition for land is increasing
Land has always had productive, moral, social and spiritual value. New 
forms of value ascribed to land have been emerging since the 1990s, 
whereby land has acquired a real or potential commercial and monetary 
value. These new forms of value are the result of overlapping processes 
of population return and urbanization, new population densities, devel-
opment, investment, resource exploitation and land grabbing. These 
processes complement and reinforce the conflict dynamics linked to 
government decentralization processes. Competition for and disputes 
over land now tend to focus on cultivable land, urban and peri-urban 
plots, and new development sites. This marks a significant shift. 
Historically, contests over land were more often about grazing lands in 
cattle-keeping areas. 
Service delivery and settlement patterns shape demand for and  
conflict over land 
It is often assumed that relatively low population densities in South 
Sudan and northern Uganda mean land remains plentiful and under-
used. This is complicated, however, by the realities of varying population 
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densities on the ground. Settlement patterns and service provision, along 
with population growth, have increased the demand for land. People 
want and need to live close to boreholes, medical services, schools, 
government and other employment opportunities, markets and perhaps 
even police posts or army garrisons for security. These concentrations 
of people create growing pressures for what then become increasingly 
limited land resources. In turn, this conditions disputes and conflicts 
over land.
Customary land rights are plural, layered and changing
To ask who owns the land can yield a multiplicity of answers. It becomes 
clear this is not, then, the most constructive way to understand land 
rights in South Sudan and northern Uganda. Customary land rights are 
more complex and nuanced than can be encapsulated in notions of either 
communal ownership or exclusive property rights. In customary law, no 
one exercises exclusive or alienable property rights over land. Any piece 
of land is simultaneously subject to multiple layers of rights—individual 
and collective; permanent, temporary, seasonal or usufruct; patrilineal 
and matrilineal; historical and contemporary. The relationships of these 
multiple rights have always been subject to negotiation and mediation. 
Increasingly, these multiple rights are contested, debated and, at times, 
conflicted. Moreover, customary land rights are not static but dynamic 
and changing.
National land reforms simultaneously recognize, simplify and subordinate 
customary land rights 
The legal rhetoric of community land ownership is an important recogni-
tion of customary land rights. At the same time, statutory law simplifies 
and distorts the nature of customary land rights. In general, it ignores the 
complex relationships of multiple communal and individual land rights. 
In Uganda in particular, statutory law ultimately promotes the conver-
sion of customary rights into more exclusive property rights through 
processes of land title registration. Land reform has, in effect, sought 
to bring customary tenure regimes under greater state control. Some 
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of the legislation itself—or the failure to fully implement it—has also 
underscored the continuing capacity of state institutions and actors to 
appropriate and control land for the purposes of resource extraction, 
commercial enterprise or development.
Customary authority over community land is changing and contested 
Recent policy and practice have given new or enhanced opportunities 
for power and profit to those recognized as customary land authorities, 
even as customary land rights have been increasingly threatened and 
undermined. Patriarchal and gerontocratic customary authorities are 
seeking to reassert their position after decades of war, displacement and 
socio-economic change. It is important to be aware that the community 
is not simply the chiefs or clan leaders who may have become the primary 
brokers in land transactions. 
Definitions of community land rights are becoming more exclusionary
There is a growing sense of the insecurity of land rights, particularly in 
urban and more densely populated areas. In this context, ordinary people 
seeking to secure their land rights must either assert their own member-
ship in patrilineal kinship groups or find the means to purchase and 
register private land titles. Pursuing the former route may contribute to 
more exclusionary definitions of land rights, denying claims to grazing, 
water and other resources and undermining vital reciprocal relations 
between different communities. Pursuing the latter is impossible for 
the vast majority of people in South Sudan and northern Uganda, which 
creates additional dynamics of exclusion. 
Both women and men are vulnerable to changes in land rights 
The denial of women’s property rights, including to land, in customary 
legal systems is a frequent focus of attention. Like those of women, 
however, men’s land rights are equally dependent on their social, kinship 
and marital relations. Contrary to received wisdom, the most vulnerable 
are not all women. Rather, the most vulnerable are those women and 
men who lack strong social and kinship ties and support, and at the same 
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time lack the financial resources to purchase land. As definitions of land 
rights change to be more exclusionary in ethnic and kinship terms, there 
is a new and greater risk that such individuals or families may be denied 
secure access to land for settlement and cultivation.
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7. Policy considerations
The specific geographic areas in South Sudan and northern Uganda 
that form the basis of this report have not previously featured promi-
nently in studies of land issues—perhaps because they have remained 
relatively peaceful. Over the past decade, however, tensions over land and 
boundaries in these areas have been steadily increasing to become more 
widespread. There is a real risk that this has the potential to feed larger-
scale conflicts, just as land was a focus for mobilizing the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) rebellion against the Sudanese 
government in the 1980s and 1990s. This report redresses a critical lack 
of empirical evidence about the practices of land governance at the local 
level. It also closely examines the dynamics of conflict surrounding 
access to and disputes over land and the various mechanisms used to 
resolve these disputes. The policy considerations presented below reflect 
concrete realities on the ground, as these have been conveyed by the 150 
respondents who were interviewed for this report. 
Legislation alone will not secure land rights for the poor and vulnerable
Most of the activity of governments, civil society advocacy and interna-
tional support focuses on producing laws and policies aiming to clarify 
and secure land rights. In general, these efforts have suffered from a lack 
of clarity in the legislation itself, conflicting goals among legislators and 
lack of effective dissemination, capacity or commitment to executing 
laws and policies by national governments. A purely legal approach to 
land rights can neglect the constraints of the broader political economy, 
in which the ability to obtain secure land rights in some contexts depends 
on status, power and wealth. The attempt to recognize customary land 
rights in national legislation has been an important step but this has also 
entailed a simplification and distortion of the complex ways in which 
land claims and obligations have been negotiated in customary regimes, 
and continue to be negotiated in practice by hybrid local land governance 
mechanisms.
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Customary land rights do not equate to exclusive ownership of property 
The legal language of land rights does not capture the complexity of 
customary land tenure and governance practices, which are based on 
multiple, overlapping claims to land. Access to land has been—and often 
continues to be—governed by social, moral and spiritual sanctions and 
obligations more than by the legal recognition of land rights. On the 
one hand, it is important to endow customary land rights with a legal 
status in order to try to safeguard them against land appropriation. On 
the other, there is a danger that the language of legal rights distorts the 
nature of customary land tenure and contributes to more exclusive and 
individualized definitions of property rights and ownership.
Privatizing land rights is unlikely to help the poor and vulnerable to gain 
secure land tenure
A relatively new market in land has emerged, from which landowners, 
brokers and regulatory authorities have been deriving considerable profit 
over the past decade or so. The privatization and commodification of 
land appears to offer more secure tenure for those with the monetary 
income to purchase titles. At the same time, this security can be under-
mined by the illegal actions of powerful actors or the incompetence and 
corruption of land governance institutions—whether state or customary, 
or a mix of both. The privatization and commodification of land is also 
likely to deprive poorer, less privileged people of land that they would 
have formerly accessed through customary systems of land rights and 
usage. The vast majority of people in this region are unable to purchase 
land, making customary access to land even more essential for their 
livelihoods. Privatization threatens to undermine this by enabling the 
wealthier to purchase land from which the poor may be excluded.
Lines are limited as a conflict prevention mechanism 
One approach to resolving boundary conflicts is to formally demarcate 
administrative boundaries. This process itself, however, also generates 
conflict. This is due to the increasing political and economic stakes in 
controlling land and because linear boundaries do not exist in many 
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of the places where people now want to create them. Although there 
is considerable historical documentation on the Kajokeji–Moyo inter-
national boundary between South Sudan and northern Uganda, this 
does not provide any clear solutions to the location of the borderline. 
There is even less historical evidence for most other currently disputed 
boundaries. Not only have these boundaries recently been created but 
previous attempts to demarcate them are vague, inaccurate or unmapped. 
Moreover, in ecological and economic contexts where migration and 
shared or overlapping land rights are vital for people’s livelihoods, 
boundary demarcation creates the potential for new means of exclusion. 
Demarcating boundaries is therefore not simply a technical exercise of 
legally determining and surveying lines, but entails wrestling with the 
very basis upon which those lines are to be defined—whose claims to 
land and territory are to be accepted, and on what forms of evidence and 
what definitions of community. Any process of demarcation requires 
very sensitive handling of these questions to avoid provoking conflict, as 
well as substantial support for negotiating local arrangements for cross-
border relations, movement, land rights and access to shared resources.
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Glossary of acronyms, words  
and phrases 
ALC Area Land Committee (Uganda)
AU African Union
boma village; lowest local government administrative 
unit (South Sudan)
CBO community-based organization
CES Central Equatoria State
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
gog-chel (Dinka) midland
gok (Dinka) highland
LC 1–5 local council; five-tiered system of local 
government (Uganda)
LRA Lord’s Resistance Army
mailo system of freehold land tenure in Uganda, 
introduced as part of the 1900 Buganda 
Agreement, granting ownership in perpetuity 
to landlords and protected rights to tax-
paying tenants; also an area of land (originally 
measured in square miles) allotted under this 
system.
monye kak (Bari) landlord or land custodian
NBG Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State 
NGO non-governmental organization
NRM/A National Resistance Movement/Army
NRO National Records Office, Khartoum, Sudan
payam second lowest administrative division, below 
counties (South Sudan)
RC resistance council; precursor to local councils 
(Uganda)
SPLM/A  Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM-IO Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in 
Opposition
toic (Dinka) seasonally flooded lowland grazing areas
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UKNA The National Archives, Kew, London, UK
UNA Uganda National Archives, Entebbe, Uganda
wut (Dinka) major social political section; cattle 
camp
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